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This thesis presents an empirical study that investigates the radical product innovation 
phenomenon in the New Zealand food and beverage industry. Its major objectives are to 
posit and test determinants of radical product innovation and their relationship in 
explaining product innovativeness, using the New Zealand food and beverage industry as 
the study context. The New Zealand food and beverage industry was chosen because of 
its long history of successful radical product innovation and the importance of that 
industry to the New Zealand economy. 
A conceptual model is proposed, based on the literature and content-validated through 
field interviews with five New Zealand food and beverage companies known to be 
innovative. The conceptual model is then theoretically-tested using quantitative data 
collected from 137 food and beverage companies in New Zealand. The research 
hypotheses were formulated to validate five posited determinants of radical product 
innovation, including their interrelationships in explaining and predicting product 
innovativeness. In addition, the study tests the effect of company characteristics on 
product innovativeness and projects the salient features of a typical highly innovative 
New Zealand food and beverage company. 
The study confirmed the five posited determinants—top management innovation 
capability (TMIC), internal innovation capability (IIC), external networking capability 
(ENC), innovative organisational culture capability (IOCC), and innovative product 
development capability (IPDC)—are causally related to product innovativeness (PI). Of 
the 12 hypotheses that constitute the theory, four were not supported by data, in that the 
direct effects of TMIC on IPDC, IIC on IPDC, and ENC on IPDC were found to be non-
significant (p > 0.05); also, the direct effect of IIC on ENC was found to be negative. The 
reasons for these discrepancies are discussed and the results are interpreted from a 
practical perspective. 
In regard to the effect of company characteristics on PI, younger companies as well as 
larger companies were found to be more innovative than their older and smaller 
counterparts. The effect of foreign ownership was not supported by data, probably due to 
a small sample size of overseas owned companies. The study also shows that a highly 
innovative New Zealand food and beverage company typically scores highly in the scales 
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of the five posited determinants. Young (founded since 2011), and medium to large in 
size (50+ full-time employees) firms also tend to outperform their counterparts in PI.  
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Chapter Overview 
This chapter provides an overview of the research. First, the research background is 
explained in section 1.2. The research aim and research objectives are then outlined in 
section 1.3 and 1.4 respectively. Afterwards, the research questions are discussed in 
section 1.5 and the methodology used to answer them is summarised in section 1.6. 
Finally, the thesis structure explaining each chapter of the thesis is presented in section 
1.7. 
1.2 Research Background 
New Zealand is a small island country located in the Southwest Pacific Ocean. The 
country is relatively isolated from major markets such as Europe, USA, or China. 
However, because of its temperate climate, fertile soil, and long coastline, New Zealand 
has an excellent environment for agricultural and horticultural production. The favourable 
environment, combined with New Zealand expertise and innovative ideas in food and 
beverage production, have allowed New Zealand to become a major global food and 
beverage supplier (Coriolis & MBIE, 2014; Riddet Institute, 2011). New Zealand is the 
world’s largest exporter of dairy products and lamb, and also a major exporter of beef, 
kiwifruit, apples, and seafood (Wilkinson, Morris, & Hall, 2015). 
The food and beverage industry has a major role in the New Zealand economy. The 
industry produces and exports a variety of food and beverage products to all over the 
world. In 2015, the industry accounted for around 46% of New Zealand’s total export 
value (The Treasury, 2016). The industry is defined here as the companies in New 
Zealand that are manufacturing, processing, producing, or wholesaling food and beverage 
products. 
Many successful New Zealand food and beverage companies earn revenue from new 
products. For example, Fonterra, a New Zealand multinational dairy co-operative and 
New Zealand’s largest company, is responsible for 25% of New Zealand’s total export 
earnings (Fonterra, 2018). The company recognises that new and innovative dairy 
products are important for its competitiveness and growth. It has the world’s leading dairy 
Research and Development Centre in Palmerston North, New Zealand. The Centre, 
working together with its overseas sister centres in Melbourne, Amsterdam, Chicago, 
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Shanghai, and Singapore, has developed many world first dairy products such as 
spreadable butter, Anlene™ range of bone nutrition products, functional milk protein 
concentrates, ClearProtein™, and Textured White Base™ ingredients (Fonterra, 2016). 
Furthermore, the company has an “open innovation” policy, which encourages 
contribution from its external partners to develop new products and technologies and has 
active research partnerships with many universities and research facilities around the 
world (Fonterra, 2016). 
Another innovative New Zealand company is Zespri International Limited. Zespri is the 
world’s largest marketer of kiwifruit. This company, like Fonterra, is a co-operative 
owned by local kiwifruit growers. The company also recognises the importance of 
product innovation in meeting changing consumer demands and driving growth. Working 
with local research organisations, the company continues to research and develop new 
varieties of kiwifruit and to improve the current varieties’ taste and resistance to diseases. 
Its most notable product innovation is the Zespri Gold, a variety of golden kiwifruit. 
Launched in 2000, the game-changing golden kiwifruit variety has added nearly $4 
billion to the New Zealand economy (Zespri, 2015). 
The last example of New Zealand companies that focuses on innovation is Silver Fern 
Farms. The company is the leading processor, marketer, and exporter of lamb, beef, and 
venison in New Zealand. It is 50% owned by local sheep, cattle, and deer farmers and the 
other 50% is owned by Shanghai Maling from China. The company recognises the 
importance of product innovation in driving profitability. The company uses its own 
“Plate to Pasture” strategy to develop new products (Silver Fern Farms, 2018, para. 2). 
The strategy allows the company to identify consumer needs and then to develop 
innovative products to meet those needs. This has allowed the company to achieve higher 
returns. Some product innovations from the strategy are the chilled products, branded 
food service range, and value added retail products which added up to 19% of the 
company’s total global sales in 2015 and are important growth drivers for the company 
(Silver Fern Farms, 2018). 
The above examples show that product innovation is essential for the success of these 
companies. Product innovation or the introduction of a new good or service is important 
for company success because it maintains company competitive advantage and generates 
new growth (Cooper, 2011; Lee & Markham, 2016). 
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Product innovation can be classified based on its degree of product innovativeness into 
incremental and radical product innovation (Garcia & Calantone, 2002). Incremental 
product innovation is a new product with a low degree of innovativeness. It represents a 
minor improvement in product performance or change relative to previous products. 
Incremental product innovation as a result of routine innovation is important because it 
allows companies to maintain their competitive advantage through continuous product 
performance improvement (Pisano, 2015). 
On the other hand, radical product innovation applies to new product that involves a high 
degree of innovativeness. It represents a significant improvement in product performance 
or departure from previous products. Development of radical product innovation, like 
incremental product innovation, is important in maintaining competitive advantage 
(Pisano, 2015). However, because of its high degree of innovativeness, it often leads to 
superior product advantage or an entirely new product category (Golder, Shacham, & 
Mitra, 2009; Kleinschmidt & Cooper, 1991; Leifer et al., 2000). Superior product 
advantage is a major factor for product success (Cooper & Kleinschmidt, 1987; McNally, 
Cavusgil, & Calantone, 2010) and the new product category leads to a new growth 
opportunity for the innovating company (Cooper, 2011). Equally important, companies 
that fail to introduce or respond to radical product innovations are often replaced by more 
innovative competitors (Abernathy & Clark, 1985; Foster, 1986; Utterback, 1994). This 
makes radical product innovation important for long term business success and survival. 
This research defines radical product innovation as the introduction of a new product that 
involves a new-to-market core technology and core value proposition. Generally, radical 
product innovation in the food and beverage industry is seen as rare, compared to other 
industries due to relatively low R&D spending, technology intensity, and consumer 
innovativeness (Barrena-Figueroa & Garcia-Lopez-de-Meneses, 2013; Galizzi & 
Venturini, 2008; Lagnevik, Sjoholm, Lareke, & Ostberg, 2003). 
However, the previous examples of New Zealand companies suggest that the New 
Zealand food and beverage industry is different. The industry has demonstrated a history 
of commercially successful radical product innovation as a result of their investment and 
scientific research in agricultural production and product development (Riddet Institute, 
2011). The industry also faces unique New Zealand contextual factors that typically 
inhibit innovation: small firm size, small local market, and large distance from major 
5 
markets (Hong, Oxley, McCann, & Le, 2016; OECD, 2007). Indeed, these radical product 
innovations may help explain New Zealand’s world leading positions in various sectors. 
The overarching research question for this study is: 
What are the determinants of radical product innovation in the New Zealand food 
and beverage industry, and how do they explain product innovativeness? 
Consequently, this research aims to understand the determinants of radical product 
innovation in the New Zealand food and beverage industry. 
1.2.1 The importance and novelty of the study 
The research is important in the following three ways. 
Firstly, this study is the first to investigate the determinants of radical product innovation 
in the New Zealand food and beverage industry. Previous studies on product innovation 
determinants in the industry (in New Zealand) are limited to incremental and moderately 
innovative product innovations (Khan, 2014; Marsh, 2004; West, 1980). No studies have 
been conducted on the determinants of radical product innovation in the New Zealand 
food and beverage industry. As many researchers have suggested, determinants of 
product innovation are dependent upon the degree of product innovativeness (Garcia & 
Calantone, 2002; Holahan, Sullivan, & Markham, 2014; Slater, Mohr, & Sengupta, 
2014). In other words, what determines food product innovation (and how) needs to be 
considered in light of the type of innovation being pursued. Therefore, the previously 
identified determinants of food product innovation in New Zealand may not be applicable 
for radical food product innovation. 
Secondly, New Zealand food and beverage companies can benefit from a greater 
understanding of radical product innovation determinants. The 2012 Product 
Development and Management Association’s (PDMA) comparative performance 
assessment study found that many companies across multiple countries and industries 
struggle with radical product innovation (Markham & Lee, 2013). In addition, New 
Zealand companies face unique innovation challenges due to its geographical isolation 
(particularly long distance from major markets) and small population (4.9 million). Small 
population means a smaller pool of skilled workers competing for comparable jobs, a 
small local market, and limited capital, which when combined with the geographical 
isolation, can make it very difficult for New Zealand companies to pursue product 
6 
innovation, in general (Hong et al., 2016; OECD, 2007). By identifying the determinants, 
New Zealand food and beverage companies can increase their organisational propensity 
to pursue radical product innovation. This will hopefully encourage more radical product 
innovation by New Zealand food and beverage companies. 
Thirdly, New Zealand as a whole can benefit from more radical food and beverage 
product innovation. The New Zealand government has set a goal of tripling New Zealand 
food and beverage exports over the next 15 years (Wilkinson et al., 2015). To achieve 
this, the industry needs to develop new high-value export categories of food and beverage 
products (Coriolis & MBIE, 2014). Anlene™ by Fonterra and Zespri Gold by Zespri are 
examples of radical product innovations that have created new export categories and 
generated significant economic value. Compared to other similar food producing 
countries such as Belgium, Denmark, Italy, and Netherlands, New Zealand still has a 
potential to double its food production (Wilkinson et al., 2015). Currently, the growth of 
the Asian middle class and their increasing demand for processed foods (i.e. foods made 
from a combination of ingredients, rather than one single or predominant ingredient) are 
creating growth opportunities for New Zealand companies with innovative food and 
beverage products (Coriolis & MBIE, 2017). Already, fresh cherries, chocolate bars and 
blocks, breakfast cereal and muesli bars, and other flavoured beverages have been 
identified as high growth food export categories (Coriolis & MBIE, 2018). 
1.3 Research Aim 
As mentioned previously, the aim of this research, is to explain the radical product 
innovation phenomenon in the New Zealand food and beverage industry. It primarily 
investigates determinants of radical product innovation in New Zealand food and 
beverage companies.  
The research does not cover commercial success factors of radical product innovation 
because commercial success factors, specifically of radical product innovation, can be 
highly dependent on market condition, making them outside the scope of this research. 
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1.4 Research Objectives 
The specific research objectives are as follows. 
1. To investigate the determinants of radical product innovation in the New Zealand 
food and beverage industry. 
2. To analyse the relationship between the determinants of radical product 
innovation and product innovativeness. 
3. To identify the company characteristics that affect product innovativeness in the 
New Zealand food and beverage industry. 
4. To identify the salient features of a highly innovative New Zealand food and 
beverage company. 
The general research objectives are as follows. 
1. To contribute new knowledge to product development discipline on the 
determinants of radical product innovation in the New Zealand food and beverage 
industry. 
2. To provide managerial recommendations to the New Zealand food and beverage 
companies on how to encourage more radical product innovation in their 
organisations. 
1.5 Research Questions 
The research questions that stem from the overarching research question are as follows. 
1.5.1 Research question 1 
RQ1 What are the determinants of radical product innovation in the New 
Zealand food and beverage industry? 
This research question is chosen because no previous studies have identified the 
determinants of radical product innovation in the New Zealand food and beverage 
industry. By identifying the determinants, New Zealand food and beverage companies 
can understand radical product innovation, better encouraging radical product innovation 
in their organisations. This is also in response to the calls by Khan (2014) and Marsh 
(2004) for a greater understanding of radical product innovation determinants in the New 
Zealand food and beverage industry. This research question contributes towards 
achieving specific research objectives 1 and 4. 
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1.5.2 Research question 2 
RQ2 How do the identified determinants of radical product innovation relate to 
one another in predicting and explaining product innovativeness? 
Radical product innovations are rare and not many are successful (Leifer et al., 2000; 
Markham & Lee, 2013). This is because radical product innovation is difficult, and 
pioneers face many uncertainties and barriers (O’Connor & Rice, 2013; Sandberg & 
Aarikka-Stenroos, 2014). There have been many studies conducted to identify radical 
product innovation determinants (Chandy & Tellis, 1998; Herrmann, Gassmann, & 
Eisert, 2007; Kyrgidou & Spyropoulou, 2013; Leifer et al., 2000; Slater et al., 2014). 
However, more studies are needed to understand how these determinants are related to 
each other in predicting and explaining product innovativeness (Colombo, Krogh, Rossi-
Lamastra, & Stephan, 2017; Holahan et al., 2014; Slater et al., 2014). Thus, there is a 
need for an empirically tested causal model of radical product innovation, involving its 
determinants (Chang, Chang, Chi, Chen, & Deng, 2012; Slater et al., 2014). The 
development of a causal model of radical product innovation will lead to a better 
understanding of the phenomenon for companies to encourage radical product innovation 
in their organisation. This leads to the second research question which addresses the 
relationship between the identified radical product innovation determinants and how they 
are related to one another in predicting and explaining product innovativeness. This 
research question contributes to achieving specific research objectives 2 and 4. 
1.5.3 Research question 3 
RQ3 What company characteristics affect product innovativeness in the New 
Zealand food and beverage industry? 
Company characteristics have been considered by several researchers when studying the 
determinants of radical product innovation (Abernathy & Utterback, 1978; 
Balasubramanian & Lee, 2008; Chandy & Tellis, 1998; Hayton, George, & Zahra, 2002; 
Hult, Hurley, & Knight, 2004). In New Zealand, companies face unique innovation 
challenges due to small company size, small local market, and long distance from major 
markets caused by the country’s geographical isolation and small population (Hong et al., 
2016). This raises the question: what company characteristics affect product 
innovativeness in the New Zealand food and beverage industry? Subquestions of RQ3 
are to what extent each characteristic affects product innovativeness (if other things 
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remain the same) and if the findings are different from those done for other countries. 
RQ3 contributes to achieving specific research objectives 3 and 4. 
1.5.4 Research question 4 
RQ4 What are the salient features of a highly innovative New Zealand food and 
beverage company? 
Lastly, less innovative New Zealand food and beverage companies can become more 
innovative by emulating the salient features of a highly innovative New Zealand food and 
beverage company. In addition, the answer can assist researchers, consultants, and the 
New Zealand government in identifying innovative New Zealand food and beverage 
companies to promote. This research question contributes to achieving the specific 
research objective 4. 





































1.6 Methodology Overview 
The methodology used to answer the research questions are summarised as follows. 
• To answer research question one (RQ1), the determinants of radical product 
innovation in the New Zealand food and beverage industry were identified 
through a comprehensive literature review in Chapter 2 and in Chapter 3 on model 
development. The identified determinants were content-validated (Chapter 5) 
through qualitative data obtained through semi-structured interviews (detailed in 
Chapter 4), involving managers belonging to five seemingly innovative New 
Zealand food and beverage companies; the theoretical validation of the 
determinants (construct validity) was accomplished subsequently, through data 
obtained from an online quantitative survey. 
• To answer research question two (RQ2), a causal model hypothesising the 
interrelationships between the identified determinants and product innovativeness 
was developed in Chapter 3, based on the extant literature. An online quantitative 
survey was then created using 7-point Likert scale questions in Chapter 4. The 
invitation to participate in the online survey was sent through to 1,144 New 
Zealand food and beverage companies through the contacts mentioned in the New 
Zealand Food & Beverage Directory. In total, 137 usable responses were received, 
and the hypothesised model was tested using the partial least squares path 
modelling (PLSPM) technique in Chapter 6. 
• To answer research question three (RQ3), company characteristics that could 
affect product innovativeness in the New Zealand food and beverage industry 
were identified (based on the literature), along with the causal direction (Chapter 
3). The identified company characteristics were collected via the same survey that 
was used to test RQ2. The hypotheses were tested using the multifactor analysis 
of variance technique (general linear model) and compared with overseas findings 
in Chapter 6. 
• To answer research question four (RQ4), the salient features of highly, 
moderately, and low innovative New Zealand food and beverage companies were 
identified from the answers to the first three research questions; the findings are 
presented and discussed for researchers, consultants, and the New Zealand 
government in Chapter 6. 
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1.7 Thesis Structure 
This thesis is structured into four parts, each containing one or more thesis chapters. The 
thesis chapters are explained in turn. 
Part 1: Research Focus 
Chapter 1 introduces the thesis. It covers the research background leading to the 
research aim, objectives, and questions. 
Chapter 2 conducts a comprehensive review of literature related to the research 
focus: determinants of radical product innovation in the New Zealand food and 
beverage industry. The research focus consists of three sections: Radical Product 
Innovation, which reviews its definitions, advantages, disadvantages, and 
determinants; Food and Beverage Industry, which explores the nature of radical 
product innovation in global and New Zealand food and beverage industries; and 
the New Zealand Context, which explains New Zealand’s economic background 
and its innovation performance, strengths, and weaknesses. The literature review 
is used to justify the research background in Chapter 1 (by identifying the 
knowledge gaps), prepare the model development in Chapter 3, and support the 
discussion in Chapter 6. 
Part 2: Research Design and Method 
Chapter 3 develops three models and hypotheses required to answer the four 
research questions. The first model is the Product Innovativeness Model, which 
is used to define and measure product innovativeness. The second model is the 
Product Innovation Process Model, which is used to identify different stages in 
the product innovation process in order to create the interview structure in Chapter 
4. The third model is the Conceptual Model, which is used to depict and 
hypothesise the interrelationships between identified determinants of radical 
product innovation and product innovativeness. Finally, company characteristics 
that could affect product innovativeness in the New Zealand food and beverage 
industry are identified and the corresponding hypotheses are proposed. 
Chapter 4 explains the research methodology in detail. It starts by outlining 
different research paradigms commonly used in social research. The researcher’s 
pragmatic research paradigm is then described. The pragmatic research paradigm 
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leads to the use of exploratory sequential mixed methods where qualitative 
interviews are conducted first as a preparation for a quantitative survey. 
Qualitative interview design was developed first to help the researcher 
analytically validate the research hypotheses and operationalise some survey 
items. Following this, a quantitative survey design was developed to collect 
quantitative data and test the research hypotheses. Afterwards, generalisation 
considerations of the research are provided. Finally, ethical considerations 
relevant to the conduct of the study are included in this chapter. 
Part 3: Data Analysis and Discussion 
Chapter 5 presents qualitative interviews analysis and discussion. First, it 
provides company overviews from five food and beverage companies in the 
Manawatu-Wanganui region of New Zealand that were interviewed. It then 
provides detailed interview results, analysis, and discussion relevant to the 
research hypotheses. 
Chapter 6 presents quantitative survey analysis and discussion. Data are first 
screened for unusual data entries, common method bias, and non-normal 
distribution. Descriptive statistics on respondents and companies are then 
provided. Afterwards, PLSPM and ANOVA hypothesis test results are analysed 
in detail. Finally, discussion of the survey findings in regard to answering the four 
research questions as well as their managerial implications are included. 
Part 4: Research Outcomes 
Chapter 7 presents the thesis conclusions. It first summarises the research 
outcomes to demonstrate how research objectives were achieved in answering the 
research questions. Knowledge contributions to the product development 
discipline and managerial recommendations to the New Zealand food and 
beverage companies are then provided to achieve the two general research 
objectives. Finally, research limitations and future research recommendations are 
outlined in this chapter. 
Figure 1.2 depicts a structure of the thesis. The arrows represent the thesis flow from 















Figure 1.2: Thesis structure  
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CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Chapter Overview 
This chapter provides a synthesis of literature on the determinants of radical product 
innovation and related subtopics. The New Zealand food and beverage industry (the 
research context) has been taken into account as much as possible. Figure 2.1 depicts the 
research domains relevant to the study as well as the focus of this study, which is the 
overlap area between following three domains: Radical Product Innovation, the Food 
and Beverage Industry, and the New Zealand Context. The three sections are important 
because they are used to justify the research background in Chapter 1 and support the 
model development process covered in Chapter 3. The three domains are reviewed in 
detail in sections 2.2, 2.3, and 2.4 respectively. The knowledge gaps and justification of 











Figure 2.1: Broader domains and research focus 
2.2 Radical Product Innovation 
Radical product innovation is explained in this section. The purpose is to understand how 
radical product innovation can be defined differently and distinctively. Furthermore, its 
advantages, disadvantages, and determinants are explored with examples from literature 















2.2.1 What is product innovation? 
The Oslo Manual (OECD & Statistical Office of the European Communities, 2005) is the 
leading international source of guidelines for collecting and interpreting innovation data. 
The manual defines innovation as “the implementation of a new or significantly improved 
product (good or service), or process, a new marketing method, or a new organisational 
method in business practices, workplace organisation, or external relations” (p. 46). The 
definition distinguishes four types of innovation: product innovation, process innovation, 
marketing innovation, and organisational innovation. 
For this study, the manual’s definition of product innovation is used. The manual defines 
product innovation as “the introduction of a good or service that is new or significantly 
improved with respect to its characteristics or intended uses” (p. 48). Product innovation 
can make use of both new and existing knowledge and technologies. Examples of product 
innovation include changes in a product’s technical specifications, components and 
materials, incorporated software, user friendliness, or other functional characteristics. A 
minimum requirement for a product innovation is that the product must be new or 
significantly improved from products previously produced by the company. 
2.2.2 How are product innovations classified? 
The purpose of product innovation classification is to understand the impact or 
implication of different categories of product innovation on product development practice 
and new product success (Garcia & Calantone, 2002; Henderson & Clark, 1990; Holahan 
et al., 2014; D. A. Norman & Verganti, 2014). Since product innovation means the 
introduction of a new good or service, this definition implies that new products will have 
different degrees of newness relative to previous products. This difference in degree of 
newness leads to different classification of product innovation. 
Below are examples of major product innovation classification based on the following 
categories: degree of product newness, degree of product innovativeness, transformation 
of a company’s competency, disruption, business model and technical competency 
change, and innovation strategy. Their implication and application are also discussed. 
2.2.2.1 Degree of product newness 
The first attempt of a classification is to categorise product innovation based on its degree 
of product newness. Booz, Allen, and Hamilton (1982) conducted a survey of corporate 
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executives and product managers of Fortune 1000 companies in the 1980s and collected 
information on over 13,000 new products introduced over a five-year period. They 
identify six categories of new products in terms of their newness to the company and to 
the marketplace, shown in Figure 2.2, as: new-to-the-world products are new products 
that create entirely new markets, new product lines are new products that allow a 
company to enter an established market for the first time, additions to existing product 
lines are new products that supplement a company’s established product lines, 
improvements in/ revisions to existing products are new products that provide improved 
performance or greater perceived value and replace existing products, repositionings are 
existing products that target new markets or market segments, and cost reductions are 
new products that provide similar performance at lower cost. The percentage share for 
each category of the total new products introduced over the five-year period of the study 












































The classification is useful in understanding a company’s mix of new product 
introduction and their consequences. From their survey, new-to-the-world products and 
new product lines were considered high value and accounted for 60% of the most 
successful new products; but at the same time, they were most risky due to higher 
variability of return (Booz et al., 1982). 
2.2.2.2 Degree of product innovativeness 
Another approach at a classification is to categorise product innovation based on its 
degree of product innovativeness. Product innovativeness is “a measure of the potential 
discontinuity a product (process or service) can generate in the marketing and/or 
technological process” (Garcia & Calantone, 2002, p. 113). 
Incremental and radical product innovation are common categories of product 
innovativeness (Kyriakopoulos, Hughes, & Hughes, 2016; Leifer et al., 2000; Markham 
& Lee, 2013). They represent the opposite ends of a product innovativeness scale. An 
incremental product innovation has a low degree of product innovativeness and is 
associated with minor improvement or continuous evolution in existing technology and 
customer benefit. Radical product innovation has a high degree of product innovativeness 
and is associated with significant improvement or discontinuous change in technology 
and customer benefit. Categories such as “continuous innovation” and “discontinuous 
innovation” also have been used to represent incremental and radical innovation (Brentani 
& Reid, 2012; Veryzer, 1998). 
In addition, some researchers have identified the need for a moderate category to 
represent a middle degree of product innovativeness (between incremental and radical); 
and proposed categories such as “moderate innovativeness” (Kleinschmidt & Cooper, 
1991), “really new” (Garcia & Calantone, 2002), and “more innovative” (Holahan et al., 
2014). Subsequently, incremental, moderate, and radical represent three categories of 
product innovativeness from low, middle, to a high degree.  
The three categories of product innovativeness can have important implications for new 
product success and product development practice. It has been suggested that new 
products with a higher degree of product innovativeness will have superior product 
advantages leading to a higher chance of product success (Calantone, Chan, & Cui, 2006; 
Kock, Gemünden, Salomo, & Schultz, 2011). In addition, managers should adapt their 
product development practice according to their project’s degree of product 
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innovativeness (Cardinal, 2001; Holahan et al., 2014; Slater et al., 2014). For instance, 
companies can leverage their existing technologies and knowledge when developing 
incremental product innovations to increase their chance of success (Kleinschmidt & 
Cooper, 1991). However, with radical product innovation, companies face higher level 
of uncertainties (O’Connor & Rice, 2013) and challenges not faced by incremental 
product innovation such as organisational resistance to change (Chandy & Tellis, 2000), 
new market creation (Aarikka-Stenroos & Lehtimäki, 2014), and pioneer burnout 
(Olleros, 1986). Consequently, companies should implement a higher level of project 
control to increase their chances of success (Cardinal, 2001; Holahan et al., 2014), 
although this approach is not universally accepted (Booz et al., 1982; McDermott & 
O’Connor, 2002). 
2.2.2.3 Transformation of a company’s competency 
Product innovation can also be classified based on its effect on the competency of the 
company. A company that chooses product development as its primary strategy can be 
considered to be competent, to the extent that the company is able to develop new 
products (Holahan et al., 2014; Prahalad & Hamel, 1990). A company can gain a 
competitive advantage by developing and utilising its competency so that it can offer 
products that have better functional performance as valued by its customers than its 
competitors can offer (Porter, 1985; Slater et al., 2014). Abernathy and Clark (1985) 
specify two domains of a company’s competency: Technology/Production and 
Market/Customer Linkage. New products affect the two domains by either entrenching 
or disrupting them. They call an innovation’s degree of effect as “transilience”. Figure 
2.3 shows Abernathy and Clark’s transilience map of innovation. 
According to Abernathy and Clark (1985), each quadrant represents different categories 
of product innovation and has different managerial implications. Regular innovation is 
an innovation that builds on established technology and marketing knowledge. It is like 
incremental product innovation because it conserves or builds on the company’s existing 
technology and market knowledge. Niche Creation innovation is an innovation that uses 
existing technology to create new market opportunities. Revolutionary innovation is an 
innovation that disrupts or destroys established technical and production competencies 
while conserving the market linkage. Lastly, architectural innovation is an innovation 
that uses new concepts in technology and creates new market linkages. It is identical to 
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radical product innovation because it utilises new technology and requires new marketing 
knowledge. 
The transilience map of innovation allows managers to understand the impact their 
product innovation will have on their company’s technology and market competency and 
to make preparations accordingly; whereas, innovativeness only deals with changes in 















Figure 2.3: Transilience map of innovation (Abernathy & Clark, 1985, p. 8) 
2.2.2.4 Disruption 
Christensen (1997) proposes an alternative classification based on disruption. He 
investigated why leading companies failed to stay atop of their industry and found that 
leading companies often succumbed to industry entrants when they faced specific market 
and technology changes. These changes are not caused by radical product innovation or 
technological/marketing competency transformation. Instead, they are caused by 





























































many industries from disk drive, mechanical excavator, steel, computer, printer, and 
retailing. Consequently, he developed the disruptive innovation model to explain the 











Figure 2.4: The disruptive innovation model (Christensen & Raynor, 2003, p. 33) 
There are three critical elements of the disruption model (Christensen & Raynor, 2003). 
Firstly, it recognises that in every market there is a rate of improvement that customers 
can utilise or absorb; this is represented by the gently sloping upward dotted line in Figure 
2.4. In addition, there is a distribution of customers around the dotted line, as indicated 
by the distribution curve at the right. The distribution represents different tiers of 
customer demand from low-end to high-end. 
Secondly, it acknowledges that in every market there is a distinctly different trajectory of 
improvement that innovating companies provide as they introduce new and improved 
products in pursuit of profit. This pace of technological progress almost always outstrips 
the rate of improvement that customers can utilise or absorb. This is represented by the 
more steeply sloping upward solid lines in Figure 2.4. 
Thirdly, it recognises two categories of innovation: sustaining innovation and disruptive 
innovation. Sustaining innovation is a product innovation that targets high-end customers 
with better performance. Sustaining innovation can be incremental or radical in character. 
















new products to existing high-end customers. Here incumbent companies almost always 
win because they have powerful motivation and resources to win. 
By comparison, disruptive innovation is a product innovation that targets emerging or 
low-end markets. It is often cheaper, simpler, or more convenient to use than the previous 
products. However, because it is new, it has a poorer performance as valued by the 
mainstream and high-end consumer. Only emerging or low-end markets are willing to 
buy the new product (Christensen & Raynor, 2003). Consequently, incumbent companies 
often reject disruptive innovation in favour of sustaining innovation, while industry 
entrants are attracted to it due to the other benefits it offers. As time passes, disruptive 
innovation improves in performance enough to meet the mainstream customer demand. 
At this point, the disruptive innovation will start replacing the sustaining innovation, 
leading to the demise of the incumbent companies. 
Christensen’s disruptive innovation model explains why leading/incumbent companies 
succumb to industry entrants with disruptive innovation. The model assists managers to 
recognise the danger and opportunity of disruptive innovation and to respond 
accordingly. 
2.2.2.5 Business model and technical competency change 
Another way to classify product innovation is to consider the business model and 
technical competency change involved in a new product. Pisano (2015) develops his 
classification by considering the degree of change a new product can have on the 
company’s existing business model and technical competency. 
Pisano (2015) identifies four categories of innovation as routine innovation, disruptive 
innovation, radical innovation, and architectural innovation, and proposed an innovation 
landscape map as shown in Figure 2.5. 
Routine innovation is an innovation that involves a minimal business model and 
technological change so that it can leverage an existing business model and technical 
competencies. It can be likened to incremental, regular, or sustaining innovation. 
Disruptive innovation is an innovation that requires a new business model while 
leveraging existing technical competencies. It can be likened to moderate innovativeness, 
niche creation, or disruptive innovation as defined by Christensen (1997). 
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Radical innovation is an innovation that requires new technical competencies but fits in 
with the company’s existing business models. It can be likened to moderate 
innovativeness or revolutionary innovation. 
Lastly, architectural innovation involves a significant business model and technological 
change and requires both a new business model and technical competencies. It can be 
linked to radical (high degree of innovativeness) or architectural innovation as defined by 













Figure 2.5: The innovation landscape map (Pisano, 2015, p. 51) 
Pisano’s innovation landscape map is a useful tool for managers to plan their innovation 
strategy and allocate resources according to the four categories of innovation. Different 
companies will face different competitive environments and have different existing 
business models and technical competencies. Thus, companies should focus on the type 
of innovation that will allow them to achieve their overall business strategy and adapt as 
their capabilities and competitive environment change (Pisano, 2015). 
2.2.2.6 Innovation strategy 
Finally, innovation strategy can also be used to classify product innovation. Innovation 
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policies or behaviours aimed at achieving” a specific innovation outcome (Pisano, 2015, 
p. 46). Verganti (2008) studied the innovation strategy of successful design-intensive 
Italian companies such as Alessi, Artemide, and Kartell. He identifies three innovation 















Figure 2.6: Innovation strategies (Verganti, 2008, p. 444) 
Market pull, or user centred innovation, is a common innovation strategy where 
companies innovate in response to their user needs and demands. It is an innovation 
strategy that leads to incremental or routine innovation. 
Technology push innovation is an innovation strategy where companies pursue 
breakthrough technologies to deliver a significant improvement in product performance. 
It is an innovation strategy that leads to new technology or revolutionary innovation. 
Design driven innovation is an innovation strategy where companies propose new 
meanings or reasons for purchase. Design driven as an innovation strategy is often 
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Wieringa, & Lutz, 2009). However, it is a valid innovation strategy that leads to new 
customer benefits or disruptive innovation (Pisano, 2015; Verganti, 2009). 
Lastly, the overlap between technology push and design driven innovation shows how 
breakthrough technologies can generate radical new meanings and vice versa (Verganti, 
2008). This area is the innovation strategy that leads to high product innovativeness or 
architectural innovation. 
2.2.3 What is radical product innovation? 
Radical product innovation is a product innovation with a high degree of product 
innovativeness (Garcia & Calantone, 2002). As previously explained in section 2.2.2.2, 
product innovativeness is “a measure of the potential discontinuity a product (process or 
service) can generate in the marketing and/or technological process” (Garcia & 
Calantone, 2002, p. 113). 
Product innovativeness is often broken down into technological and marketing newness 
(Danneels & Kleinschmidt, 2001; Garcia & Calantone, 2002; Kleinschmidt & Cooper, 
1991). Technological newness is a measure of technological change (Chandy & Tellis, 
1998; Kock et al., 2011). Technology can be defined as “the processes by which an 
organisation transforms labour, capital, materials, and information into products and 
services of greater value” (Christensen, 1997, p. xiii). Marketing newness is a measure of 
value proposition change (Kock et al., 2011; Markides & Geroski, 2005). Value 
proposition can be defined as “a short, clear, simple statement of how and on what 
dimensions a product concept will deliver value to prospective customers” (Kahn, Kay, 
Slotegraaf, & Uban, 2013, p. 475). 
Both technological and marketing newness are used in this research to measure product 
innovativeness. Product innovativeness is measured by considering the core technology 
and core value proposition change in a new product relative to the previous products from 
the company and market perspective. A new product that utilises a new-to-market core 
technology and core value proposition has a high degree of product innovativeness. 
Whereas, a new product that builds on available core technology and core value 
proposition has a low degree of product innovativeness. Consequently, radical product 
innovation is defined as the introduction of a new product that involves a new-to-market 
core technology and core value proposition. 
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Section 3.2 describes the development of a product innovativeness model. It provides a 
comprehensive explanation of product innovativeness measure and radical product 
innovation definition. 
2.2.4 Why is radical product innovation important? 
Radical product innovation introduces to the marketplace a new technology and value 
proposition not previously available. This high degree of product innovativeness gives 
radical product innovation many advantages over less innovative product innovation. The 
advantages of radical product innovation are summarised below. 
2.2.4.1 Superior product advantage 
Firstly, product innovativeness is an important driver for product advantage. Product 
advantage or a product that delivers unique benefits and superior performance is the major 
factor for product success (Cooper & Kleinschmidt, 1987; McNally et al., 2010). 
Kleinschmidt and Cooper (1991) studied the relationship between product innovativeness 
and product success of 195 new products from 125 industrial product companies. They 
found a U-shaped relationship between product innovativeness and product success 
where both incremental and radical product innovation had a statistically significant 
positive relationship with product success. Incremental and radical product innovation 
showed high product success while moderate product innovation showed the least product 
success. The reason for this U-shaped relationship is because incremental product 
innovation relies on the existing capabilities, leading to low uncertainties and more 
proficient product development activities, while radical product innovation offers new 
technologies and unique benefits, leading to superior product advantage. Moderate 
product innovation was the least successful because it was far enough from existing 
capabilities and not innovative enough to offer compelling values (Kleinschmidt & 
Cooper, 1991). 
Other studies have come to a similar conclusion regarding the U-shaped relationship 
between product innovativeness and product success (Calantone et al., 2006; Kock et al., 
2011). Still, it is important to recognise that some studies have found no relationship 
between them (Danneels & Kleinschmidt, 2001; Szymanski, Kroff, & Troy, 2007; 
Tatikonda & Rosenthal, 2000). For example, Szymanski, Kroff, and Troy (2007) 
conducted a meta-analysis of 95 correlations on product innovativeness and product 
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success from 32 studies on the topic and found that product innovativeness did not have 
a direct impact on product success; only when a meaningfulness dimension (the degree 
of functional relevant to the customer) was included in the product innovativeness 
measure did the relationship become stronger. The reason for this is because product 
innovativeness can be perceived negatively by the customer due to issues such as low 
product familiarity (Calantone et al., 2006), high learning cost (Reinders, Frambach, & 
Schoormans, 2010), and innovation/change resistance (Heidenreich & Handrich, 2015). 
As a result, product innovativeness can also lead to product disadvantage and this explains 
why some studies find no relationship between product innovativeness and product 
success. 
In conclusion, radical product innovation is important for creating product differentiation 
leading to superior product advantage. However, managers need to be careful not to create 
product disadvantage as a result of customer unfamiliarity or a lack of relevant product 
benefit or meaningfulness. 
2.2.4.2 Industry transformation or new market creation 
Secondly, radical product innovation can transform industry or create a new market 
(Golder et al., 2009; Utterback, 1994). The reason radical product innovation can 
transform or create a new market is because it brings to the marketplace a new technology 
and value proposition that lead to a significant change in consumer behaviour (Chandy & 
Tellis, 2000; Leifer et al., 2000). 
Incremental product innovation plays an important role in advancing the existing 
technological process and maintaining company competitiveness (Foster, 1986; Pisano, 
2015). However, radical product innovation is responsible for initiating a new 
technological process and introducing new customer benefits. This leads to a new product 
category and lays a foundation for future generations of incremental and moderate 
product innovation, which are important for long term growth (D. A. Norman & Verganti, 
2014; Sood & Tellis, 2005; Utterback, 1994). 
In certain cases, radical product innovation can be a matter of company survival (Chandy 
& Tellis, 2000). This is because radical product innovation can destroy existing 
technological and marketing competency and replace them with new ones (Abernathy & 
Clark, 1985; Abernathy & Utterback, 1978). Schumpeter (1942) referred to this as the 
process of “creative destruction” (p. 83). Companies that ignore radical product 
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innovation risk having their competency obsoleted, while pioneers or early adaptors of 
radical product innovation can gain significant competitive advantages (Cooper, 2005; 
Verganti, 2009). 
2.2.4.3 Driver for national growth 
Lastly, radical product innovation is an important driver for national growth and 
prosperity (Golder et al., 2009; Tellis, Prabhu, & Chandy, 2009). Radical product 
innovation can affect a national economy by creating new industries or destroying them. 
For example, the invention of synthetic fibres destroyed 40% of New Zealand’s wool 
export value during the 1970s (Easton, 2016b). The crash of wool export value, combined 
with higher competition from other countries, was considered unfavourable for the New 
Zealand economy at the time (Singleton, 2008). 
Looking back from today’s perspective, the change forced New Zealand companies to be 
more innovative and to diversify into new markets leading to a stronger economy overall. 
Other radical product innovations such as the refrigeration (Easton, 2016b), the tanker 
delivery of whole milk from farms to factory (Anderson, 2011), and the breeding of New 
Zealand specific plant and animal varieties (Riddet Institute, 2011) have opened up new 
export opportunities and added significant economic value for New Zealand. Hence, 
radical product innovation is considered here as an important driver for the growth of the 
New Zealand economy. 
2.2.5 Why is radical product innovation difficult?  
Despite its advantages, radical product innovation is a double-edged sword (Calantone et 
al., 2006; Kleinschmidt & Cooper, 1991). The 2012 Product Development and 
Management Association (PDMA)’s comparative performance assessment study, which 
studied product innovation performance from 453 companies in North America, Europe, 
and Asia, provides a project performance comparison between incremental, more 






Table 2.1: Project Performance (Markham & Lee, 2013, p. 412) 








Radical 29.2 31.7 53.1 46.3 
More Innovative 43.6 49.1 66.3 58.7 
Incremental 57.9 62.3 72.9 68.0 
 
Table 2.1 shows all project performance metrics worsen as the project becomes more 
innovative. This indicates that innovative projects present more challenges for 
companies. How companies overcome innovative project challenges can determine their 
success with radical product innovation. The disadvantages of radical product innovation 
are summarised below. 
2.2.5.1 High degree of uncertainty 
Firstly, radical product innovation has a higher degree of uncertainty when compared to 
incremental and moderate innovation. This is because radical product innovation requires 
new marketing and technological competency, which can be difficult to develop (Holahan 
et al., 2014; Slater et al., 2014). This also leads to higher level of risk, chance for failure, 
and variability of return (Booz et al., 1982; Leifer et al., 2000; Min, Kalwani, & Robinson, 
2006). 
2.2.5.2 Multi-dimensional uncertainties 
Secondly, there are several dimensions of uncertainty associated with radical product 
innovation. O’Connor and Rice (2013) conducted a longitudinal case study of 12 radical 
projects in 10 large established companies in the United States. They identify four 
categories of uncertainty associated with radical projects as follows. 
• Technical uncertainty – which is related to the development, application, and 
manufacturing of new technology. 
• Market uncertainty – which is related to the understanding of customer wants 
and needs, and other marketing considerations such as a business model, market 
creation, sales and distribution, and competitors. 
• Organisational uncertainty – which is related to the organisational 
transformation and learning needed to develop and commercialise the new 
product. 
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• Resource uncertainty – which is related to the resource acquisition (both 
financial and competency) needed for the project. 
The four categories of uncertainty explain the key challenges associated with radical 
product innovation. The high technical and market uncertainty lead to long development 
time and project unpredictability, and organisational and resource uncertainty lead to 
organisational resistance and complicated product development processes. These high 
uncertainties explain why there is a strong tendency for companies to pursue incremental 
product innovation rather than radical product innovation (Bers, Dismukes, Miller, & 
Dubrovensky, 2009; Cooper, 2011). 
Other dimensions of radical product innovation uncertainty include “latency” which 
refers to how predictable an uncertainty is and “criticality” which refers to how significant 
an uncertainty has on the project’s success (O’Connor & Rice, 2013). 
2.2.5.3 Context dependence 
Lastly, the implication and significance of radical product challenges are dependent on 
the innovation context. Sandberg and Aarikka-Stenroos (2014) conducted a systematic 
review of 103 research articles on radical product innovation barriers. They identified and 
grouped the barriers into internal and external barriers. Internal barriers are challenges 
originating from within the company and are related to issues such as mindset, 
competencies, resources, and organisational structure. External barriers are challenges 
originating from outside the company and are related to issues such as external relations 
and business environment. 
Table 2.2 presents the main internal and external radical product innovation barriers 
according to company size, target market, and stages of radical product innovation 
process. The table shows restrictive mindset as the prominent internal barrier, and 
customer resistance and undeveloped network and ecosystem as the major external 






Table 2.2: Main Radical Product Innovation Barriers (Sandberg & Aarikka-
Stenroos, 2014) 
Innovation Context 
Main Radical Product Innovation Barriers 
Internal barriers External barriers 
Company 
Size 
SMEs • Restrictive mindset 
• Lack of incubation 
competencies 
• Insufficient resources 
• Undeveloped network 
and ecosystem 
• Paucity of external 
finance 
Large companies • Restrictive mindset 





• Customer resistance 








• Lack of discovery 
competencies 
• Restrictive mindset 
• Customer resistance 




• Restrictive mindset 
• Lack of incubation 
competencies 








Ideation stage • Insufficient resources 
• Restrictive mindset 
• Customer resistance 




• Insufficient resources 





• Lack of acceleration 
and commercialisation 
competencies 
• Customer resistance 
• Undeveloped network 
and ecosystem  
 
2.2.6 What determines radical product innovation? 
In this section, radical product innovation determinants from other industries, beside the 
food and beverage industry, are identified and summarised. Determinants from other 
industries are identified first to provide a universal picture of radical product innovation 
determinants. The determinants of radical product innovation from the food and beverage 
industry are identified and discussed later in section 2.3.1. 
Originally, the determinants of radical product innovation were conceptualised based on 
the organisational characteristics associated with radical product innovation. Today, they 
are mostly conceptualised based on the organisational capabilities required by a company 
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to introduce radical product innovation. Subsequently, radical product innovation 
determinants are separated into two groups: organisational characteristics and 
organisational capabilities. They are explained below. 
2.2.6.1 Organisational characteristics 
Organisational characteristics are determinants of radical product innovation that include 
company age, company size, national culture, industry phase, willingness to cannibalise, 
and company orientation. They are explained in turn. 
Company age 
Company age is the number of years for the company since its inception. Young 
companies (e.g. industry entrants) are more likely than old companies (e.g. incumbents) 
to be innovative because they are less inhibited by bureaucratic process or past success 
(Balasubramanian & Lee, 2008; Christensen, 1997; Huergo & Jaumandreu, 2004). 
Alternatively, older companies can accumulate more resources and experience, which can 
be beneficial when pursuing radical product innovation because it requires more 
development resources, technological capability, and product development capability 
(Chandy & Tellis, 2000; Holahan et al., 2014; Leifer et al., 2000). 
Company size 
Company size is the number of full-time employees in the company. Smaller companies 
are often associated with radical product innovation because of their entrepreneurial 
characteristics (Abernathy & Utterback, 1978; Schumpeter, 1934). 
On the other hand, as innovation becomes more complex and resource intensive, larger 
companies with more resources and monopoly power can gain innovative performance 
advantage over smaller companies (Chandy & Tellis, 2000; Schumpeter, 1942). 
National culture 
National culture is defined as “the collective programming of the mind that distinguishes 
the members of one group or category of people from others” (Hofstede, 2011, p. 3). 
National culture can influence entrepreneurship characteristics of a nation and explain 
why certain nations are more innovative than others (Hayton et al., 2002). Furthermore, 
national culture can influence local markets’ acceptance of new and different products 
(i.e. consumer innovativeness) (Steenkamp, Hofstede, & Wedel, 1999). 
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Industry phase 
Abernathy and Utterback (1978) studied the dynamics of innovation in multiple industries 
from incandescent light bulbs, papers, steel, and internal-combustion engines. They used 
a productive unit of analysis instead of a company or product type for their study to better 
capture the innovation dynamics across an industry. Their findings suggest that a 
company’s capacity to innovate depends on the phase of the industry it is in. In other 
words, the phase of industry determines the company’s capacity to introduce radical 
product innovation. A dynamics of innovation model shown in Figure 2.7 identifies three 










Figure 2.7: Dynamics of innovation model (Utterback, 1994, p. 91) 
The fluid phase is the early years of an industry. It is initiated by the identification of a 
new need or new technology. During this period, there is a high rate of moderate or radical 
product innovation as industry pioneers experiment with different product designs. The 
competitive advantages are based on superior functional performance offered by the new 
technology rather than lower cost. Process innovation is not of primary importance due 
to constant change in product design. 
The transitional phase is the middle years of an industry. It is initiated by the emergence 
of a dominant product design and market acceptance. During this period, companies begin 
changing their focus from product innovation to process innovation. The competitive 
advantages are based on meeting specific user needs and using more efficient and higher 

















The specific phase is the latter years of an industry that some industries enter. It is initiated 
by the introduction of a well specified product design and highly specialised production 
method. During this period, companies focus on incremental product and process 
innovation. The competitive advantages are based mainly on price. Moderate or radical 
product innovation is difficult and costly due to the highly-specialised production 
method. The only way for the industry to break out of this phase is through radical product 
or process innovation typically introduced from outside the industry. 
Willingness to cannibalise 
Chandy and Tellis (1998) investigated why some companies were more successful at 
radical product innovation than others. They argued against the Schumpeter’s suggestion 
that company size was the predictor of radical product innovation. Instead, they proposed 
willingness to cannibalise, or the extent to which a company was prepared to reduce the 
actual or potential value of its investments, was the key driver of radical product 
innovation. This driver was critical because leading companies often were afraid to 
cannibalise their existing investments in specialised technology, needed to serve the 
current market, to pursue radical product innovation. Consequently, companies willing to 
abandon their existing investments were more likely to pursue radical product innovation. 
They defined radical product innovation based on two commonly used underlining 
dimensions of radical product innovation definitions: “technology”, which determined 
the extent the technology involved in a new product differed from prior technologies, and 
“markets”, which determined the extent the new product fulfilled customer need per 
dollar better than existing products. Table 2.3 shows four types of innovation based on 
their classification using the two dimensions. According to the table, radical product 
innovation is an innovation that incorporates a substantially different technology and 
provides substantially greater customer need fulfilment per dollar relative to existing 
products. 
Table 2.3: Types of Product Innovations (Chandy & Tellis, 1998, p. 476) 




Low Incremental innovation Market breakthrough 
High Technological breakthrough Radical innovation 
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Chandy and Tellis (1998) then identified four organisational factors that influenced a 
company’s willingness to cannibalise. These factors were more useful than company size 
and industry phase as they could be controlled by managers. The four factors were 
specialised investments, which was the level of company investments in specialised 
technology; internal markets, which was the level of internal organisational autonomy 
and competition; product champion influence, which was the extent employees who 
advocate new product ideas could affect the activities of the organisation; and future-
market focus, which was the extent the company emphasises future customers and 
competitors relative to current customers and competitors. 
Figure 2.8 shows the hypothesised model of radical product innovation developed by 
Chandy and Tellis (1998). Willingness to cannibalise acted as the mediator between the 
four organisational factors and radical product innovation. The company size (firm size) 













Figure 2.8: Hypothesised model of radical product innovation (Chandy & Tellis, 


















Data were collected through a survey of key managers mostly at the director or vice 
president level. To control for the effects of competitive intensity and environmental 
turbulence, three highly competitive and turbulent high-tech industries were chosen for 
the study. The industries were computer hardware, photonics, and telecommunication. In 
total, 483 useable samples were collected, and the model was tested using a path analysis. 
Chandy and Tellis (1998) found that willingness to cannibalise was a powerful predictor 
of an organisational propensity for radical product innovation. Alternatively, company 
size had no significant effect on radical product innovation. Out of the four organisational 
factors, only specialised investments, as expected, had a negative effect on the company 
willingness to abandon their investments. The other three factors were significant and 
positively contributed to the company willingness to cannibalise investments. 
Furthermore, they adequately countered the negative effect of specialised investments. 
Hence, internal markets, product champion influence, and future market focus are 
important organisational characteristics managers need to cultivate to increase their 
organisational willingness to cannibalise investments in the pursuit of radical product 
innovation. 
Company orientation 
Hult, Hurley, and Knight (2004) attempted to identify the antecedents of innovativeness. 
They defined innovativeness as the capacity of a company to introduce new processes, 
products, or ideas in the organisation. 
Figure 2.9 shows their hypothesised model which identifies market orientation, learning 
orientation, and entrepreneurial orientation as the antecedents of innovativeness. Market 
orientation was related to the generation, dissemination, and responsiveness to market 
intelligence; learning orientation was related to the development of new knowledge in 
the organisation; and entrepreneurial orientation was related to the entry of new 
businesses. The three orientations represented the company’s culture, or the norms, 
values, and beliefs that influenced the company’s innovation behaviours, and were 











Figure 2.9:  Hult et al.’s hypothesised model (Hult et al., 2004, p. 430) 
Hult, Hurley, and Knight (2004) claimed they were the first to integrate the three 
orientations into a model with innovativeness and business performance. They also 
contended how market turbulence (the degree of customer demand and preference 
volatility) moderated the relationships between the three orientations and innovativeness 
and the innovativeness and business performance. They collected 181 survey responses 
from marketing managers in multinational industrial companies and tested their model 
using structural equations modelling. 
They found all the relationships between the three orientations and innovativeness and 
the innovativeness and business performance significant and positive. Furthermore, 
innovativeness was an important mediator between the three orientations and business 
performance. The market turbulence had no effect on the innovativeness and business 
performance relationship, indicating that innovativeness was important regardless of the 
market volatility. Only market orientation was significant in high market turbulence, 
suggesting that market orientation was more important in a rapidly changing market 
environment and less so in a stable market environment. 
2.2.6.2 Organisational capabilities 
Later, researchers begin to use organisational capabilities, instead of organisational 
characteristics, to conceptualise the determinants of radical product innovation. This 
transition can be explained by the inclusion of resource-based views as their theoretical 
basis for model development. The resource-based view is a management theory that a 
company’s competitive advantage comes from its resources, such as its organisational 
capabilities (Barney, 1991; Peteraf, 1993; Wernerfelt, 1984). 
Business 
Performance 






The resource-based view is employed by many researchers for studying radical product 
innovation determinants because it explains how a company can achieve radical product 
innovation by building productive organisational capabilities required for radical product 
innovation (Herrmann, Tomczak, & Befurt, 2006; Kyrgidou & Spyropoulou, 2013; Slater 
et al., 2014). Nevertheless, organisational characteristics are still used in some studies. 
For example, Herrmann et al. (2007) uses organisational characteristics as the antecedents 
to the organisational capabilities required for radical product innovation. 
According to Porter (1985), companies can achieve competitive advantage by delivering 
a product at lower cost or offering unique benefits to the buyer. He identifies five forces 
which influence a company’s ability to achieve competitive advantage in an industry: the 
entry of new competitors, the threat of substitutes, the bargaining power of buyers, the 
bargaining power of suppliers, and the rivalry among existing competitors. By evaluating 
the five forces of an industry, a company can determine the attractiveness or profitability 
of the industry and develop a competitive strategy that will allow the company to 
influence and position itself favourably against the five forces. A company is said to have 
sustainable competitive advantage when it can maintain its favourable position and 
consistently earn above the industry average (Porter, 1985). 
The resource-based view is different from Porter’s five forces theory because it considers 
a company’s resources, instead of an industry’s attractiveness, as the basis of competition. 
Resources can be defined as tangible and intangible assets connected to a given company 
such as its “brand names, in-house knowledge of technology, employment of skilled 
personnel, trade contacts, machinery, efficient procedures, capital, etc.” (Wernerfelt, 
1984, p. 172). For these resources to create competitive advantage, they must be valuable, 
rare, difficult to imitate, and hard to substitute (Barney, 1991). A company is said to have 
sustainable competitive advantage when its competitors are unable to recreate the 
company’s resources or duplicate the competitive advantage the company enjoys from its 
idiosyncratic resources (Barney, 1991). 
Prahalad and Hamel (1990) introduce a concept of “core competency” to expand the 
theory of resource-based view. Fundamentally, core competencies are “the collective 
learning in the organisation, especially how to co-ordinate diverse production skills and 
integrate multiple streams of technologies” (Prahalad & Hamel, 1990, p. 81). They can 
be viewed as the key technological resources companies can invest in and cultivate in 
order to gain a competitive advantage. A core competency must meet three criteria: it 
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provides potential access to a wide variety of markets; it makes a significant contribution 
to the perceived customer benefits of the end product; and it is difficult for competitors 
to imitate (Prahalad & Hamel, 1990). Core competencies allow managers to exploit the 
key technological resources of their company through economy of scope, leading to new 
business units in multiple markets. 
Following this, Grant (1996) introduces a “knowledge-based” concept as an extension of 
the resource-based view. Here, knowledge is posited as the primary source of value, 
making it the most important resource in an organisation. The company is conceptualised 
as an institution for integrating knowledge where its primary function is knowledge 
application rather than knowledge creation. Consequently, the focus of management 
should be on building knowledge management capability to support knowledge 
aggregation (i.e. absorptive capacity (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990)) and knowledge 
distribution, integration, and utilisation within the organisation. Because knowledge 
resides within individuals (employees), can be tacit or implicit, and is carried through an 
organisation by rules and directives, sequencing, routines, and group problem solving and 
decision making, it is considered socially complex and very difficult to duplicate, making 
a heterogeneous knowledge a major determinant of competitive advantage. The extent of 
competitive advantage will depend upon the ability of management to access and 
integrate the specialised knowledge of their employees. The knowledge-based concept 
expands the resource-based view theory by putting greater emphasis on knowledge (as a 
resource) and its relationship with competitive advantage. 
In today’s business environment, there is a higher level of competition and market 
turbulence caused by globalisation and technological and market discontinuities. 
Consequently, core competencies can be seen as a liability or “core rigidities” in a high 
turbulence market because they discourage companies from abandoning their key 
technological resources or specialised investments (Chandy & Tellis, 1998; Leonard-
Barton, 1992). To stay competitive, companies must be capable of abandoning their 
specialised investments and building new ones (Chandy & Tellis, 1998; Herrmann et al., 
2007). This leads to another concept called “dynamic capabilities” introduced by Teece, 
Pisano, and Shuen (1997). They define dynamic capabilities as “the firm’s ability to 
integrate, build, and reconfigure internal and external competencies to address rapidly 
changing environments” (Teece et al., 1997, p. 516). In other words, dynamic capabilities 
are a company’s ability to transform their resources in response to a changing business 
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environment. To clarify the concept, Teece (2007) develops a framework to identify the 
foundations of dynamic capabilities, which includes sensing, seizing, and reconfiguring. 
By building organisational capabilities to sense technology and marketing changes, seize 
the resources required to exploit the changes, and reconfigure the existing resources, 
companies can constantly renew themselves and achieve sustainable competitive 
advantage in a high turbulence market (Teece, 2007). 
For this research, the resource-based view theory, including its core competency, 
knowledge-based, and dynamic capabilities concepts, are used for developing the 
conceptual model in section 3.4. They are needed to understand the causes of sustainable 
competitive advantage in today’s business environment and identify the organisational 
capabilities needed for radical product innovation at a company level of analysis. Porter’s 
five forces theory is not considered because it is better suited for an industrial level of 
analysis which is outside the scope of this study. Subsequently, organisational capabilities 
needed for radical product innovation include: a radical innovation hub; willingness to 
abandon investments; the capability to transform competencies and markets; 
organisational capabilities in established firms; entrepreneurial, managerial, and technical 
capabilities; internally and externally oriented knowledge capabilities; and radical 
product innovation capability. They are explained in turn. 
Radical innovation hub 
Leifer et al. (2000) conducted a five-year longitudinal case study of 12 radical innovation 
projects in 10 large, mature companies. They defined a radical innovation project as a 
project with the potential to produce one or more of the following: an entirely new set of 
performance features, improvements in known performance features of five times or 
greater, and a significant (30 percent or greater) reduction in cost. A radical innovation 
was a product, process, or service with unprecedented performance features or familiar 
features with potential for significant improvements in performance or cost. Radical 
innovation had the potential to transform existing markets or industries or create new 
ones. 
They found that radical innovation process had a long development time (often a decade 
or longer), was highly uncertain and unpredictable, nonlinear and stochastic (interrupted 
by several discontinuities such as project pauses, changed priorities, setbacks, or changes 
with key players), as well as being contextually dependent; in contrast, incremental 
innovation process was short, clearly defined, and continuous. As a result, radical 
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innovation was much more difficult and riskier compared to incremental innovation. 
Nevertheless, radical innovation was becoming more important in large and mature 
companies for maintaining their competitiveness. 
Consequently, they proposed establishing a radical innovation hub as a strategy for large 
and mature companies to deal with the many uncertainties and discontinuities associated 
with radical projects. They stated: 
A radical innovation hub—or even better, a distributed network of small, nimble 
hubs—can serve as the repository for the cumulative learning about managing 
radical innovation. In addition, a hub is a natural “home base” for all those who 
play pivotal organisational roles in making radical innovation happen—radical 
innovators, idea hunters and gatherers, internal venture capitalists, members of 
evaluation and oversight boards, and corporate entrepreneurs. Most important, 
hubs help manage the interfaces between radical innovation projects and the 
mainstream organisation, enhancing the flow of positive resources and 
diminishing the flow of negative elements. (p. 185) 
Table 2.4 provides a summary of management mechanisms (competencies) in the radical 
innovation hub as identified by Leifer et al. (2000). The management mechanisms are as 
follows: involving senior management, capturing radical innovations, acquiring 
resources, engaging individual initiative, managing internal/external partners, and 
managing transitions. These competencies are explained according to their level of 
maturity between early and mature radical innovation capability. The level of maturity 
guides managers in developing these competencies or radical innovation capability within 
their organisations. Subsequently, the radical innovation hub is a powerful strategy for 
large and mature companies to develop radical innovation and achieve long term 
competitive advantage.
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lack of supportive 
culture. 
Mavericks try to catch the 
attention of patrons. There 
is a lack of infrastructure 
and systematic approach. 
Acquisition of 
resources is ad hoc. 
Project teams often 
expect a budget 




tasks, staffing the 
project team, and 
engaging 
champions rely on 
individual 
initiative. 
Relationships with internal 
and external partners are 
developed on an ad hoc, 
project-by-project basis by 
each project team.  
Communication is 
poor between the 
radical innovation 
project and the 
business unit. Project 
often transitions too 
early and radical 
innovation flounders. 
Project relies on 



















Radical innovation idea 
hunters seek opportunities. 
Radical innovation hubs 
help establish effective 
evaluation boards that use 
appropriate criteria. Non-
traditional marketing and 
business development 
personnel work with 
radical innovation technical 
teams to develop the 
business model.  
Individual managers 
with authority to 
provide seed funding 
and internal venture 
capital provide 
multiple sources of 
capital for radical 
innovation. The firm 
adopts a portfolio 





work with HR to 







experts, and team 
members.  
Relationships between 
radical innovation activity 
and internal and external 
partners are developed at a 
strategic level, relying on 
the collaboration of the 
project team, the radical 
innovation hub, and the 
oversight board.  







to ensure a 
successful transition 
to the operating unit.  
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Willingness to abandon investments 
Herrmann, Tomczak, and Befurt (2006) used a causal analytic model to identify the 
determinants of radical product innovation. They measured product innovativeness, or 
novelty, based on two dimensions: its degree of novelty intensity, between high and low; 
and the perspective of novelty, from the company and customer’s point of view. Table 
2.5 presents their four types of product innovation as a result of combining the two 
dimensions. Radical product innovation was defined as a new product based on a new 
technological basis with a high novel utility experience to the customer. 
Table 2.5: Four Types of Product Innovations (Herrmann et al., 2006, p. 21) 
Novelty of technology or novelty from 
the company’s point of view 
Novelty of utility creation or novelty from the 
customer’s point of view 
Minimal High 









Herrmann, Tomczak, and Befurt (2006) expanded the willingness to cannibalise—the 
model previously developed by Chandy and Tellis (1998)—to include other 
organisational and strategy factors based on the resource-based view proposed by 
Wernerfelt (1984) and the value-added chain created by Porter (1985). The resource-
based view was a management theory that a company’s idiosyncratic resources 
determined its ability to create competitive advantage (Peteraf, 1993; Wernerfelt, 1984). 
The value-added chain identified core business functions that were involved with product 
innovation process such as human resource management, technology development, 
operations, logistics, and marketing and sales (Porter, 1985). Their resulting hypothesised 



















Figure 2.10: Herrmann et al.’s hypothesised model (Herrmann et al., 2006, p. 31) 
Herrmann, Tomczak, and Befurt (2006) collected 109 questionnaire responses from 
senior managers in 53 companies across software, hardware, telecommunications, 
biotechnology, microelectronics, and image processing industries that originated in 
Germany, UK, and France. They tested their hypothesised model through a partial least 
squares analysis and found that the willingness to abandon investments strongly 
determined radical product innovation. All the factors in Figure 2.10 were found to drive 
the company’s willingness to abandon investments, but not at the same level. A focus on 
new customers had the strongest impact followed by the product champions and life-long 
learning. They were identified as the key factors that influenced a company’s willingness 
to abandon investment and pursue radical product innovation. 
Capability to transform competencies and markets 
Herrmann, Gassmann, and Eisert (2007) went further than the previous models and 
considered both the antecedents and determinants of radical product innovation in order 
to develop a more unifying framework of radical product innovation determinants. They 
defined their dependent variable radical product innovations similarly to the definition 





















products that incorporated substantially different technology from existing products and 
could fulfil customer needs either significantly better than existing products, or addressed 
different types of needs not previously fulfilled with existing products. 
First, Herrmann, Gassmann, and Eisert (2007) borrowed the theory of a resourced-based 
view (Wernerfelt, 1984) and the core competency (Prahalad & Hamel, 1990) to explain 
the impact radical product innovation had in diminishing the value of existing resources 
and core competencies. Then, they argued that dynamic capabilities, as proposed by 
Teece et al. (1997), were necessary to cope with the diminishing value caused by radical 
product innovation and build new resources and core competencies. This leads to their 













Figure 2.11: Herrmann et al.’s hypothesised model (Herrmann et al., 2007, p. 96) 
The model consisted of organisational characteristics, organisational capabilities, and 
organisational outcomes. Organisational characteristics were the innovation culture and 
orientations that acted as the antecedents to organisational capabilities. Organisational 
capabilities were the dynamic capabilities that acted as the determinants of radical product 
innovation. They specified two dynamic capabilities as transformation of competencies 
and transformation of markets. The transformation of competencies was defined as the 
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company’s willingness to abandon and develop new competencies (such as new 
technologies), and the transformation of markets was defined as the company’s 
willingness to pursue new markets at the potential expense of existing markets. 
Organisational outcomes were the propensity of a company to introduce radical product 
innovation and acted as the study dependent variable. 
Herrmann, Gassmann, and Eisert (2007) collected 72 questionnaires from general 
managers or managers in the R&D areas from companies in industries with high 
competition and dynamic technological changes. The hypothesised model was tested 
using partial least square modelling. They found that both the transformation of 
competencies and the transformation of markets were strongly related to radical product 
innovation. This suggested that organisational capabilities to transform competencies and 
markets were important determinants of radical product innovation. All the organisational 
characteristics were also found to influence the organisational capabilities. However, 
learning organisation and long-term orientation did not have a significant relationship to 
the transformation of markets. 
Organisational capabilities in established firms 
Chang, Chang, Chi, Chen, and Deng (2012) investigated how established companies 
could improve their radical innovation performance from an organisational capabilities 
view. They argued that established companies often lagged behind young/start-ups 
companies in introducing radical innovation because of their structural inertia 
(inappropriate structures and systems), which acted as inhibitors to radical innovation. 
Based on the organisational capability theory and innovation capability view, they 
regarded radical innovation capability as “a firm’s ability to explore, adapt, tolerate and 
experiment with new products, processes, and services for non-mainstream businesses” 
(Chang et al., 2012, p. 443). They then divided the radical innovation capability into four 
types: 
1. Openness capability – “a firm’s ability to search sources of radical innovation 
with external, distant and wider orientation rather than internal, local and narrow 
sources” (Chang et al., 2012, p. 444). 
2. Integration capability – “a subset of the ability to integrate and align the 
organisational connectedness and ambidexterity of radical innovation with the 
mainstream business” (Chang et al., 2012, p. 444). 
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3. Autonomy capability – “a firm’s ability to encourage and tolerate risky, 
ambiguous, unsuccessful radical ideas” (Chang et al., 2012, p. 445). 
4. Experimentation capability – “a subset of a firm’s ability to probe, experiment 
with, test, and commercialise radical ideas and concepts, across R&D, 
manufacturing and marketing disciplines” (Chang et al., 2012, p. 445). 
Their hypothesised model is presented in Figure 2.12. The model shows how the four 
organisational capabilities are positively correlated to radical innovation performance and 
act as mediators to overcome the structural inertia that exists in established companies. 
The structural inertia consists of five inhibitors: limited organisational searching; 
insufficient organisational capabilities to plan and evaluate radical innovation; rigid 
organisational routines and culture; incorrect staffing, compensation, and reward systems; 
and reluctance to experiment in unknown territory. Radical innovation performance is 
measured as the percentage share of radical innovation sales to total sales within five 













Figure 2.12: Chang et al.’s hypothesised model (Chang et al., 2012, p. 445) 
Chang et al. (2012) conducted a postal questionnaire survey targeting the senior managers 



















or Senior R&D managers, from top 500 Taiwanese manufacturing companies. The survey 
resulted in 112 effective responses with a 22.4% response rate and the data were analysed 
through multiple regressions. They found all the organisational capabilities were 
significant and positively correlated to radical innovation performance, which indicated 
their importance in improving radical innovation performance in established companies. 
Experimentation capability was found to have the highest positive coefficient followed 
by autonomy capability, integration capability, and openness capability. They also tested 
organisational characteristic factors such as company size, R&D size, ICT-firm, and 
original brand manufacturer’s business model and found most of them insignificant in 
explaining radical innovation performance. They recommended future study could 
investigate the structure and interrelationships of these organisational capabilities where 
a structural equation model method may be used for analysis. 
Entrepreneurial, managerial, and technical capabilities 
Borrowing from the resource-based view and insights from the literature on 
organisational capabilities, Kyrgidou and Spyropoulou (2013) proposed three 
organisational capabilities needed for radical product innovation. Their study provided 
new insights into the role of innovativeness to business performance from the resource-
based view perspective. It aimed to examine the relationship between organisational 
capabilities, innovativeness, and business performance. Capabilities were referred to as 
“the organisational processes through which resources are obtained, combined and 
deployed, enabling the firm to achieve a strong marketplace position relative to 
competitors” (DeSarbo, Di Benedetto and Song, 2007, as cited in, Kyrgidou & 
Spyropoulou, 2012, p. 3). 
Figure 2.13 shows their hypothesised model which includes three organisational 
capabilities: entrepreneurial capabilities refers to the company’s ability to identify and 
exploit new innovative ideas, managerial capabilities refers to the company’s ability to 
manage and utilise resources, and technical capabilities refers to the company’s ability 
to develop and advance new technology. 
Innovativeness was defined as a measure of an organisation’s willingness to adapt new 
technologies, processes, and ideas in order to offer new products. Business performance 
was related to the company’s sales, customer, and financial performances. The firm’s age 










Figure 2.13: Kyrgidou and Spyropoulou’s hypothesised model (Kyrgidou & 
Spyropoulou, 2013, p. 291) 
Kyrgidou and Spyropoulou (2013) conducted a mail survey of top-level managers such 
as CEOs and managing directors from 218 Greek companies in pharmaceuticals, 
information communication and technology, and food and beverage manufacturers. They 
used the elliptically reweighted least squares estimation procedure in EQS for model 
analysis. The results supported that entrepreneurial, managerial, and technical capabilities 
drove innovativeness and that innovativeness enhanced business performance. They also 
found that the control variables, number of employees and the firm’s age, had no 
significant effect on innovativeness and business performance. 
Internally and externally oriented knowledge capabilities 
Maes and Sels (2014) examined the role and contribution of internally and externally 
oriented knowledge-related capabilities to radical product innovation in small and 
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). Their hypothesised model, shown in Figure 2.14, was 
developed based on the knowledge-based (Grant, 1996) and dynamic capabilities 
concepts (Teece et al., 1997). 
Internally oriented knowledge-related capabilities were knowledge diversity capability, 
which represented the company’s ability to broaden their employees’ knowledge base; 
and knowledge sharing capability, which represented the company’s ability to facilitate 
knowledge sharing among their employees. Externally oriented knowledge-related 
capabilities were exploratory learning, transformative learning, and exploitative 












to acquire and utilise external knowledge (i.e. absorptive capacity (Cohen & Levinthal, 
1990)). They hypothesised that a company’s internally oriented knowledge-related 
capabilities were positively related to its externally oriented knowledge-related 
capabilities because a company’s absorptive capacity was dependent upon the company’s 
internal knowledge base and its ability to combine and exchange knowledge internally. 
They defined radical product innovation as the development of a new product not 
familiar to customers or with a new quality and measured based on its percentage to total 








Figure 2.14: Maes and Sels’ hypothesised model (Maes & Sels, 2014, p. 146) 
Maes and Sels (2014) collected a sample of 194 SMEs (companies with maximum 250 
employees) in dynamic environments (high demands for innovation) from the Panel 
Survey of Organisations in the Flanders survey database and tested their hypothesised 
model using path analysis. They found the knowledge sharing capability strongly related 
with all the learning processes, whereas knowledge diversity capability only strongly 
related with the exploratory learning and weakly with the other two. In addition, all the 
learning processes were strongly connected with each other leading to radical product 
innovation. However, only knowledge sharing capability was strongly related to radical 
product innovation, but knowledge diversity capability was not. 
Radical product innovation capability 
Slater et al. (2014) conducted an extensive literature review in order to develop a model 
of radical product innovation capability (RPIC). They defined RPIC as the capability to 
develop and commercialise products or services that offered unprecedented performance 
















that RPIC was more difficult to develop than incremental product innovation capability 
because radical product innovation required dynamic capabilities, where managers 
needed to adapt, integrate, and deploy both internal and external skills, resources, and 
functional competencies in order to maintain competitive advantage. 
They first conducted a review of the empirical literature in order to identify the 
organisational characteristics supportive of the RPIC. Subsequently, Slater et al. (2014) 
specified five components of RPIC: senior leadership which was the characteristics of 
chief-level executives of the organisation; organisational culture which was the values, 
beliefs, and assumptions of the organisation; radical product innovation process which 
was the radical product development process and practices of the organisation; 
organisational characteristics which was the structure, reliance on partners, cross-
functional integration, and performance measurement of the organisation; and product 
launch strategy which was “the mechanism through which the organisation 
communicates its value proposition to the chosen target customers” (Slater et al., 2014, 























































Slater et al. (2014) then realised the existence of interrelationships between each of the 
components. Through additional literature review, they proposed an interrelationships 












Figure 2.16: Interrelationships between components of radical product innovation 
capability (RPIC) (Slater et al., 2014, p. 555) 
Slater et al. (2014) posited that senior leadership shaped the organisational culture, RPIC 
process, and organisational characteristics given their responsibility. They also contended 
that organisational culture could influence senior leadership (the bidirectional arrow in 
Figure 2.16), organisational characteristics, RPIC process, and product launch strategy 
because it guided the values, beliefs, and assumptions of the whole organisation. Next, 
they argued that organisational characteristics affected RPIC process and product launch 
strategy because it determined resources available for radical product innovation. In 
addition, RPIC process affected product launch strategy because it influenced the final 
product concept. Lastly, radical product innovation (RPI) performance, which was the 
final dependent variable (the phenomenon that Slater et al.’s (2014) attempted to explain 
via their model), was defined as the success of the radical product innovation in the 
marketplace. This success was typically measured in revenue, profit, customer 
satisfaction, and number of ideas in the pipeline (Chan, Musso, & Shankar, 2008, cited 
in Slater et al., 2014) and moderated by market conditions because they influenced how 

















likely the target customers would buy the radical product and by organisational 
characteristics because they determined resources available for the company to 
commercialise it successfully. 
Slater et al. (2014) concluded their paper by recommending scholars to explore and test 
the interrelationships between the various components of RPIC as well as their level of 
importance in order to assist managers in their pursuit of a RPIC. Furthermore, how the 
components could operate differently for radical versus incremental product innovation 
was another potential area of investigation. 
2.3 The Food and Beverage Industry 
The nature of radical product innovation in the global and New Zealand food and 
beverage industry are explored in this section. 
2.3.1 What influences radical product innovation in the global food and 
beverage industry? 
The food and beverage industry refers to a group of companies involved in the 
manufacturing, processing, producing, and wholesaling of food and beverage products. 
Compared to other industries, the food and beverage industry has a relatively low rate of 
radical product innovation. Booz, Allen, and Hamilton (1982) provided a percentage of 
new-to-the-world products at 10% for all industries average and 6% for consumer 
nondurables (which was the lowest among all industries). According to ECR Europe 
(1999), out of 24,543 new consumer goods (beverages, food, and non-food) introduced 
to retailers in Europe, around 2.2% could be considered radical or true new products, 
while the majority (77%) were “me-too” or incremental products. Furthermore, out of all 
the radical products launched, 43% were “dead” or “almost dead” within one year (ECR 
Europe, 1999). A more recent review of food product innovation has given the industry 
average of 1-2% for radical product innovation and 75% for incremental product 
innovation; while around 75% of new food products failed (Winger & Wall, 2006). This 
indicates that the food and beverage industry has a smaller number of radical product 
innovations compared to other industries and those introduced are not very well 
appreciated by consumers (Lagnevik et al., 2003). 
One major reason there is less radical product innovation in the food and beverage 
industry is because of the conservative/risk avoidance nature of food consumers (Galizzi 
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& Venturini, 2008; Lagnevik et al., 2003; Rama & Tunzelmann, 2008). Food products 
are strongly associated with cultural and societal values, more so than other industries 
(Earle, 1997b). As a result, food consumers can be strongly resistant to new and different 
food products as discovered in insect-based food products (de-Magistris, Pascucci, & 
Mitsopoulos, 2015), coffee in capsules (Barrena-Figueroa & Garcia-Lopez-de-Meneses, 
2013), and vacuum meat packaging (Chen, Anders, & An, 2013). In addition, national 
context can influence the local consumer acceptance of new food products (Barcellos, 
Aguiar, Ferreira, & Vieira, 2009; Squires, Juric, & Cornwell, 2001), including the 
retailers because they determine what products are placed before the consumer (Winger 
& Wall, 2006). Without strong consumer demands for innovative products, food and 
beverage companies are less likely to pursue radical product innovation. 
However, fewer radical product innovations does not mean the industry lacks innovation 
or ability to innovate. Instead, Galizzi and Venturini (2008) argue that the industry is 
reasonably innovative with increasing streams of product innovation. Furthermore, the 
industry has a lot of innovation through the entire food system including production, 
harvesting, processing, manufacturing, and distribution that often are not measured when 
evaluating the industry’s innovativeness or technology intensity (Earle, 1997b; Ministry 
of Economic Development, The Treasury, & Statistics New Zealand, 2011). 
Nevertheless, relatively slow growing global food markets, increasing competition, and 
food consumer needs for pleasure and health, in connection with simplicity, are creating 
demands for innovative food products (Figiel & Kufel, 2016). Today’s food consumers 
are demanding more functional foods (food products with health benefits, technological 
process, and nutritional function) due to increasing healthcare costs, life expectancy, and 
older peoples’ desire for an improved quality of life in their later years (Bigliardi & Galati, 
2013a). This requires a break from the traditional food product development that favours 
incremental food product innovation towards a new approach of food product 
development that can support radical food product innovation (Khan, Grigor, Winger, & 
Win, 2013). 
There have been many studies that look into the determinants of radical product 
innovation in the global food and beverage industry. Table 2.6 provides a summary of 
studies related to radical product innovation determinants in the global food and beverage 
industry. They all report similar findings regarding food and beverage companies 
favouring incremental over radical product innovation. Smaller food companies are also 
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likely to pursue incremental rather than radical product innovation. The common 
determinants of radical product innovation in the industry are investment in internal 
technical and marketing capabilities; collaboration with suppliers, retailers, and 
consumers; and ability to absorb external information and knowledge. 
Table 2.6: Studies of Radical Product Innovation Determinants in the Food and 
Beverage Industry 
Authors (Year)  Methodology Findings 




sent to 500 Spanish food 
and drink companies. 
They found the nature of innovation 
activities in the Spanish food and drink 
industry to be evolutionary rather than 
revolutionary. This was due to the 
industry’s adoption of defensive or 
imitative innovation strategy.  
The level of in-house technological 
capability was identified as an important 
determinant of radical product innovation 
because it influenced the company’s 
ability to utilise externally generated 
technological knowledge. 
Siriwongwilaichat 
& Winger (2004) 
Interviews with 62 food-
processing companies, 43 
technical information 
providers, and three focus 
groups with technical 
food product developers 
in Thailand. 
Thai-owned food companies tended to be 
less innovative than multinationals. 
Thai food companies’ internal technical 
staff were the major source of new food 
product ideas and internal technical 
knowledge for food product development. 
New radical products required greater 
input from external technical knowledge 
sources compared to incremental 
products. Food ingredient suppliers were 
the main external knowledge provider to 
the internal technical staff for incremental 
innovation and food-processing 
equipment suppliers for radical 
innovation. 
Improving the internal technical staff’s 
capabilities to absorb external technical 
knowledge could improve radical product 
innovation. 
Avermaete et al. 
(2004) 
In-depth survey of 177 
small food manufacturing 
companies (3 to 50 
employees) located in six 
rural areas in the EU. 
Skills of the workforce, the company’s 
investment in know-how, and the use of 
external sources of information had a 
positive impact on small companies’ 
innovativeness. 
Interestingly, they found no evidence of a 
significant relationship between the top 
manager’s characteristics (background 
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Authors (Year)  Methodology Findings 
and experience) and innovation 
performance. 
Ziggers (2005) A survey with 650 
companies in the food and 
pharmaceutical industry 
in the Netherlands. 
The results indicated that differences in 
organisational factors, more than 
environmental factors, determine the 
adoption of radical product innovation 
(such as health enhancing food products) 
in the industry. The organisational factors 
that encouraged the adoption of radical 
product innovation in the industry were 
organisational characteristics (size, 
organisational knowledge, formalisation, 
centralisation, and interconnectedness), 
and propensity to co-operate (flexibility, 





The national survey data 
for innovation analysis 
carried out by Capitalia—
isolated data for 234 
companies in the Italian 
food industry. 
The quality of human capital (i.e. 
accumulated know-how and education 
within the organisation) and capacity to 
build relationships (i.e. with the modern 
distribution) were the main determinants 






with 21 participants from 
12 Swedish food 
manufacturing companies.  
Few innovations in the Swedish food 
industry were considered radical. Food 
manufacturers developed products in 
house for consumers without working 
with them or other companies. This was 
due to lack of trust in the supply chain 
and limited exchange of information. 
An “open innovation” mindset to organise 
and work differently could encourage 




A survey questionnaire 
with 84 participants from 
large and non-large 
Brazilian food companies. 
External integration with suppliers and 
customers was positively related to both 
incremental and radical innovation. 
However, customer integration was 
mainly found in large food companies. 
Furthermore, radical innovation was 
directly related to large companies 
whereas incremental innovation was 
directly related to non-large food 
companies. 
 
In conclusion, the food and beverage industry has a relatively lower rate of radical product 
innovation compared to other industries because the majority of food consumers are 
conservative and risk adverse. Despite this, there is an increasing demand for functional 
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foods leading to opportunities for innovative food product innovation. Surprisingly, the 
food and beverage industry has similar radical product innovation determinants, although 
not as comprehensive, to other industries such as building technical and marketing 
capabilities, collaboration with external partners (e.g. suppliers, retailers, and consumers), 
and learning/absorbing new knowledge. However, given the food and beverage industry 
context, certain determinants may be more important such as a willingness to abandon 
investments (to overcome organisational resistance/inertia) and capability to transform 
markets (to reduce consumer resistance). 
2.3.2 What influences radical product innovation in the New Zealand food 
and beverage industry? 
The New Zealand food and beverage industry has an important role for the New Zealand 
economy. The industry contributed to around 46% of New Zealand’s total export values 
in 2015 (The Treasury, 2016). Meat and dairy products are the most important food 
exports and they accounted for around 37% of total export values in 2015 (The Treasury, 
2016). Other major food and beverage products include apples, kiwifruit, salmon, 
mussels, oysters, and wine. The industry also has a wide range of emerging growth 
products such as honey, avocados, ice cream, chocolate, beer, and soft drinks (Wilkinson 
et al., 2015). 
The industry has many cases of successful radical product innovation. Examples include 
the Anlene™ range of bone nutrition products launched in 1991 by Fonterra, which is the 
first high-calcium dairy product marketed in Asia and is earning more than $350 million 
per annum with an average 70% market share (Riddet Institute, 2011); Zespri Gold, which 
is a game-changing golden kiwifruit variety launched in 2000 that has added nearly $4 
billion to the New Zealand economy (Zespri, 2015); Rockit™ apple, which is the world’s 
first specially bred miniature apple that has been licensed to growers across the world 
(Rockit Trading Company, n.d.); and Greenshell™ Mussel hatchery, which is a 
pioneering method for breeding Greenshell™ mussels in captivity that could soon be 
worth $200 million to the New Zealand economy (SPATNZ, 2017). These products are 
radical because they utilise a new technology platform and offer to the market a major 
new customer benefit or product differentiation. 
The industry successful radical product innovation can be attributed to its commitment to 
product innovation, investment in scientific research and development, and education and 
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training of its people (Earle, Earle, & Anderson, 2001; Riddet Institute, 2011; Wilkinson 
et al., 2015). The previous examples of radical product innovation happened because of 
the commitment by the innovating companies/innovators to pursue their ideas despite the 
technical and marketing challenges. For example, it took four years of paper work for the 
Rockit™ apple to officially become the world’s smallest apple (Rawson, 2014). 
Government owned research organisations (i.e. Crown Research Institutes) such as Plant 
& Food Research, AgResearch, and Landcare Research serve the industry by conducting 
scientific research and development in response to industry needs. For example, Zespri 
Gold was developed as a joint effort between Plant & Food Research and Zespri (Plant 
& Food Research, 2017). Lastly, New Zealand has four higher education institutions with 
major food and beverage research to provide the education and training: Massey 
University, Lincoln University, The University of Auckland, and University of Otago 
(Wilkinson et al., 2015). Furthermore, New Zealand food and beverage companies have 
access to food innovation hubs such as the New Zealand Food Innovation Network, 
FoodHQ, and Lincoln Hub that are located across New Zealand. These hubs provide 
technical and business consultation, networking, and investments to New Zealand food 
and beverage companies that may require them. 
Nevertheless, the industry has a few weaknesses regarding radical product innovation; a 
small domestic market, long distance to market, small company size, and the lack of a 
deep and rich food cultural heritage (compared to France or Italy) can be considered the 
industry’s weaknesses (Coriolis & MBIE, 2014). This again reflects the unique New 
Zealand contextual factors of small population and relative geographical isolation, which 
inhibit New Zealand companies from obtaining the resources or knowledge that could be 
critical for radical product innovation. 
Currently, there are no studies of radical product innovation determinants in the New 
Zealand food and beverage industry. By comparison, there have been a few studies of 
product innovation determinants in the New Zealand food and beverage industry. Three 
relevant studies are summarised here. 
The first study was by West (1980), who conducted research into product development 
practice and success factors in the New Zealand food industry. The study was conducted 
through a detailed questionnaire sent to 24 food companies in New Zealand followed by 
a personal interview with the company executive responsible for the product development 
function for each company selected. She identified five factors considered by New 
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Zealand managers to be important for product development success: an innovative and 
technological company orientation, a supportive company structure, consideration for the 
consumer, security for development, and a well-rounded company marketing emphasis. 
These factors were then evaluated against the actual practices. Technical skills were 
found to be heavily emphasised while design creativity, supportive company structure, 
and marketing emphasis (particularly a consideration for consumer needs) were 
inadequate. Overall, the study indicates New Zealand food companies’ strength lies in 
the technical skills but less in design creativity, consumer knowledge, and supportive 
company structure. 
The second study was by Marsh (2004) who developed a framework for analysing the 
determinants of innovation, using the New Zealand biotechnology sector as the study 
context. The framework was developed with particular reference to the neo-classical, 
endogenous growth, evolutionary, and systems of innovation approaches, including 
alternative methods of measuring innovation output and innovation rate. Data were 
collected from a re-analysis of the first comprehensive survey of biotechnology in New 
Zealand, an original survey conducted by Marsh, interviews with senior management of 
biotechnology companies, and a detailed review of secondary sources. The framework 
covered several determinants of innovation (company size, company type, conduct of 
R&D, involvement in modern biotechnology, specialisation, and alliances) on innovation 
output and innovation rate, and the final results supported most of these determinants. His 
study also provided a detailed description of the biotechnology sector and empirical 
insights into the innovation behaviour of biotechnology companies in New Zealand. 
Finally, the third study was by Khan (2014) who investigated the characterisation of 
functional food product development in New Zealand and Singapore. Functional foods 
were becoming a major focus of new food product development because they were 
associated with higher return and competitive advantage. However, their development 
was more complex than traditional food products because they called for an open and 
interactive product development approach. Data were collected from New Zealand and 
Singaporean companies using a mixed-method approach (quantitative and qualitative 
techniques). Significant differences between traditional food product development suited 
for incremental food products, versus functional food product development suited for 
radical food products, were found. The differences included orientation towards 
innovation, knowledge generation (analytical), development of the resource base of a 
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company (open innovation), collaborative networks and arrangements, and 
commercialisation strategies. Barriers to functional food product development were from 
a closed new product development perspective driven by the management cost of 
innovation, regulatory complications, and lack of technical skills. Khan (2014) concluded 
New Zealand food companies needed to move away from traditional food product 
development and adopt a new product development approach that supports more 
innovative food products such as functional foods in order to differentiate their offerings 
and sustain their competitive advantage. 
On the whole, the New Zealand food and beverage industry’s radical product innovation 
performance is facilitated by its commitment to product innovation, scientific research 
and development, and education and training; and hindered by its distance from market 
and small local population. Multiple organisations in New Zealand, ranging from the 
government funded research institutions, education institutions, and innovation hubs, 
help the industry overcome the hindering factors by providing the resources and 
knowledge required. The previous studies of product innovation determinants suggest 
that the industry is reasonably good at incremental product innovation. However, further 
studies are required to understand radical product innovation determinants in the New 
Zealand food and beverage industry and explain how some New Zealand food and 
beverage companies achieve radical product innovation. 
2.4 New Zealand Context 
This section explains what influences product innovation in New Zealand by reviewing 
its economic background, innovation performance, strengths, and weaknesses for all New 
Zealand industries as a whole. 
2.4.1 What influences product innovation in New Zealand? 
From the 1850s until the Second World War, the New Zealand economy was based 
mainly on the export of wool and sheep meat to the United Kingdom (Easton, 2016a). 
Due to the high demand for New Zealand primary products, New Zealand enjoyed 
premium payment and high economic growth. For the domestic market, New Zealand 
companies were protected from overseas competition by Government regulations and 
protection policies. During this period, New Zealand maintained a high standard of living 
with little competitive pressures from overseas companies. 
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In late 1966, the export price of wool collapsed by 40% due to the competition from 
synthetic fibres (Easton, 2016b). This was followed by the United Kingdom’s entry into 
the European Economic Community in 1973. The lower payment and reduced demand 
from the United Kingdom forced New Zealand companies to innovate and seek new 
markets. Globalisation also pressured the New Zealand government to radically change 
its economic policy. From 1984, the New Zealand government significantly reduced its 
level of regulations and protection policies. This gave New Zealand companies greater 
freedom and flexibility to compete internationally. However, some local manufacturing 
industries, such as car assembly, could not compete and closed as a result. 
Today, the New Zealand economy is made up of a sizable manufacturing and a large 
services sector complementing a highly efficient export-oriented agricultural sector (The 
Treasury, 2016). The primary industries (agricultural, horticultural, forestry, mining, and 
fishing industries) still play an important role in New Zealand’s economy and account for 
just over 50% of New Zealand’s total export earnings (The Treasury, 2016). China, 
Australia, and the United States are New Zealand’s top three export markets, and they 
account for 46% of New Zealand’s merchandise exports in 2015 (The Treasury, 2016). 
Small to medium sized enterprises (SMEs), defined as companies with 0 to 99 full-time 
employees, have an important role in the New Zealand economy (Cameron & Massey, 
1999). SMEs represent 99.6% of all companies in New Zealand and provide 52.8% of all 
employment, and in 2011, contributed around 48% to the GDP (Ministry of Business, 
Innovation and Employment, 2014). 
2.4.2 What is New Zealand’s innovation performance? 
On a measure of innovation output, New Zealand has relatively higher rates of marketing 
and product innovation but lower rates of process and organisational innovation 
compared to other countries in the OECD (Ministry of Economic Development et al., 
2011). Around 46% of all companies reported innovation activities in 2011 and the 
innovation output increases with the company size as larger companies have more 
resources and capacity to innovate (Statistics New Zealand, 2011). Companies with 6 to 
19 employees also reported a higher rate of marketing method innovation than other types 
of innovation (Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment, 2014). 
On a measure of product innovativeness, of all the New Zealand companies who had 
introduced new products in 2009, 43% had new-to-New Zealand product innovation and 
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19% had new-to-the-world product innovation (Statistics New Zealand, 2010). By 
comparison, in Australia during the 2014-15 period, 7.4% of innovating business had 
new-to-Australia product innovation and 8.4% had new-to-the-world product innovation 
(Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2016). New Zealand’s high percentage of new-to-market 
product innovation can be explained given the New Zealand’s relatively small local 
market, making it easier to introduce new products from overseas (Statistics New 
Zealand, 2010). However, it is unclear why New Zealand had a higher percentage of new-
to-the-world product innovation. This could be due to differences in measurement 
method, timing of data collection, or national context. 
Figure 2.17 compares the rate of New Zealand’s product innovativeness with respect to 
business size. It shows the rate of new-to-New Zealand product innovation increases with 
business size. This suggests that larger companies are better at introducing new-to-New 
Zealand product innovation than smaller companies. However, there was no clear 
relationship between new-to-the-world product innovation and business size (Statistics 
New Zealand, 2010). 
 
Figure 2.17: Rate of product innovativeness relative to company size (Statistics 
New Zealand, 2010, p. 33) 
2.4.3 What are New Zealand’s innovation strengths? 
New Zealand innovation system’s strengths lie mainly in its scientific research base 
(Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment, 2012). Compared to the other 30 
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OECD countries, New Zealand publications in science and engineering articles per 
million inhabitants is ranked 11th in the OECD and a proportion of total R&D personnel 
per thousand total employment is ranked 6th in the OECD (Ministry of Economic 
Development et al., 2011). 
Furthermore, New Zealand has good conditions and supportive environments for 
entrepreneurship and innovation (OECD, 2007). New Zealanders are often recognised for 
their ability to innovate despite the challenges; for example, the terms “kiwi ingenuity” 
or “No. 8 wire” often comes to mind (Bridges & Downs, 2000). It is suggested that New 
Zealand’s can-do attitude, entrepreneurship, and ingenuity may be the result of its pioneer 
and agricultural background (Anderson, 2011; Riddet Institute, 2011). In addition, the 
New Zealand government has been promoting product innovation, starting from the 
Think Big projects in the 1980s (Gustafson, n.d.), the Knowledge Wave Conference in 
2001 (University of Auckland Business Review, 2001) to the recent Business Growth 
Agenda (Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment, 2015). 
2.4.4 What are New Zealand’s innovation weaknesses? 
On the other hand, New Zealand’s innovation system’s weaknesses are in its relatively 
low business R&D spending, venture capital investment, and patent activities (Ministry 
of Business, Innovation and Employment, 2012). Compared to the other 30 OECD 
countries, New Zealand’s business expenditure on R&D as a percentage of GDP is much 
lower (24th in the OECD), the size of the venture capital market as a percentage of GDP 
is smaller and relatively underdeveloped (21st out of 26 available OECD countries), and 
the number of triadic patent families1 per million population is low and decreasing (21st 
in the OECD) (Ministry of Economic Development et al., 2011). 
In addition, New Zealand companies face unique contextual factors of small firm size, 
small local market, and geographical isolation, which can be considered disadvantages to 
New Zealand innovation performance (Hong et al., 2016). These unique contextual 
factors contribute to innovation difficulties faced by New Zealand companies, which 
include higher R&D cost, difficulty in accessing distant overseas markets, and a lack of 
management, marketing, and distribution skills (OECD, 2007); it is estimated that the 
                                                 
1  “Triadic patent families” means a set of patents taken at the European Patent Office (EPO), the Japan 
Patent Office (JPO), and granted by the US Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), to protect the 
same invention. 
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geographical isolation alone accounts for 10% of New Zealand productivity loss (OECD, 
2008, as cited in McCann, 2009). This is supported by Statistics New Zealand’s (2011) 
finding where the high cost to develop or introduce innovation, lack of management 
resources, and lack of appropriate personnel are the biggest barriers to innovation as 
reported by New Zealand companies. 
A higher percentage of SMEs also experienced challenges such as the high cost and lack 
of management resources compared to large companies (Ministry of Business, Innovation 
and Employment, 2014). Whereas, the majority of businesses reported factors not 
hampering their ability to innovate are access to intellectual property, lack of co-operation 
with other businesses, government regulation, and lack of information, which reflect New 
Zealand’s good and supportive business environment (Statistics New Zealand, 2011). 
Equally important, is a finding suggesting that New Zealand’s lifestyle, pioneer values 
and cultural beliefs may contribute only to user and small-scale innovation, not popular 
and commercially successful innovation (Rinne, 2011). Rinne and Fairweather (2011) 
conducted a research to understand the difference in innovation identity across countries. 
They collected data from multiple countries through computer-assisted self-interviewing 
and internet survey with adult volunteers from local schools. They found little evidence 
that the government effort to promote innovation as a part of New Zealand national 
identity is entering the public’s consciousness. Less than 10% of innovating companies 
surveyed by Statistics New Zealand (2011) rated universities, polytechnics, Crown 
Research Institutes (CRIs), other research institutes, or research associations as important 
sources of ideas and information for innovation. It is possible that New Zealand 
companies are not fully utilising the New Zealand innovation system’s strength in its 
scientific research base or that these institutions are not relevant to most New Zealand 
companies. 
Overall, New Zealand has a reasonably good product innovation performance relative to 
other OECD countries. This is due to its strong scientific research base, ingenuity, and 
government support for business, entrepreneurship, and innovation. However, given New 
Zealand’s relatively small population, small local market, and geographical isolation, 
many small to medium sized New Zealand companies lack the resources needed to pursue 
product innovation effectively (Hong et al., 2016; OECD, 2007). As a result, most New 
Zealand companies focus their innovation efforts on domestic markets (Ministry of 
Economic Development et al., 2011). New Zealand’s export share of medium to high 
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technology export is also the lowest in the OECD due to a high concentration of primary 
exports and the share of high growth businesses is low and dropping (Ministry of 
Economic Development et al., 2011). Given the New Zealand context, it is important to 
test the validity of the determinants of radical product innovation identified by the 
researcher through systematic review of extant literature, which seldom cover food and 
beverage, as well as the New Zealand context. Thus, this research examines the validity 
of the determinants of radical product innovation from a theoretical standpoint 
(theoretical validity or construct validity) and practical validity (acceptance via 
qualitative field research). 
2.5 Knowledge Gaps and Justification of the Research Questions 
2.5.1 The need for a theoretical framework that better explains how radical 
product innovation is caused through organisational behaviour 
The preceding sections of this chapter reviewed several models that either predict or 
explain radical product innovation phenomenon using organisational characteristics 
(section 2.2.6.1) and organisational capabilities (section 2.2.6.2). The organisational 
characteristics identify the organisational traits that are associated with radical product 
innovation phenomenon and the organisational capabilities identify the organisational 
behaviours that are associated with radical product innovation phenomenon. 
The model posited by Chandy and Tellis (1998), posits “willingness to cannibalise” as 
the sole company trait that causes radical product innovation. Willingness to cannibalise 
is an organisational characteristic because it explains a company’s attitude towards 
investments, rather than an organisational behaviour that explains (along with other 
variables) how radical product innovation is caused. 
Similarly, the model posited by Hult et al. (2004) posits innovativeness as being caused 
through three company orientations. The three company orientations are organisational 
characteristics because they explain a company’s attitude towards innovation, rather than 
the behaviours that can lead to radical product innovation. A potential shortcoming of 
Hult et al.’s (2004) model is that the model assumes that the three company orientations 
are causally mutually exclusive. 
In light of the resource-based view of competitive advantage, as mentioned earlier in 
section 2.2.6.2, quite a number of researchers posited organisational capabilities as the 
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determinants of radical product innovation (e.g. the radical innovation hub proposed by 
(Leifer et al., 2000), the model proposed by Herrmann et al. (2006), and the model 
proposed by Herrmann et al. (2007)), but organisational capabilities is just an inimitable 
resource bundle that is being used by the proponents of the resource-based view to explain 
competitive advantage, with or without radical product innovation. As a result, they fail 
to explain radical product innovation as an organisational behavioural phenomenon. 
In addition, the model posited by Herrmann et al. (2006) can be considered to be a 
refinement of the work of Chandy and Tellis (1998). The sole mediator used by Herrmann 
et al. (2006) to explain radical product innovation phenomenon, namely “Abandon 
Investments”, is identical to the sole mediator used by Chandy and Tellis (“Willingness 
to Cannibalise”) in every respect but the name. While Herrmann et al. (2006) used more 
organisational characteristics to explain willingness to cannibalise than Chandy and Tellis 
(1998), their model, too, fails to explain radical product innovation as an organisational 
behavioural phenomenon. 
Other newer models (e.g. the model proposed by Chang et al. (2012), the model proposed 
by Kyrgidou and Spyropoulou (2013), and the model proposed by Maes and Sels (2014)) 
offer greater insights into organisational behaviours that lead to radical product 
innovation. Nevertheless, they are limited within their study contexts (e.g. established 
firms or SMEs) and Kyrgidou and Spyropoulou (2013) assume the behavioural 
determinants are causally mutually exclusive. 
The model proposed by Slater et al. (2014) is a step in the right direction because the 
researchers have included several behavioural determinants to explain the radical product 
innovation phenomenon by enhancing organisational capability (more precisely, RPIC). 
The model offers a more cohesive and comprehensive model of radical product 
innovation determinants than prior models. 
In summary, Slater et al.’s (2014) model provides a reasonable basis (a starting point) to 
study the behavioural determinants of radical product innovation, taking the food and 
beverage industry as a context and New Zealand as a delimiter (boundary) for the study. 
This justifies the overarching research question (what are the determinants of radical 
product innovation in the New Zealand food and beverage industry, and how do they 
explain product innovativeness?), which in turn leads to the first two research questions. 
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2.5.2 Company characteristics on radical product innovation 
The literature review of organisational characteristics (section 2.2.6.1) revealed that 
company characteristics (e.g. age, size, national culture, industry phase, willingness to 
cannibalise, and company orientation) do potentially affect radical product innovation. 
What is not known is the extent to which these company characteristics explain radical 
product innovation in the New Zealand food and beverage industry. This justifies the third 
research question: “what company characteristics affect product innovativeness in the 
New Zealand food and beverage industry?”. 
The fourth and final research question is a natural extension of the preceding research 
questions. 
2.6 Chapter Summary 
The chapter presented the literature review related to the determinants of radical product 
innovation in the New Zealand food and beverage industry (research focus). The findings 
in this chapter are used to justify the research background in Chapter 1, prepare the model 
development in Chapter 3, and support the discussion in Chapter 6. Three research areas 
relevant to the research focus are summarised as follows. 
Firstly, radical product innovation was reviewed to identify its definition, advantages, 
disadvantages, and determinants. Radical product innovation is defined as the 
introduction of a new product that involves a new-to-market core technology and core 
value proposition. It has a high potential to cause technological and marketing 
discontinuity, making it important for creating superior product advantage, new markets, 
and national growth. However, it is challenging to develop because of the high level of 
uncertainties and barriers (O’Connor & Rice, 2013; Sandberg & Aarikka-Stenroos, 
2014). There have been many studies on radical product innovation determinants from 
organisational characteristics to today’s organisational capabilities. At this time, an 
empirically tested interrelationships model of radical product innovation determinants is 
needed (Chang et al., 2012; Slater et al., 2014). 
Secondly, factors that influence radical product innovation in the global and New Zealand 
food and beverage industry are explored. It is found that radical product innovation is rare 
within the global food and beverage industry due to the conservative nature of food 
consumers. Nevertheless, functional foods are creating demands for innovative food 
68 
products. Radical product innovation in the New Zealand food and beverage industry is 
influenced by the industry’s commitment to product innovation, scientific research and 
development, and education and training. There have been three studies that investigate 
product innovation determinants in the New Zealand food and beverage industry. 
However, further study into the determinants of radical product innovation is needed. 
Thirdly, the New Zealand context is explained. Overall, New Zealand product innovation 
performance is strongly influenced by its economic background and context. Its strong 
scientific research base, supportive business environment, and government initiatives 
help strengthen its innovation performance. However, it is hampered by the unique New 
Zealand context factors of small population and geographical isolation that increase cost 
and limit skilled employees available for innovation. Given this context, this research 
examines the validity of the determinants of radical product innovation from a theoretical 
standpoint (theoretical validity or construct validity) and practical validity (acceptance 
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CHAPTER 3 MODEL DEVELOPMENT 
3.1 Chapter Overview 
This chapter covers the development of models and research hypotheses needed to answer 
the research questions. 
RQ1 What are the determinants of radical product innovation in the New 
Zealand food and beverage industry? 
Two measurement models are needed to answer the RQ1. A product innovativeness 
model is needed to operationally define “product innovativeness”. The criterion variable 
product innovativeness acts as the response variable (also the effect variable) of the causal 
determinants of product innovativeness. This model is developed using technological and 
marketing newness literature provided in section 3.2. Companies that score highly in 
product innovativeness are deemed to be practicing radical product innovation. A product 
innovation process model (the second model) is needed to identify different stages in the 
product innovation process, which collectively explains (or determines or predicts) 
product innovativeness. The product innovation process model is developed by 
combining existing product innovation processes literature provided in section 3.3, in 
order to answer the first research question. 
RQ2 How do the identified determinants of radical product innovation relate to 
one another in predicting and explaining product innovativeness? 
A conceptual model is needed to conceptualise the interrelationships between the 
identified determinants of radical product innovation and product innovativeness. In other 
words, the conceptual model serves as the basis for the product innovativeness model and 
the product innovation process model. The conceptual model is developed from the 
theory of a resource-based view and organisational capabilities for radical product 
innovation, with regard to the New Zealand food and beverage industry context, in section 
3.4, in order to answer the second research question. 
RQ3 What company characteristics affect product innovativeness in the New 
Zealand food and beverage industry? 
Company characteristics that have the potential to affect product innovativeness in the 
New Zealand food and beverage industry are identified in section 3.5. This is in order to 
answer the third research question. 
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RQ4 What are the salient features of a highly innovative New Zealand food and 
beverage company? 
Both the conceptual model and company characteristics are used to answer the RQ4. 
Finally, a hypothesised model and research hypotheses are presented in section 3.6. 
3.2 Product Innovativeness Model 
In this section, the product innovativeness model is developed to measure product 
innovativeness and identify radical product innovation. Product innovativeness is defined 
as “a measure of the potential discontinuity a product (process or service) can generate in 
the marketing and/or technological process” (Garcia & Calantone, 2002, p. 113). 
Product innovativeness can be broken down into technological newness and marketing 
newness (Danneels & Kleinschmidt, 2001; Garcia & Calantone, 2002; Kleinschmidt & 
Cooper, 1991). As a result, both the technological newness and marketing newness are 
used to measure product innovativeness in this study. As mentioned earlier, the higher a 
company scores on newness (i.e. product innovativeness score), the higher the degree of 
product innovativeness of that company. 
In the following three sections, technological newness and marketing newness are 
explained in section 3.2.1 and 3.2.2 respectively, leading to the final model of product 
innovativeness covered in section 3.2.3. 
3.2.1 Technological newness 
Technological newness is a measure of technological change (Chandy & Tellis, 1998; 
Kock et al., 2011). Technology can be defined as “the processes by which an organisation 
transforms labour, capital, materials, and information into products and services of 
greater value” (Christensen, 1997, p. xiii). 
Tushman and Anderson (1986) studied the patterns of technological change in the 
minicomputer, cement, and airline industries from their beginnings through 1980. They 
found that technology evolved through a long period of technological evolution 
interrupted by technological breakthrough. Technological evolution means an 
incremental improvement in product performance through technological refinement. 
Technological breakthrough means a significant improvement in product performance 
due to technological discontinuity. 
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Foster (1986) introduced the S-curve concept (Figure 3.1) to help managers visualise and 
predict technological change. Essentially, the S-curve, in the above context, is a graph of 
the relationship between technology performance and effort (or funds) put into improving 
it. In the beginning, the performance improvement is slow due to limited knowledge and 
competencies. As key knowledge and technological competencies are obtained, the 
performance begins to improve rapidly (learning curve effect) as shown in the middle of 
the curve. Eventually, the rate of performance improvement slows down, and further 
improvement becomes more difficult and expensive when the limit of technology 











Figure 3.1: The S-curve on technology performance vs effort (Foster, 1986, p. 31) 
When the limit of technology performance is reached, an alternative technology with a 
higher limit often emerges to replace the current technology. Foster (1986) calls this 
technological transition period, a “technological discontinuity”. This period is shown as 
a gap between a pair of S-curves in Figure 3.2. According to Foster (1986), leading 
companies often lose their market leadership position during the technological transition 
























Figure 3.2: Technological discontinuity (Foster, 1986, p. 102) 
Sood and Tellis (2005) further investigated the pattern of technological change 
empirically. They argued that the commonly believed S-curve model of technological 
change is incorrect and lacked empirical support. They studied the evolution of 14 
technologies in the following four product categories: data transfer, computer memory, 
desktop printers, and display monitors. Data were sourced from historical archives using 
the historical method2 to minimise survival and self-report bias and to gain new insights 
from historical readings and longitudinal analysis (Sood & Tellis, 2005). They found that 
technology change follows an irregular step function instead of a single S-shaped curve. 
Technologies can have a long period of no improvement in performance then interrupted 
by a significant improvement. New technologies could enter above or below the 
performance of existing technologies and have zero or multiple crossing in performance 
as they compete with each other. The idea of smooth performance improvement and 
                                                 
2  The historical method is defined by Golder (2000) as “the process of collecting, verifying, 
interpreting, and presenting evidence from the past” (p. 157). He has broken it down into five stages: 
1. Select a topic and collect evidence. 2. Critically evaluate the sources of the evidence. 3. Critically 














single crossing as predicted by the S-curve are not supported by their analysis. This leads 
to their conclusion that the S-curve may not be suitable to predict technological change. 
It is also important to consider the technological components and architecture of a new 
product when evaluating radical and incremental technological change (Henderson & 
Clark, 1990; Sood & Tellis, 2005). A product can be considered a system consisting of 
sub systems, where each sub system represents an individual component of the product; 
and how the sub systems are assembled together into a system represents an architecture 
of the product (Henderson & Clark, 1990). For example, print head, ink cartridge, paper 
feeder, and power supply are components of an inkjet printer, and how these components 
are assembled together into a functional product is the architecture of the inkjet printer. 
Sood and Tellis (2005) take this distinction further and define technological change based 
on the technology’s attributes instead of its effects in order to avoid the risk of asserting 
premises that are true by definitions. They define three types of technological change: 
“platform innovation” as a new technology based on distinctly different scientific 
principles from those of existing technologies, “component innovation” as a new use of 
parts or materials within the same technological platform, and “design innovation” as a 
reconfiguration of the linkages and layout of components within the same technological 
platform. Other researchers use the term “core technology” (Chandy & Tellis, 2000; 
Golder et al., 2009; Tushman & Anderson, 1986) and “ancillary components” (Golder et 
al., 2009) to make the distinction between radical and incremental technological change 
respectively. Core technology is the central technology used in the product and ancillary 
components are the supporting technologies and mechanisms used in the product (Golder 
et al., 2009). 
This study chooses to use a change in the new product’s core technology relative to 
previous products to measure its technological newness. This measure is considered most 
reliable given the pattern of technological change as discovered by Sood and Tellis 
(2005). Consequently, a new product that uses a new core technology has a high degree 
of technological newness and a new product that uses available core technology has a low 
degree of technological newness. 
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3.2.2 Marketing newness 
Marketing newness is a measure of value proposition change (Kock et al., 2011; Markides 
& Geroski, 2005). Value proposition can be defined as “a short, clear, simple statement 
of how and on what dimensions a product concept will deliver value to prospective 
customers” (Kahn et al., 2013, p. 475). 
Marketing newness or value proposition change is an important measure of product 
innovativeness (Garcia & Calantone, 2002; Markides & Geroski, 2005). People do not 
buy products solely for practical purposes; they can also buy them for emotional, 
ideological, or societal purpose (Drucker, 1994; Kotler & Armstrong, 2014; Verganti, 
2008). New products such as fashionable goods, books, and online web services are 
examples of new value propositions that use available technologies. 
It has been proposed that value proposition follows a similar change pattern to that of 
technology’s (Garcia & Calantone, 2002; Verganti, 2008). When a new product is 
introduced, marketers need to find a compelling value proposition to get sales. They 
improve their product’s value proposition performance by building customer knowledge 
and marketing competencies. This incremental improvement in value proposition 
performance can be called the value proposition refinement. Similarly, when a value 
proposition is replaced by a superior value proposition, this process of change can be 
called the value proposition discontinuity. Examples of value proposition discontinuity 
are new uses of existing technologies or changes in customer demand brought by a new 
or disruptive technology (Christensen & Raynor, 2003; Golder et al., 2009). 
Furthermore, it is proposed here that value proposition can be broken down into two 
levels of benefits—core benefit and auxiliary benefits—much the same way as 
technology can be broken down into its core and ancillary components; this is to make 
the distinction between radical and incremental value proposition change. According to 
Kotler and Armstrong (2014), a product can be broken down into three levels, as shown 
in Figure 3.3: core customer value, actual product, and augmented product. Core 
customer value is the fundamental reason the customer buys the product; actual product 
is the way core customer value is delivered to the customer; and augmented product is 
the additional customer services and benefits associated with the product. 
In this case, the three levels of product can be used to break value proposition down to 
core benefit and auxiliary benefits. As a result, the core value proposition is the core 
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customer value (i.e. the fundamental reason the customer buys the product) while the 
auxiliary benefits are the actual product and augmented product (i.e. the way core value 














Figure 3.3: Three levels of product (Kotler & Armstrong, 2014, p. 250) 
This study chooses to use a change in the new product’s core value proposition relative 
to previous products to measure marketing newness. It is assumed that the pattern of value 
proposition change is similar to the pattern of technological change, as discovered by 
Sood and Tellis (2005) and that value proposition can be broken down into core benefit 
and auxiliary benefits. Consequently, a new product that uses a new core value 
proposition has a high degree of marketing newness; by the same token, a new product 

























3.2.3 Final measurement model on product innovativeness 
By combining both the technological newness and marketing newness of a new product, 
the final product innovativeness model is developed and shown in Figure 3.4. The vertical 
axis is the technological newness, which measures core technology change of the new 
product relative to previous products. And the horizontal axis is the marketing newness, 
which measures core value proposition change of the new product relative to previous 
products. 
The model presents four categories of product innovativeness: incremental, new 
technology, new value proposition, and radical. Since the degree of change is continuous, 













Figure 3.4: Product innovativeness model 
In order to define each category of product innovativeness, it is important to consider 
from whose perspective a new product’s technological and marketing newness is judged  
(Danneels & Kleinschmidt, 2001; Garcia & Calantone, 2002; Johannessen, Olsen, & 
Lumpkin, 2001). For example, a product can be seen as new by a company from a 
company perspective, but old when judged from a broader, industry perspective. Hence, 
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it is important to consider at what level (and who’s perspective) a product’s degree of 
innovativeness is being judged. 
Garcia and Calantone (2002) conducted an extensive review of product innovativeness 
measures from marketing, engineering, and product development disciplines. They 
recommend two levels of perspective that should be used when judging a product degree 
of innovativeness: the macro level and the micro level. The macro level includes the 
world, industry, and market perspective, while the micro level includes the company 
perspective. Figure 3.5 provides a visual representation of the macro and micro level 










Figure 3.5: Visualisation of the macro and micro level perspectives (adopted from 
Garcia & Calantone, 2002) 
Since the world, industry, and market perspective are all interconnected, Garcia and 
Calantone (2002) contend that the industry perspective is sufficient to measure macro 
level change (and of course, the company perspective, for micro level change). However, 
due to New Zealand’s relatively small market size, it is argued that for the New Zealand 
context, the market perspective is a more appropriate measure of macro level change than 
the industry perspective. Therefore, the technological and marketing newness are judged 
from the market perspective (macro) and company perspective (micro) in this study. 
Given the final model of product innovativeness and the macro and micro level 












1. Incremental product innovation – is the introduction of a new product that 
involves a new-to-company core technology and/or core value proposition. An 
example is a new product with new ancillary components and/or auxiliary benefits 
that is based on an available core technology and core value proposition. It has a 
low degree of product innovativeness. 
2. New technology innovation – is the introduction of a new product that involves 
a new-to-market core technology. An example is a new product with new ancillary 
components and/or auxiliary benefits that is based on a new-to-market core 
technology but an available core value proposition. It has a moderate degree of 
product innovativeness. 
3. New value proposition innovation – is the introduction of a new product that 
involves a new-to-market core value proposition. An example is a new product 
with new ancillary components and/or auxiliary benefits that is based on a new-
to-market core value proposition but an available core technology. It has a 
moderate degree of product innovativeness. 
4. Radical product innovation – is the introduction of a new product that involves 
a new-to-market core technology and core value proposition. An example is a new 
product with new ancillary components and auxiliary benefits that is based on a 
new-to-market core technology and core value proposition. It has a high degree 
of product innovativeness. 
This study uses the product innovativeness model to measure product innovativeness and 
identify cases (companies) that achieve radical product innovation. The model is 
consistent with Garcia and Calantone’s (2002) recommendation to consider both the 
marketing and technological perspective and the macro and micro level perspective when 
judging a product’s degree of innovativeness. It also judges product innovativeness based 
on its attributes instead of its effects to avoid asserting premises that are true by definition 
as suggested by Sood and Tellis (2005). 
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3.3 Product Innovation Process Model 
Product innovation can be viewed as a process of technological development combined 
with market introduction of an invention to end-users through adoption and diffusion 
(Garcia & Calantone, 2002). This means product innovation is a process that can be 
broken down into multiple stages or steps (Cooper, 2008; Earle, 1997a). To be specific, 
a product innovation process (or product development process) is defined as “a 
disciplined and defined set of tasks, steps, and phases that describe the normal means by 
which a company repetitively converts embryonic ideas into saleable products or 
services” (Kahn et al., 2013, p. 463). 
There are five popular product innovation processes: Stage-Gate, integrated product 
development (IPD), lean product development, agile product development, and design 
thinking (Anderson, 2017). Stage-Gate is a product innovation process based on a set of 
product development activities separated by gates (Cooper, 2008). IPD is a product 
innovation process based on a managerial approach for product development through 
parallel execution and exchange of information (Gerwin & Barrowman, 2002). Lean 
product development is a product innovation process based on lean principles originally 
developed from Toyota’s Production System (Liker & Morgan, 2006). Agile product 
development is a product innovation process based on twelve principles of agile software 
development commonly used in the software industry (Beck et al., 2001). Lastly, design 
thinking is a product innovation process based on a designer’s thinking process (design-
driven innovation (Verganti, 2009) is an example of design thinking). 
For this section, product innovation processes with similar characteristics to Stage-Gate 
are selected to develop a model of the product innovation process. These product 
innovation processes are chosen because they identify predominant activities involved in 
the entire product innovation process (regardless of their degree of product 
innovativeness), whereas the other four product innovation processes identify a set of 
guiding principles (i.e. lean and agile) and overlapped/specific activities involved in the 
product innovation process (i.e. IPD and design thinking). 
An overview of different product innovation processes related to both incremental and 
radical product innovation are provided first in section 3.3.1. These product innovation 
processes are combined into the final model of product innovation process in section 
3.3.2. The model is used to structure the interview questions in section 4.4.2. 
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3.3.1 Product Innovation Processes 
Below is an overview of different product innovation processes for both incremental and 
radical product innovation. They are selected based on their relevance to the research. 
3.3.1.1 Booz, Allen, and Hamilton’s new product development process 
Booz, Allen, and Hamilton (1982) conducted many in-depth interviews and 
comprehensive surveys with top management and product managers from leading 
companies in the United States and Europe to map the key stages involved in new product 
development. Through their research and consultancy experience, they have developed 
several important new product management concepts. One such contribution is the 7-step 
new product development process shown in Figure 3.6. The new product development 
process identifies 7 steps which in turn specify the activities and management 
requirements needed to introduce new products from new product strategy development 










Figure 3.6: New product development process (Booz et al., 1982, p. 11) 
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3.3.1.2 Marquis’s process of innovation framework 
Marquis (1982) analysed more than 500 successful incremental product and process 
innovations to find common characteristics in incremental innovation (Marquis viewed 
radical product innovation as rare and unpredictable and hence did not include radical 
product innovation in his analysis). However, Marquis’s process of innovation 
framework is useful for understanding the radical product innovation process because it 
explains how a company can search and utilise technological knowledge and recognise 
market demand. 
Marquis’s process of innovation framework is shown in Figure 3.7. A temporal scale is 
shown at the bottom of the diagram to show the stages a company goes through to develop 
a successful innovation: recognition, idea formulation, problem solving, solution, 
development, and utilisation and diffusion. Innovation can be conducted from beginning 
to end within a single company. However, it is more common for companies to utilise 
information from other sources at different times and places. The two major sources of 
information are the current state of technical knowledge and the existing or potential 
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3.3.1.3 Earle’s framework for a food product development process 
Earle (1997a) studied the changes in the food product development processes from the 
1960s through to the 1990s. She elucidates that the food product development processes 
have evolved over time as a result of new food production methods, increased emphasis 
on recipe development, greater consideration of consumer needs, and integration of 
market research and new technologies. She considers both the knowledge of industrial 
customers (or consumers and the knowledge of modern sciences) and technological 
development as being equally important in a food product development process. 
By reviewing the evolution of food product development processes from 1967 through to 
1995, Earle (1997a) identifies seven stages in a food product development process: 
1. Business strategy 
2. Product and process development 
3. Product testing 
4. Market testing 
5. Product launch preparation 
6. Product launch 
7. Post-launch evaluation 
Earle (1997a) shows that a new process is developed based on new changes in the food 
industry, which includes the consideration of the total food system, greater consumer 
demands and quality concerns, long term business needs, and the multinational nature of 
the food system. The proposed process consists of four stages: 
1. Product strategy and planning 
2. Creation, design, and development of product 
3. Production process, marketing strategy, quality assurance, and commercial 
product 
4. Launch and post-launch 
The four stages can be broken down into activities, outcomes, and management actions 
and decisions, and are separated by top management’s go or no-go decision. They are 
developed in response to the new changes in the food industry and can guide managers 
in their food product development effort. Earle’s (1997a) four stage food product 
development process framework is used for this analysis. 
84 
3.3.1.4 Song and Montoya-Weiss’s conceptualisation of new product development 
activities  
Song and Montoya-Weiss (1998) compared a “really new” versus incremental product 
innovation process. From their previous case-studies and focus group interviews, they 
identify six new product development activities critical for a new product’s success, 
regardless of its degree of innovativeness: 
1. Strategic planning – the preliminary assessment and integration of a project’s 
resource requirement, market opportunities, and strategic directives. 
2. Idea development and screening – the generation, elaboration, and evaluation 
of potential solutions to the identified strategy opportunities. 
3. Business and market opportunity analysis – the execution of the marketing 
tasks into well-defined sets of attributes that fulfil consumers’ needs and desires. 
4. Technical development – the designing, engineering, testing, and building of the 
desired product. 
5. Product testing – the testing of the product itself as well as its marketing and 
advertising programs. 
6. Product commercialisation – the co-ordination, implementation, and monitoring 
of the new product launch. 
After studying 163 really new and 169 incrementally developed new products, Song and 
Montoya-Weiss (1998) found strategic planning, business and market opportunity 
analysis, technical development, and product commercialisation equally important for 
both really new and incremental product innovation in determining their success. 
However, strategic planning and business and market opportunity analysis had opposite 
effects on the innovation profitability. Improving the proficiency in business and market 
opportunity analysis was found to increase the profitability of incremental products, but 
was found to be counterproductive for really new products. In contrast, improving the 
proficiency in strategic planning positively improved the profitability of really new 
products, but had a negative effect on incremental products. Hence, the authors argued 
that companies should adjust their attention and resource allocation for each new product 




3.3.1.5 Veryzer’s conceptualisation of discontinuous product innovation process 
Veryzer (1998) investigated the difference between the new product development 
processes for discontinuous (radical) products and continuous (incremental) products. 
Discontinuous products are products that involve significant new technologies and offer 
significantly enhanced customer benefits. Continuous products are products that utilise 
existing technology and provide the same benefits as existing products. 
Based on in-depth case studies involving eight discontinuous product development 
projects in large Fortune 500 companies with proven track records for discontinuous 
innovation, Veryzer (1998) identified some significant differences between discontinuous 
innovation process and continuous innovation process. Firstly, unlike continuous 
innovation, discontinuous innovation was found to be managed in a more flexible way 
due to high level of technological and market uncertainty. Secondly, internal 
technological capability, technological breakthroughs, and a product champion were 
found to be important drivers in starting a discontinuous innovation project. Lastly, 
customer involvement and conventional business analysis were found to be 
counterproductive in the early phases of discontinuous innovation because of the lack of 
understanding or appreciation of the new technologies. 
From these differences, Veryzer (1998) develops a model of discontinuous product 

























Figure 3.8: Discontinuous product innovation process (Veryzer, 1998, p. 317) 
The discontinuous product innovation process is initiated by the convergence of dynamic 
drifting (new technologies), contextual factors, and the vision of a product champion. 
From this convergence, new technologies are explored through formulation and 
preliminary design to identify a potential product application. Then, the formal evaluation 
screen is carried out in order to significantly increase funding for development. Following 
this, formative prototype, lead user testing, and design modification are conducted to 
develop the product into a prototype to test its feasibility and identify a target market. The 
conventional market assessment and financial analysis are seen negatively during these 
early stages because of the limited understanding of the new technologies. Afterwards, a 
more conventional product development process can be conducted, once the product is 
transferred from the R&D group to the operating unit. At this point, the development 
process becomes similar to continuous or incremental product innovation, from 
prototyping through to commercialisation activities. Market assessment and financial 
analysis can be conducted to increase the product’s chance of success. 
In summary, discontinuous innovation, like radical product innovation, has a high level 
of technological and market uncertainty. As a result, companies need a different 
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Veryzer (1998), to deal with high uncertainties. Nevertheless, further work is needed to 
determine whether or not a more formalised and systematic process could improve the 
radical or discontinuous project performance (Veryzer, 1998). 
3.3.1.6 Cooper’s Stage-Gate approach 
Cooper (2008) introduces the idea of Stage-Gate as a robust idea-to-launch system for 
new product development. Stage-Gate is a conceptual and operational map for managing 
new product development projects from idea to launch and beyond. The standard Stage-
Gate process consists of a series of stages where a team carries out development activities, 
separated by gates, where go or kill decisions are made to continue investing in the 
project. Each stage is designed to gather relevant information to reduce key project 
uncertainties and risks, and the project gets costlier to cancel after each stage. 
The Stage-Gate approach assists the project team in planning and improving the quality 
of product development activities and can be adapted according to the level of uncertainty 
or risk, which in turn increases the chance of new product success (Cooper, 2008). The 
stages in the Stage-Gate process described by Cooper (2008) are as follows: 
1. Discovery 
2. Scoping 
3. Build business case 
4. Development 
5. Testing and validation 
6. Launch 
7. Post-launch review 
3.3.2 Finalising the model based on extant literature 
The product innovation processes identified in section 3.3.1 are compared and combined 
in Table 3.1.
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Table 3.1: Combining Product Innovation Processes 
Booz, Allen, & 
Hamilton (1982) 
Marquis (1982) Earle (1997) Song & Montoya-
Weiss (1998) 
Veryzer (1998) Cooper (2008) Combined Process 
New Product Strategy 
Development 
Recognition Product Strategy and 
Planning 
Strategic Planning Convergence Discovery Opportunity 
Recognition 
↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ 
Idea Generation Idea Formulation Creation, Design, and 
Development of Product 
Idea Development & 
Screening 
Formulation Scoping Idea Development 
Screening & 
Evaluation 
↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ 
Business Analysis ↓ ↓ Business & Marketing 
Opportunity Analysis 
↓ Build Business Case Business Analysis 
↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ 
Development Problem Solving ↓ Technical Development Preliminary Design Development Development 
↓ Solution ↓ ↓ Formative 
Prototype 




Testing Development Production Process, 
Marketing Strategy, Quality 
Assurance, & Commercial 
Product 
Product Testing Prototype Testing & Validation Testing & 
Validation 
↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ 
Commercialisation Utilisation & 
Diffusion 





     Post-Launch Review  
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The final model of product innovation process based on the above combined process is 




Figure 3.9: Product innovation process model 
The product innovation process model specifies predominant activities an innovating 
company most likely goes through to introduce a new product to the marketplace. The 
model is applicable for all product innovations, regardless of the degree of 
innovativeness. The model is only used as a guide for the interview structure in section 
4.4.2. It does not list all the activities involved in new product development. Each stage 
represented by the product innovation process model is defined below. 
1. Opportunity recognition – a new product idea is recognised possibly through 
random discovery, new technologies, or strategic planning. 
2. Idea development – the new product idea is developed into a new product 
concept or prototype. 
3. Business analysis – the new product concept is evaluated according to the 
innovating company’s criteria. 
4. Development – the new product concept undergoes technological and marketing 
development into a functional new product. 
5. Testing & validation – the functional new product is prepared for production and 
commercialisation. 
6. Commercialisation – the final new product is launched into the marketplace 













3.4 Conceptual Model 
This section covers the development of the conceptual model of radical product 
innovation determinants, using the New Zealand food and beverage industry as a context. 
The conceptual model provides the basis for addressing the research questions. Radical 
product innovation determinants are defined as the factors that affect the propensity of a 
company to pursue radical product innovation (Herrmann et al., 2007). 
From the literature review of radical product innovation determinants in section 2.2.6, it 
is concluded that radical product innovation determinants are commonly conceptualised 
based on organisational capabilities. These organisational capabilities are from the theory 
of a resource-based view of competitive advantage. The resource-based view is a 
management theory that considers a company’s idiosyncratic and valuable resources 
(such as its capabilities, competency, and knowledge, and more importantly the complex 
way in which they are bundled that makes them difficult for another organisation to 
imitate) as the cause of its competitive advantage (Barney, 1991; Peteraf, 1993; 
Wernerfelt, 1984). Hence, organisational capabilities conducive to radical product 
innovation are considered as the determinants of radical product innovation. 
Seven organisational capabilities conducive to radical product innovation have been 
identified and discussed in section 2.2.6.2. Following this, a conclusion is that a more 
comprehensive and structural model of radical product innovation determinants is needed 
(Chang et al., 2012; Slater et al., 2014). Since the food and beverage industry has similar 
determinants of radical product innovation to other industries’ (as concluded in section 
2.3.1), the seven organisational capabilities are combined into five determinants of radical 
product innovation as shown in Table 3.2. The organisational characteristics in Herrmann 
et al.’s (2007) study are not included since they are not organisational capabilities. 
The five determinants that are identified are top management innovation capability, 
internal innovation capability, external networking capability, innovative organisational 
culture capability, and innovative product development capability. The five determinants 
are defined as organisational behaviour and explained in sections 3.4.1 to 3.4.5 
respectively. Afterwards, the conceptual model and the interrelationships between the 
identified determinants and product innovativeness are proposed in section 3.4.6. It is 
argued that managers can encourage more radical product innovation in their organisation 
by knowing these determinants and their effects on radical product innovation.
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Table 3.2: Combining Organisational Capabilities (Determinants) of Radical Product Innovation 
Radical 
innovation hub 






































N/A N/A N/A Managerial 
capabilities 











































































3.4.1 Top management innovation capability 
Top management innovation capability is the ability of top management to manage 
radical product innovation in their organisation. Earle et al. (2001) provide a summary of 
top management responsibilities in food product development (PD) as follows. 
Product development at both the programme and the project levels needs to be 
based on the business strategy. It is the responsibility of top management and they 
need to set the strategies for the product development programme for the present 
and future years, and also the aims for the individual projects. Top management 
needs to ensure that there are systematic PD Processes for the different levels of 
innovation and types of products. Having set the strategy and the PD process, they 
need to ensure that there is the necessary product, processing, distribution and 
marketing knowledge in the company, and also the ability to create new 
knowledge in design, development, and commercialisation. (p. x) 
This indicates that top management have the responsibilities of setting the business and 
product development strategy, product development process, resource allocation, and 
product development capability of their organisation. Without top management 
involvement, radical projects can easily be replaced with less innovative projects, or 
abandoned due to lack of resources or other short-term concerns (Cooper, 2011; Kyrgidou 
& Spyropoulou, 2013; Leifer et al., 2000). Top management act as radical project 
sponsors, protecting them from inhibiting forces in the company and supplying them with 
the resources and encouragement required (Booz et al., 1982; McDermott & O’Connor, 
2002). In large established companies, they can establish supportive organisational 
structure and mechanisms, such as the radical innovation hub, to facilitate radical projects 
and personnel involved (Leifer et al., 2000; Slater et al., 2014). 
According to O’Connor and Rice (2013), companies face four types of uncertainties 
associated with radical product innovation: 
• Technical uncertainty – which is related to the development, application, and 
manufacturing of new technology. 
• Market uncertainty – which is related to the understanding of customer wants 
and needs, and other marketing considerations such as a business model, market 
creation, sales and distribution, and competitors. 
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• Organisational uncertainty – which is related to the organisational 
transformation and learning needed to develop and commercialise the new 
product. 
• Resource uncertainty – which is related to the resource acquisition (both 
financial and competency) needed for the project. 
These uncertainties explain the majority of radical product innovation barriers (Sandberg 
& Aarikka-Stenroos, 2014) and prevent most companies from achieving radical project 
success (O’Connor & Rice, 2013). It is argued that top management have the power to 
alleviate these uncertainties (or barriers) through their actions, given their responsibilities 
in the organisation. 
Firstly, top management can overcome the technical and marketing uncertainty by 
providing a product development strategy and process to their organisation. Product 
development strategy directs the company’s product development programme in 
alignment with the business strategy (Earle et al., 2001). Product development strategy 
can be greatly influenced by top management’s strategic vision (Booz et al., 1982; Slater 
et al., 2014). Tellis and Golder (1996) refer to top management’s vision influencing the 
product development strategy as “envisioning the mass market”, where top management 
envision a future product or target market that guides and inspires their company’s 
product development programme. Other types of visions include “technology vision” 
(Reid, Roberts, & Moore, 2015) and “market visioning” (O’Connor & Veryzer, 2001) 
that bring clarity and solutions to the technical and marketing uncertainty. Some tools top 
management can use to communicate their vision include portfolio management, 
technology roadmapping, and product roadmapping (Anderson, 2017; Phaal, Farrukh, & 
Probert, 2004). In addition, top management have the ability to influence the choice of 
product development process (Booz et al., 1982; Slater et al., 2014). By choosing 
appropriate product development processes according to a different degree of product 
innovativeness, top management can provide structure and instruction to the product 
development team, reducing uncertainties and risks, and improving project performance 
(Cooper, 2008; Holahan et al., 2014). 
Secondly, top management can reduce the organisational uncertainties by demonstrating 
their commitment to innovation to the whole organisation. They can demonstrate 
commitment by allocating resources to radical projects (Slater et al., 2014), abandoning 
old investments in pursuit of new opportunities (Herrmann et al., 2006), transforming 
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their organisational competencies and pursuing new markets (Herrmann et al., 2007), and 
showing managerial persistence in spite of technical and marketing challenges (Tellis & 
Golder, 1996). They can also provide an executive oversight to assist with the 
organisational transformation process and encourage learning and risk taking within their 
organisation through appropriate incentives, performance indicators, and initiatives 
(Herrmann et al., 2006; Leifer et al., 2000; Slater et al., 2014). 
Lastly, top management can reduce resource uncertainty by acquiring and allocating the 
necessary resources for radical product innovation. They can acquire the necessary 
resources from both internal sources (within the company) and external sources (external 
partners). Top management can acquire resources from internal sources by allocating 
available company resources such as finances and personnel for radical projects. They 
can also build internal resources within their organisation by investing in internal 
competencies (Danneels, 2002). These internal competencies are the company’s internal 
innovation capability that allows it to create new knowledge in design, development, and 
commercialisation (Earle et al., 2001). Top management can also acquire external 
resources (such as capitals, capabilities, competency, and knowledge) by building 
relationship and collaboration with external partners. According to Verganti (2008), top 
management of the organisation recognises the importance of maintaining a network of 
interpreters in a design discourse. These interpreters work to provide vital knowledge and 
influence on evolving consumer needs and design trends; both of these are necessary for 
radical product innovation. They can also invest in the development of absorptive 
capacity for acquiring and utilising external knowledge (Grant, 1996; Maes & Sels, 
2014). 
For the aforesaid reasons, top management innovation capability is posited to be a major 
determinant of radical product innovation. This determinant goes beyond the traditional 
view of top management support for innovation; top management innovation capability 
considers the ability to envision product development strategy, acquire and allocate 
necessary resources, support and protect radical projects, and implement appropriate 
product development practices. These become possible because of the responsibilities 
and influence top management have in their organisation. The better the top management 




3.4.2 Internal innovation capability 
Internal innovation capability is the ability of an organisation to develop and utilise its 
in-house technological and market competency for radical product innovation. As 
highlighted by Rubera, Ordanini, and Calantone (2012), two key tasks are involved in 
product innovation: “to physically develop a product (which requires technological 
competency) and to sell the product (which requires market competency)” (p. 768). 
Examples of technological competency include manufacturing plant and equipment, 
manufacturing know-how, engineering know-how, and quality assurance tools; examples 
of market competency include knowledge of customer needs and processes, distribution 
and sales channels, communication channels, and company/brand reputation (Danneels, 
2002). This determinant is similar to the core competency concept (section 2.2.6.2), 
making it important for gaining competitive advantage (Prahalad & Hamel, 1990). 
Internal innovation capability is closely related to overcoming technical, market, and 
resource uncertainty. A company with strong technological and market competency can 
exploit them for product innovation (Danneels, 2002; Rubera et al., 2012). Cooper and 
Kleinschmidt (1987) recommend companies to pursue new products with high 
technological and marketing synergy (a good fit with the company’s available 
technological and market competency) because such products are positively linked to new 
product success. Similarly, Tellis and Golder (1996) advise companies to leverage their 
assets such as brand-name recognition, including their distribution, production, or 
managerial expertise, when entering into a new product category. Likewise, Prahalad and 
Hamel (1990) advocate for companies to invest in and cultivate their core competency to 
achieve economy of scale and scope. In other words, companies with strong internal 
innovation capability are better prepared to cope with technical and marketing 
uncertainties leading to a higher chance of new product success. 
Based on the previous argument, it is further argued that internal innovation capability is 
important for product innovation, regardless of its degree of innovativeness. This view is 
at odds with some radical product innovation literature that view internal competencies 
as having the potential to inhibit companies from pursuing radical product innovation. It 
is argued in the literature that radical product innovation can sometimes destroy internal 
competencies, which in turn leads to organisational resistance (Abernathy & Clark, 1985; 
Chandy & Tellis, 1998; Leonard-Barton, 1992; Tushman & Anderson, 1986). In this 
study, it is argued that failure to pursue radical innovation is due to inability or 
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unwillingness on the part of the company to develop their internal competencies by 
replacing, transforming, or integrating the current internal competencies with new 
competencies (Chang et al., 2012; Herrmann et al., 2007, 2006; O’Reilly & Tushman, 
2011). As discovered by Chandy and Tellis (1998), supportive organisational 
characteristics (internal markets, product champion influence, and future-market focus) 
do adequately counter the negative effects of having specialised investments (large 
investment in specialised technology). This finding is consistent with the findings of 
Chang et al. (2012) and Kyrgidou and Spyropoulou (2013) who identified “integration 
capability” and “managerial capabilities” respectively as powerful determinants to 
overcome the organisational resistance for radical innovation. Companies could also 
invest in “non-specific investments” and “market-focused core competencies” to avoid 
having specialised investments (Herrmann et al., 2006). 
The process of internal competency development can be interpreted as a process of 
organisational learning or exploration, where a company develops new knowledge 
through activities such as search, experimentation, risk taking, and innovation (March, 
1991). According to Danneels (2002), exploration is a necessary process for companies 
to acquire new competencies they do not have for radical product innovation. McDermott 
and O’Connor (2002), based on their case studies of radical product innovation in 10 large 
established companies, found that companies sometimes engaged in competency 
stretching, where their internal competencies were neither enhanced nor destroyed; 
instead, they found that new competencies are being created, allowing the companies to 
enter into new competency domains. McDermott and O’Connor (2002) argue that 
competency stretching could be an important activity for long-term growth and renewal 
of large established companies. Alternatively, companies can become ambidextrous 
organisations so that they can exploit existing competencies, while exploring for new 
competencies at the same time (O’Reilly & Tushman, 2011). 
It is suggested that one of the reasons companies can utilise their existing competencies 
for radical product innovation is because radical product innovation actually borrows in 
a certain degree from previous radical product innovation (Golder et al., 2009). Golder et 
al. (2009) examined 29 radical innovations (e.g. telegraph, refrigerator, tape recorder, 
microwave, colour television, and digital camera) from their initial concept through to 
mass-market commercialisation. They found that many radical innovations are actually 
borrowed from previous radical innovations in four ways: shared core technology, shared 
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ancillary components, shared functionality, and shared look-and-feel. Similarly, 
Kleinschmidt and Cooper (1991) found radical product innovation to be linked to high 
technological and marketing synergy. They went on to say: 
Non-innovative products are logically ‘close-to-home,’ hence synergies will exist, 
an expected result. But highly innovative products also had synergy. One might 
speculate that because highly innovative products are more uncertain and risky 
that they tend to be undertaken only when management is convinced that there is 
a good match between the resource base of the firm and the needs of the project. 
(p. 248) 
Tellis and Golder (1996) made a similar discovery in that they found that many market 
leading companies use their dominant positions or expertise and strengths in one product 
category to enter and dominate another related product category. Golder et al. (2009) best 
summarise this when they say: 
Companies can take both an engineering orientation toward borrowing from 
previous innovations by adopting core technologies and components or a 
marketing orientation by adopting common functionality and a similar look-and-
feel. Because most of the radical innovations in our sample borrowed from 
previous radical innovations, such strategies are likely to be very important in 
developing future radical innovations. (p. 177) 
Thus, a strong internal innovation capability is argued to be beneficial for radical product 
innovation because it allows the company to achieve an economy of scope and reduce 
technical and marketing uncertainty when developing new technologies and value 
propositions; this is based on the assumption that the company is able to develop its 
internal innovation capability according to their radical product innovation needs. 
Lastly, it is proposed that internal innovation capability is important for alleviating 
resource uncertainty. Pioneers of radical product innovation often fail because they are 
unable or unwilling to commit the resources necessary for market leadership (Golder & 
Tellis, 1993). It may also be that sometimes, pioneers of radical product innovation could 
not handle the technological discontinuities that may happen after the introduction of new 
technology (Olleros, 1986). They could also be ill-equipped with regard to market 
competency needed to access end consumers, create demands, or capture the value of 
their radical products (Min et al., 2006; Teece, 1986). Furthermore, incumbents face 
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additional challenges of integrating new competencies into their existing competencies 
(Chang et al., 2012). As a result, the lack of strong internal innovation capability could 
explain the high pioneer failure rate for radical product innovation. 
Thus, in this study, having a strong internal innovation capability is posited to be an 
important determinant of radical product innovation. Internal innovation capability 
allows the company to leverage its internal competencies for new technologies and value 
propositions. How well a company is able to invest in and utilise their technological and 
market competency will determine the strength of its internal innovation capability. 
3.4.3 External networking capability 
External networking capability is the ability of an organisation to collaborate with 
external partners for radical product innovation. It complements the company’s internal 
innovation capability (internal resources) by providing it with an access to external 
resources (e.g. assets, capitals, capabilities, competencies, and knowledge) that the 
company does not have for radical product innovation. It is noted that companies can 
outsource resources from other companies. This is interpreted as being congruent with 
the resource-based view in relation to a firm’s boundary, where certain resources are kept 
in-house as core competencies while others are outsourced for strategic reasons such as 
to reduce cost, increase flexibility, improve focus, and exploit external resources (Espino-
Rodríguez & Padrón-Robaina, 2006). 
Joseph (2008) studied the role of customers and other external influencers (OEIs) had on 
the development and success of six radical ICT products for industrial markets by small 
to medium sized New Zealand technology companies. Since Joseph’s study context is 
similar to the context of this study, his list of potential external influencers on new product 
development is used for the field work in the present study. The potential external 
influencers identified by Joseph (2008) are customers (including distributors, purchasers, 
and end users), suppliers, investors, complementors, consultants and advisors, 
universities, competitors, and governments and other authorities. 
The external influencers mentioned above are referred to as external partners in this 
study. External partners can help companies reduce the technical, market, and resource 
uncertainty associated with radical product innovation in many ways. Olleros (1986) 
suggests that pioneers of radically new technologies use strategies such as subcontracting 
manufacturing work, forming joint ventures with established mass-marketers, licensing 
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its technology, or establishing co-operative R&D agreement with current or potential 
competitors to reduce risks associated with being a pioneer (e.g. pioneer burnout). 
McDermott (1999), based on a longitudinal case study of seven radical product 
development projects in five Fortune 500 companies, found that product development 
team members (in all seven projects) rely on the existence of large, informal networks of 
individuals—both inside and outside the company—to help with the development 
process, the objective being the achieving of savings, both in money and time. 
Furthermore, McDermott found that alliances (long-term relationship between two 
companies) ranging from market-driven, manufacturing-driven, and R&D-driven 
alliances are used by successful developers to fill in any competency gaps. In addition, 
government funding for research was also found to be important (McDermott, 1999). 
External networking capability is related to the “open innovation” model where a 
company commercialise both its own and external ideas by utilising both its internal and 
external resources and pathways (Chesbrough, 2003). Since new knowledge and radical 
product ideas are often located outside the companies, the development of absorptive 
capacity or openness capability can contribute to radical product innovation (Chang et 
al., 2012; Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; Maes & Sels, 2014). This view is shared by several 
researchers who have identified the ability to utilise externally generated ideas and 
knowledge, build relationships with distributors, and integrate with suppliers and 
customers to be an important determinant of radical product innovation in the food and 
beverage industry (Capitanio et al., 2010; Martinez & Briz, 2000; Siriwongwilaichat & 
Winger, 2004; Tomas et al., 2014). 
However, the idea of open innovation is still not widely adopted in the food and beverage 
industry (Bigliardi & Galati, 2013b; Sarkar & Costa, 2008). Some of the reasons include 
a lack of trust and communication in the supply chain (Beckeman et al., 2013), the 
industry’s orientation toward incremental innovation strategy (Martinez & Briz, 2000), 
and a low level of competitive pressure (Martinez, Lazzarotti, Manzini, & García, 2014; 
Ziggers, 2005). According to Martinez et al. (2014), food and beverage companies need 
to have a dedicated architecture for collaboration (supporting organisational structures, 
supporting management actions, collaboration mindset, and IP protection mechanisms) 
to successfully access and leverage external knowledge. Similarly, Saguy and 
Sirotinskaya (2014) identify a lack of open innovation mindset and an IP model prevents 
SMEs in the food and beverage industry from fully embracing open innovation. These 
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issues suggest that external networking capability may be relatively weak in the food and 
beverage industry compared to other industries. 
Another important facet of external networking capability is the cluster effect. As Porter 
(1998) defines, “clusters are geographic concentrations of interconnected companies and 
institutions in a particular field. Clusters encompass an array of linked industries and other 
entities important to competition” (p. 78). A cluster enables companies and institutions 
within it to share information and resources that can improve the whole cluster’s 
productivity, competitiveness, and ability to innovate (Porter, 1998). 
There are many strategies companies can employ to exploit or leverage the clusters they 
are in. Coviello and Joseph (2012) propose a company’s ability to immediately identify 
and involve customers (from its customer network) in new product development being 
crucial for a successful major innovation. Verganti (2008) demonstrates how leading 
Italian design companies are able to build and exploit their network position within the 
design discourse to generate new product ideas, influence consumer demands, and attract 
talented designers to work for them. 
However, it needs to be noted that gaining access to valuable resources in a cluster is not 
an easy task. As Porter (1998) points out, “tapping into the competitively valuable assets 
within a cluster requires personal relationships, face-to-face contact, a sense of common 
interest, and ‘insider’ status. The mere colocation of companies, suppliers, and 
institutions creates the potential for economic value; it does not necessarily ensure its 
realisation” (p. 88). Companies also need the competency to involve the right customers, 
at the right time, and in the right form, to benefit significantly from customer 
collaboration (Lettl, 2007). 
For the food and beverage industry, food clusters have been identified to promote 
innovation in several food export countries (Beckeman & Skjöldebrand, 2007; Lagnevik 
et al., 2003). Retailers are a major external partner in a food cluster because they 
ultimately determine what products get placed before the consumer and can also influence 
consumer tastes and buying habits by changing the placement of products on shelves 
(Winger & Wall, 2006). Retailers can work together with food manufacturers to share 
important consumer knowledge and improve the success rate of new products (ECR 
Europe, 1999; Stewart-Knox & Mitchell, 2003). At the same time, a trend of retailers’ 
branded food products has, in some cases, turned retailers into competitors who drive the 
innovation activities of food and beverage companies (Galizzi & Venturini, 2008; Winger 
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& Wall, 2006). Since consumers are the final deciders of new food product acceptance, 
they too should be involved in all stages of the food product development project (Earle 
et al., 2001). Next, food ingredient suppliers and food processing equipment suppliers 
can provide important technical knowledge for innovation (Siriwongwilaichat & Winger, 
2004). Spill over of knowledge from other manufacturing sectors (especially from the 
chemical and drug industry) could also be useful for food and beverage companies (Rama 
& Tunzelmann, 2008). 
For the New Zealand food and beverage industry context, food clusters or networks such 
as the New Zealand Food Innovation Network, Food HQ, and Lincoln Hub provide a 
pathway for companies to share knowledge and resources more effectively and 
efficiently. New Zealand government funded research institutions, universities, and 
government grants also play a pivotal role for the industry by conducting scientific 
research and development (i.e. knowledge creation), education and training, and 
encouraging innovation respectively. 
Consequently, in this study, it is posited that external networking capability enables 
companies to acquire and utilise external resources to fill gaps in their internal innovation 
capability to achieve radical product innovation. As shown above, there are many external 
partners a company can tap into to build strategic relationships for development of 
innovative new products. Furthermore, given how difficult it is to build long-term 
relationships with external partners, external networking capability is hard to imitate and 
substitute, and can be important for competitive advantage. 
3.4.4 Innovative organisational culture capability 
Innovative organisational culture capability is the ability of an organisation to cope with 
high uncertainty created by radical product innovation. Organisational culture is defined 
as the values, beliefs, and assumptions of the organisation (Slater et al., 2014). Radical 
product innovation is seen as high risk, due to a high degree of uncertainty (O’Connor & 
Rice, 2013). As a result, many companies are reluctant to pursue radical product 
innovation (Sandberg & Aarikka-Stenroos, 2014). This is especially true for large 
established companies given their specialised investments, established competencies, and 
structural and cultural inertias (Chandy & Tellis, 1998; Tushman & Anderson, 1986; 
Tushman & O’Reilly, 1996). However, an organisation that can tolerate a high degree of 
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uncertainty (or risks), are more likely to welcome and support radical product innovation 
(Chang et al., 2012; Kyrgidou & Spyropoulou, 2013; Slater et al., 2014). 
Innovative organisational culture capability is very important for dealing with the 
technical, market, and organisational uncertainty. Cooper (2011) sums this up very 
nicely: 
Having the right climate and culture for innovation, an appetite to invest in 
innovative and more risky projects, and the right leadership from the top is the 
number one factor that distinguishes top innovation companies… Those 
businesses that create a positive climate for innovation, support innovation at 
every opportunity, reward and recognise innovators and successful development 
teams, and welcome ideas from all employees do much better at product 
innovation. (p. 6) 
Tellis and Golder (1996) use the phrase “relentless innovation” to refer to companies that 
are committed to continuous innovation to keep improving their products (this covers 
both incremental and radical product innovation), even at the cost of cannibalising their 
current product sales. Markham and Lee (2013), who presented the results of Product 
Development and Management Association’s 2012 comparative performance assessment 
study, identified eight elements of an innovation culture; best companies were found to 
exhibit all eight cultural elements over 55% of the time, while the remaining companies 
exhibited all but one of those elements less than 50% of the time. The eight elements of 
an innovative culture identified by Markham and Lee (2013) are 1. Failure is understood 
as a part of innovation. 2. Managers establish innovation objectives. 3. Innovation 
objectives are included in a performance review. 4. Recruitment parameters are included 
in innovation potential. 5. There is effective communication with external partners. 6. 
Innovation and risk-taking are valued. 7. Managers are open to constructive conflict. And 
8. There is effective communication within the company. 
One way to study a company’s organisational culture is to investigate its orientation. Hult 
et al. (2004) identify three orientations (i.e. the culture or norms, values, and beliefs) that 
significantly and positively influence a company’s innovativeness: “market orientation”, 
“learning orientation”, and “entrepreneurial orientation”. Market orientation refers to the 
generation, dissemination, and responsiveness to market intelligence; learning orientation 
refers to the development of new knowledge; and entrepreneurial orientation refers to the 
entry of new businesses. Based on the literature, other orientations that could affect a 
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company’s propensity for radical product innovation include “technological orientation” 
(the ability and willingness of a company to acquire a substantial technological 
background and use it in the development of new products); “competitor orientation” (the 
ability and willingness of a company to identify, analyse, and respond to competitors’ 
actions); and “customer orientation” (the ability and willingness of a company to identify, 
analyse, understand, and answer user needs) (Gatignon & Xuereb, 1997). In addition, 
some organisational capabilities conducive to organisational culture for radical product 
innovation, based on the literature are “autonomy capability”, which is a company’s 
ability to encourage and tolerate risky, ambiguous, and unsuccessful radical ideas (Chang 
et al., 2012); and “entrepreneurial capabilities”, which is a company’s ability to identify 
and exploit new innovative ideas (Kyrgidou & Spyropoulou, 2013). 
Equally importantly, it is argued that companies must engage their employees to support 
radical product innovation (Cooper, 2011; Leifer et al., 2000). There must be a human 
resource strategy to identify, select, reward, and retain radical innovation champions, 
experts, and team members (Leifer et al., 2000). In addition, top management must clearly 
define a product innovation strategy and a set of objectives that are well communicated 
across the organisation (Cooper, 2011). Without the appropriate human resource strategy 
and clearly defined product innovation strategy and objectives, top management is likely 
to face strong organisational resistance to radical product innovation (Cooper, 2011; 
Leifer et al., 2000). According to Tushman and O’Reilly (1996), strong organisational 
resistance is caused by both “structural inertia” and “cultural inertia”. Structural inertia is 
a resistance to change rooted in the size, complexity, and interdependence of an 
organisation’s structures, systems, procedures, and processes; cultural inertia is a 
resistance to change rooted in the informal norms, values, social networks, and stories 
that come from age and success (Tushman & O’Reilly, 1996). In addition, employees can 
perceive radical projects as career risks, leading to individual resistance (O’Connor & 
McDermott, 2004). Thus, top management can reduce organisational resistance to radical 
product innovation by setting an appropriate human resource strategy and clearly 
communicating their product innovation strategy and objectives across the organisation. 
Thus, innovative organisational culture capability is a pivotal organisational capability to 
cope with high uncertainty created by radical product innovation. Culture represents the 
values, beliefs, and assumptions of the organisation and can be embedded in their 
structures, procedures, processes, and networks that can be explicit or implicit. 
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Companies with strong innovative organisational culture capability are more likely to 
accept radical product ideas and transform themselves accordingly, while companies 
without this capability are likely to reject radical product ideas or have strong resistance 
against them. Innovative organisational culture capability can be developed by 
implementing strategic orientations that favour radical product innovation, such as 
relentless innovation, entrepreneurial orientation, setting an appropriate human resource 
strategy to support radical innovators, and communicating a clearly-defined product 
innovation strategy (and objectives) across the organisation. 
3.4.5 Innovative product development capability 
Innovative product development capability is the ability of an organisation to conduct 
product development of a radical product. Product development is defined as “the overall 
process of strategy, organisation, concept generation, product and marketing plan creation 
and evaluation, and commercialisation of a new product” (Kahn et al., 2013, p. 462). 
Radical product development is different from moderate and incremental product 
development because of the varying degrees of product innovativeness, in the case of the 
latter two types of product development. The phase “varying degrees” can be interpreted 
to mean different degrees of uncertainty or risk (O’Connor & Rice, 2013). Many 
researchers have recommended that product development managers change their product 
development practices according to their project’s level of product innovativeness (Booz 
et al., 1982; Holahan et al., 2014; McDermott & O’Connor, 2002; Slater et al., 2014). 
However, what practices are appropriate for radical product development, vis-à-vis others 
(moderate and incremental), is still being highly debated in the literature (Holahan et al., 
2014; Lee & Markham, 2016; Story, Daniels, Zolkiewski, & Dainty, 2014). 
Based on a survey and personal interviews involving 125 industrial product companies, 
Cooper and Kleinschmidt (1987) identified three critical success factors for new products, 
through their seminal study: 
• Product advantage – The product is superior to competing products in the eyes 
of the customer; the product offers unique features, higher quality, lower costs, 
innovativeness (first of its kind in the market), or better solutions. 
• Proficiency of predevelopment activities – The “up-front” activities, namely 
initial screening, preliminary market assessment, preliminary technical 
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assessment, detailed market study or marketing research, and business or financial 
analysis, are undertaken proficiently. 
• Protocol – There is a clear definition of the target market prior to the product 
development stage; customers’ needs, wants, and preferences; the product 
concept; and product specifications and requirements. 
Cooper and Kleinschmidt (1987) also identified five less critical, but important, success 
factors: 
• Proficiency of technological activities – The technological-oriented activities, 
namely preliminary technical assessment, product development, in-house testing 
of a product, trial/pilot production, and production start-up, are undertaken 
proficiently. 
• Proficiency of market-related activities – The market-oriented activities, 
namely preliminary market assessment, detailed market study/marketing 
research, customer testing of a prototype or sample, trial selling/test market, and 
market launch, are undertaken proficiently. 
• Technological synergy – A good fit between the project needs and the company’s 
technological competency. 
• Market potential – Market attractiveness from size, growth, customer demand, 
and product importance to the customer. 
• Marketing synergy – A good fit between the project needs and the company’s 
marketing competency. 
In a subsequent study, Kleinschmidt and Cooper (1991) analysed the relationship 
between the eight success factors and the degrees of product innovativeness (low, 
moderate, and high) using the same data in their previous study (Cooper & Kleinschmidt, 
1987). They found five out of the eight success factors to be significantly related to 
product innovativeness; the five significant success factors are characterised as follows. 
• Product advantage – More innovative products offer greater opportunities for 
differentiation leading to superior product advantage. 
• Synergies (marketing and technological) – Highly innovative products can have 
high synergies like low innovative products, while moderately innovative 
products have the lowest synergies. 
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• Pre-development activities – The “up-front” works are particularly well 
executed for highly innovative products due to their higher uncertainties and risks. 
• Marketing activities – Marketing activities are well-executed for both highly 
innovative and low innovative products. Highly innovative products demand 
more time and attention to deal with market uncertainties and risks, while low 
innovative products are closer to home, meaning marketing activities are executed 
more routinely and proficiently. However, moderately innovative products suffer 
most from poorer execution. 
In relation to the three non-significant success factors (protocol, market potential, and 
technological activities), Kleinschmidt and Cooper (1991) argue that innovative products 
do not have more-or-less attractive markets (market potential); similarly, they argue that 
the protocol and technological activities are equally well defined and executed for all 
levels of product innovativeness. According to them, moderately innovative products are 
the least successful overall, because they lack the product advantage and synergies and 
have poorly executed predevelopment and marketing activities. 
Holahan et al. (2014) recently reviewed product development practices for radical product 
innovations. They used a sample of 380 business units drawn from the 2004 Product 
Development and Management Association (PDMA) Foundation’s Comparative 
Performance Assessment Survey to investigate how formal product development 
practices differ for incremental, more innovative, and radical product innovations. They 
reviewed product development practices according to five major new product 
development (NPD) capabilities; they found several significant differences in the 
practices depending on the degree of product innovativeness: 
• NPD process – As the degree of product innovativeness increases, so does the 
adherence to formal product development processes. This is contrary to the 
general recommendation (e.g. Booz et al., 1982; Leifer et al., 2000) that radical 
product development be managed more flexibly. Instead, companies are more 
likely to skip, combine, or overlap stages/gates during incremental projects than 
radical projects. The possible reasons for this are to mitigate risks and reduce cost 
and time associated with radical product development, by bringing in more 
structure and control. This finding is inconsistent with the literature (e.g. 
McDermott & O’Connor, 2002; Song & Montoya-Weiss, 1998). 
107 
• Organisation for NPD (people, project team etc.) – A full-time project leader, 
a project champion, and cross-functional team effectiveness are associated with 
radical projects, while only a part-time project leader is associated with 
incremental projects. Product champion and cross-functional team effectiveness 
are less important for incremental projects due to the lower level of support 
required. This finding is consistent with the literature (e.g. Booz et al., 1982; 
Leifer et al., 2000; McDermott & O’Connor, 2002). 
• PD strategy (portfolio management etc.) – Radical projects are actually 
managed with the same level of rigour and accountability as incremental (and 
more innovative) projects to meet strategic and financial objectives. This is 
contrary to the expectation that a radical product should be managed with more 
open-ended and entrepreneurial managerial approach. However, it is noted that 
this finding may not be applicable for the fuzzy front end (the early stages of 
product development process) where radical ideas are identified and developed. 
This finding is inconsistent with the literature (e.g. Booz et al., 1982; Song & 
Montoya-Weiss, 1998; Tushman & O’Reilly, 1996). 
• Organisational culture – Radical product ideas surprisingly come from both 
formal idea generation practices such as trend analysis, customer observation, 
brainstorming sessions, and competitor analysis, and informal idea generation 
practices such as skunkworks, bootstrapping projects, and free time. The authors 
assert that radical ideas are reportedly coming from formal practices more than 
informal practices. This finding is inconsistent with the literature (e.g. Leifer et 
al., 2000; Veryzer, 1998). 
• Senior management commitment to NPD (top management support, 
resources allocation etc.) – Top management and corporate level of support, 
involvement, and commitment to new products are correlated with the level of 
product innovativeness. This finding is consistent with the literature (e.g. Booz et 
al., 1982; Cooper, 2011). 
An important conclusion in the Cooper and Kleinschmidt (1987; 1991) and Holahan et 
al. (2014) studies is that radical product development can and should be managed through 
a formal product development process, mainly to reduce risk and improve project success. 
Another important conclusion in the aforesaid studies is that many success factors or best 
practices on incremental and moderate product development are applicable to radical 
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product development. Authors argue that these shared success factors or best practices 
are superior product advantage; clearly defined project protocol; well executed 
predevelopment, technological, and marketing activities; high technological and 
marketing synergies; and attractive market potentials are important for reducing 
technical, market, organisational, and resource uncertainty associated with all degrees of 
product innovativeness. 
In addition, the aforementioned studies identify several key differences in success factors 
or best practices that product development managers should be aware of when developing 
new products (radical versus incremental or moderate). The differences are listed below. 
Firstly, radical product development requires a full-time project leader (Booz et al., 1982; 
Holahan et al., 2014). This is because radical projects have a high level of uncertainty and 
risk. Thus, a full-time project leader is needed to take accountability for the project and 
provide full-time attention. On the other hand, a part-time project leader who has other 
responsibilities could manage incremental and moderate products because these projects 
require less attention and managerial resources. 
Secondly, radical product development requires the existence of a project champion 
(Cooper, 2011; Holahan et al., 2014; McDermott & O’Connor, 2002). A project 
champion is a passionate supporter of the project and can come from any part of the 
company. They contribute to radical project success by providing support and protection 
against organisational barriers or inertias the radical product development team may face. 
They are not really needed for incremental and moderate projects since these projects are 
generally well accepted by the company (these project teams experience fewer 
organisational barriers or inertias). 
Thirdly, radical product development requires a multi-disciplinary team (Booz et al., 
1982; Cooper, 2011; Holahan et al., 2014; McDermott & O’Connor, 2002). This is 
because radical product development requires both existing knowledge and new 
knowledge and that these knowledge bases are likely to reside in personnel from different 
departments across the company. A multi-disciplinary team allows for these knowledge 
bases to be accessed, utilised, and combined into new knowledge. For incremental and 
moderate products, specialised or experienced team members are more likely to have the 
required knowledge without requiring significant involvement of personnel from other 
departments. 
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Lastly, radical product development requires a well-structured product development 
process (Cooper, 2011; Holahan et al., 2014). A well-structured product development 
process brings in structure and control, which reduces uncertainties and risks and 
improves a project’s chance of success. Top management should also set clear and 
appropriate performance metrics or project criteria to track radical project performance 
and make go/kill decisions. On the other hand, a more free and flexible product 
development process can be used for incremental or moderate project to save time and 
cost—for example, see Stage-Gate Xpress and Stage-Gate Lite processes (Cooper, 2008). 
A possible explanation for the above mentioned practice differences is that the radical 
versus incremental activities of product development represents the exploration of new 
ideas versus exploitation of known capabilities in organisational learning (March, 1991). 
In keeping with the knowledge-based view, exploration implies the search for new 
knowledge, while exploitation implies the utilisation of existing knowledge (Grant, 
1996). This indicates that radical product development is an exploration activity for new 
knowledge, while incremental product innovation is an exploitation activity of existing 
knowledge (moderate product development is a middle-of-the road activity that involves 
both new knowledge and existing knowledge) (Danneels, 2002). Therefore, good 
practices on incremental product development are likely to be good exploitation 
activities, whereas good practices on radical product development are likely to be good 
exploration activities. This explains the need for different product development practices 
to suit different degrees/levels of product innovativeness. 
Furthermore, since radical product development is likely to be an exploration activity, it 
can shed some light on the current debate in the literature on best practices for radical 
product development. One side of the argument is that radical product development teams 
need more freedom and flexibility to successfully explore for new knowledge (Booz et 
al., 1982; McDermott & O’Connor, 2002). According to Booz et al. (1982), an 
appropriate environment is required for radical product development. As Booz et al. 
(1982) highlight “in general, riskier ventures or those with a longer payback period, such 
as the development and launching of new product lines or new-to-the-world products, 
require a relatively unstructured, entrepreneurial management approach” (p. 22). 
Similarly, McDermott and O’Connor (2002) found radical product development teams 
experienced greater difficulties due to the existing product development practices that 
were impractical and illogical for radical product development. The basic premise in this 
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school of thought is that it is difficult to make plans and set objectives for radical product 
development because of its exploration nature. As a result, a more flexible and less 
controlling product development process gives more leeway to the product development 
team and is likely to be more successful than the traditional structure and control driven 
product development process associated with incremental product development. 
The other side of the argument is that radical product development teams need more 
structure and managerial control to successfully explore for new knowledge (Cooper, 
2011; Holahan et al., 2014). As Cooper (2011) asserts, “just because these projects are 
imaginative and bold is no reason to throw discipline out the window. In fact, quite the 
reverse is true” (p. 2). Holahan et al. (2014) made a similar argument for researchers to 
reconsider the role of control in radical product development. Without structure and 
control, the project team runs the risk of going out of control in their exploration activities 
(March, 1991). According to Cooper (2008), the difficulties experienced by radical 
product development teams are likely caused by poorly designed product development 
process and metrics. Cooper observes that some companies misinterpret the Stage-Gate 
(an idea-to-launch process) as a rigid and linear process, leading to bureaucracy that 
stifles innovation. Cooper highlights that Stage-Gate is a flexible and adaptable process 
that can be scaled according to project needs and risk levels; radical products should be 
managed through a full Stage-Gate process because they have high risks, while 
incremental and moderate products could be managed through shortened processes (e.g. 
Stage-Gate Xpress and Stage-Gate Lite) to save resources and improve speed because 
they have lower risks. The basic premise in this school of thought on radical product 
innovation is that structure and control bring order to exploration activities and help 
mitigate risks, saving both time and organisational resources. This is different from the 
previous argument that recommends a more free and flexible product development 
process to cope with high uncertainties. 
It is argued that both arguments suffer from a few limitations. Firstly, the Booz et al. 
(1982) and McDermott and O’Connor (2002) studies are limited to large companies and 
a few detailed case studies. Thus, their findings may not be generalisable across small to 
medium sized companies whose resources are limited to the extent that they cannot afford 
to give their employees the freedom and flexibility to develop radical products in their 
own ways. The Cooper (2011) and Holahan et al. (2014) studies are based on a company 
level of analysis and quantitative measures. As a result, the researchers might have missed 
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the challenges faced by radical product development team members. In addition, 
McDermott and O’Connor (2002) and Holahan et al. (2014) did not specifically state 
whether or not the radical projects/products they studied were commercialised (reached 
the marketplace) or were considered commercially successful. Therefore, it is quite 
possible that the differences in the findings are attributable to different research 
methodologies. 
Secondly, Holahan et al. (2014) suggest that the difference between incremental product 
development practices and radical product development practices could lie in the early 
stages of the product development process or the fuzzy front end of the product 
development process. Both Holahan et al. (2014) and Veryzer (1998) posit that, relative 
to incremental product development, a different idea selection process may be needed in 
radical product development to capture and formulate radical product ideas because 
radical product ideas are highly unpredictable. This idea notwithstanding, Eling, Griffin, 
and Langerak (2016) found that a formal idea selection process is associated with both 
commercially successful incremental and radical new products. However, Eling et al. 
(2016) do not explain the challenges radical product development teams face during the 
middle and latter stages of the product development process (McDermott, 1999; Veryzer, 
1998). Therefore, it is reasonable to argue that differences between incremental and 
radical practices could exist in any stage of the product development process, not just the 
early stages. 
Thirdly, the idea of radical product development as an exploration activity may be too 
simplistic. Several studies on radical product innovation have demonstrated that 
companies utilise both their existing resources (exploitation) as well as newly searched 
resources (exploration) (Kleinschmidt & Cooper, 1991; McDermott, 1999; Tellis & 
Golder, 1996). This suggests that radical product development is a mixture of both 
exploitation and exploration activities. Thus, it might be possible to utilise good practices 
for both exploitation and exploration activities in a radical product development 
environment. Therefore, this offers another explanation for the finding differences 
between incremental and radical product development practices. 
The three limitations discussed above provide some insights into the two conflicting 
arguments. Nevertheless, the discussion does not resolve the conflict nor answer what 
best practices to use for radical product development. For the purpose of this study, one 
possible solution is for a company to be capable of doing exploitation and exploration 
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activity simultaneously or become an “ambidextrous organisation” as introduced by 
Tushman and O’Reilly (1996). This view is shared by Cooper (2008) and Veryzer (1998) 
who recommend for companies to adapt their product development process according to 
different degrees of product innovativeness (or uncertainty/risk). Unfortunately, due to 
the conflicting findings previously discussed, there are no ready-made answers to the 
question “what product development process should a company adopt for radical product 
innovation?”. In an attempt to extend knowledge, this study takes a position that a well-
structured product development process is superior to a flexible product development 
process for radical product innovation because the studies supporting this argument are 
more recent (e.g. Cooper, 2011; Holahan et al., 2014). 
In the balance, this research posits that innovative product development capability is 
required to develop radical products. It is different from incremental and moderate 
product development capability (an ability to develop incremental and moderate 
products) simply on the argument that radical product development has a higher degree 
of uncertainty leading to different best practices. The best practices for radical product 
development (based on the current literature) are a full-time project leader, a project 
champion, a multi-disciplinary team, a compelling business case (superior product 
advantage, clearly defined project protocol, high technological and marketing synergies, 
and attractive market potentials), well executed product development activities 
(predevelopment, technological, and marketing activities), and a well-structured product 
development process. These practices are important for reducing technical, market, 
organisational, and resource uncertainty associated with radical product innovation. 
Companies with innovative product development capability are more likely to 
successfully develop radical products. 
3.4.6 Final model development process 
Having identified the five determinants of radical product innovation, how these 
determinants relate to product innovativeness is argued in this section. To this end, a 
conceptual model is developed by reviewing the impact radical product innovation has 
on the organisation; the dynamic capabilities concept is introduced to provide a 
theoretical basis for the five determinants as well as to explain how impacts on radical 
product innovation are managed. Subsequently, each determinant (depicted in the 
conceptual model) of radical product innovation is reviewed as a causal antecedent to 
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develop the final theoretical model that predicts and explains radical product 
innovativeness (the final outcome variable). 
3.4.6.1 Dynamic capability as a basis for radical product innovation 
To recap, radical product innovation is a form of product innovation that involves a new-
to-market and new-to-company core technology and core value proposition (previously 
covered in section 3.2.3). Consequently, radical product innovation has a potential to 
cause discontinuities for both the company responsible for the innovation and the 
marketplace the innovation is introduced to (Garcia & Calantone, 2002). The company 
and market discontinuities mean companies need capabilities to transform themselves 
accordingly. Otherwise, they risk losing competitive advantage to their competitors 
(Abernathy & Clark, 1985; Abernathy & Utterback, 1978; Tushman & Anderson, 1986). 
Organisational capabilities that allow companies to transform themselves in response to 
radical product innovation are construed as dynamic capabilities. 
“Dynamic capabilities” is a management concept introduced by Teece et al. (1997). It is 
defined as “the firm’s ability to integrate, build, and reconfigure internal and external 
competencies to address rapidly changing environments” (Teece et al., 1997, p. 516). The 
concept was developed based on the theory of a resource-based view to respond to a 
higher degree of market turbulence brought by globalisation and increasing market and 
technological discontinuities. Teece (2007) argues that dynamic capabilities are needed 
for sustainable competitive advantage (i.e. superior long-term financial performance). 
Companies with dynamic capabilities are likely to gain competitive advantage because 
they can respond to technology and/or market discontinuities more quickly and 
effectively than their competitors who do not possess dynamic capabilities. 
According to Teece (2007), dynamic capabilities are made up of three core components: 
sensing, seizing, and reconfiguring. Sensing refers to identifying and shaping 
opportunities and threats; seizing refers to acquiring and developing of the right resources 
to address the opportunities and threats; and reconfiguring refers to transforming and 
reorganising of a company’s resources in response to changes. 
In a radical product innovation context, sensing could be viewed as identifying and 
shaping radical product innovation opportunities and threats. Many companies fail to 
recognise a radical product innovation opportunity or threat because their existing 
organisational structure and culture, which are important for their current business 
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success, blind them from recognising the radical product innovation opportunity or threat 
(Tushman & O’Reilly, 1996). Other factors such as specialised investments and core 
rigidities can also prevent or inhibit companies from pursuing radical product innovation 
for fear of cannibalising or obsoleting them (Chandy & Tellis, 1998; Leonard-Barton, 
1992). Too much focus on the current customer, technology, or business model can also 
prevent companies from realising the emergence of a new customer, technology, or 
business model that then become the mainstream (Christensen & Raynor, 2003; Foster, 
1986; Herrmann et al., 2007). Lastly, a lack of absorptive capacity (the ability to recognise 
the value of new external information and assimilate and apply it for product innovation) 
can prevent companies from appreciating a new technology or customer, and in the long-
term could prevent the companies entirely from pursuing the product innovation (Cohen 
& Levinthal, 1990). Companies that fail to sense market or technological changes are 
likely to be superseded by their competitors who capitalise on these macro-environmental 
changes (Christensen, 1997; Foster, 1986; Utterback, 1994). 
The above said, sensing alone is insufficient because companies need seizing to acquire 
necessary resources for radical product innovation. Without the necessary resources, a 
company (particularly a pioneer) is unlikely to be successful in its radical product 
innovation endeavour (Golder & Tellis, 1993; Leifer et al., 2000; Olleros, 1986). Few 
companies have all the necessary resources readily available, and therefore most 
companies need strategies to acquire them from internal and external sources (McDermott 
& O’Connor, 2002). Companies can acquire the necessary resources from internal 
sources by developing and utilising their own in-house technological and market 
competencies (Danneels, 2002); for example, leveraging their production and brand 
assets (Tellis & Golder, 1996), and resource allocation (Cooper, 2011). In addition, 
companies can acquire the necessary resources from external sources in many ways; for 
example, forming alliances with other companies (McDermott, 1999), outsourcing to 
provide certain capabilities (Olleros, 1986), integration or licensing (Teece, 1986)3, hiring 
knowledgeable personnel (McDermott & O’Connor, 2002), and tapping into their 
networks or clusters (Porter, 1998; Verganti, 2008). 
                                                 
3  According to Teece (1986), integration involves owning and aligning complementary assets within 
the company and licensing involves signing contracts with independent suppliers, manufacturers, or 
distributors. 
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Finally, companies must be able to reorganise themselves to pursue radical product 
innovation. Reconfiguring could be viewed as transformation of the organisation itself. 
As the business environment changes, a company needs to be capable of adjusting its 
resources such as its strategy, structure, skills, and culture to stay competitive (Tushman 
& O’Reilly, 1996). Most companies are successful doing this for incremental product 
innovations because the transformation required is minimal. However, they often fail 
when they try to transform themselves for radical product innovation (Abernathy & 
Utterback, 1978; Tushman & Anderson, 1986). There are many reasons companies fail 
to transform themselves for radical product innovations. The first major reason is due to 
the high and multi-dimensional uncertainties of radical product innovation (O’Connor & 
Rice, 2013). The second, equally major reason is the structural and cultural inertia that 
inhibits companies (often an incumbent) from successfully transforming themselves 
(Tushman & O’Reilly, 1996). Sometimes, the changes are subtle and hard to detect 
making it difficult for companies to transform effectively in a timely manner (Christensen 
& Raynor, 2003; Henderson & Clark, 1990). Lastly, there are many contextual barriers 
such as insufficient resources and customer resistance that can inhibit a company from 
pursuing radical product innovation (Sandberg & Aarikka-Stenroos, 2014). 
Consequently, it is argued that companies that are capable of overcoming the difficulties 
of organisational transformation are likely to be successful in their pursuit of radical 
product innovation. 
Based on the previous arguments, it is posited that the five identified determinants of 
radical product innovation constitute dynamic capabilities. This author shares a similar 
view with many authors that have linked radical product innovation determinants to 
dynamic capabilities (Chang et al., 2012; Herrmann et al., 2007; Kyrgidou & 
Spyropoulou, 2013; Maes & Sels, 2014; Slater et al., 2014). Consider Chang et al. (2012) 
who assert the following: “as radical innovation deals with the transfer of resources and 
the acceleration of innovation capabilities, it is argued that the dynamic capability view 
can help to explain how such transfer of resources and change in capabilities can be 
achieved” (p. 449). Herrmann et al. (2007) make a similar argument: “we argue that 
dynamic organisational capabilities are required to manage the discontinuities associated 
with radical innovations” (p. 94). Slater et al. (2014) assert the same thing: “the ability to 
successfully develop and commercialise radical product innovations constitutes a 
‘dynamic capability’” (p. 553). 
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3.4.6.2 A structural model linking the determinants of radical product innovation 
via dynamic capability 
Top management innovation capability 
From the foregoing discussion, it is argued that top management innovation capability is 
a part of sensing capabilities. Top management play a vital role in identifying and shaping 
radical product innovation opportunities and threats. However, this does not mean that all 
the processes and mechanisms for information collection and organisational learning 
should be replaced by top management. The said processes and mechanisms are important 
for collecting and processing information. Rather, the argument brought forth here is that 
top management have an important role in evaluating this information and converting it 
into strategic decisions or actions. As stated by Teece (2007): 
Information must be filtered, and must flow to those capable of making sense of 
it… Hypothesis development, hypothesis ‘testing,’ and synthesis about the 
meaning of information obtained via search are critical functions, and must be 
performed by the top management team… If enterprises fail to engage in such 
activities, they won’t be able to assess market and technological developments 
and spot opportunities. As a consequence, they will likely miss opportunities 
visible to others. (p. 1323) 
Thus, top management innovation capability allows a company to identify and shape 
radical product innovation opportunities and threats and is linked to sensing capabilities. 
Internal innovation capability and external networking capability 
Internal innovation capability and external networking capability are a part of seizing 
capabilities. Both determinants are vital in providing access to internal and external 
resources needed for radical product innovation. They also enable the creation and 
development of these resources, making the resources more valuable in the long run. 
Internal innovation capability allows internal resources to be acquired by developing and 
utilising the company’s in-house technological and market competencies. By comparison, 
external networking capability allows external resources to be acquired by developing 
collaborative relationships with key external partners that control access to these valuable 
resources. Teece (2007) sums up seizing capabilities very nicely: “Addressing 
opportunities involves maintaining and improving technological competencies and 
complementary assets and then, when the opportunity is ripe, investing heavily in the 
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particular technologies and designs most likely to achieve marketplace acceptance” (p. 
1326). Thus, it is argued that internal innovation capability and external networking 
capability are important for providing and utilising the resources needed for radical 
product innovation and are linked to seizing capabilities. 
Innovative organisational culture and innovative product development capabilities 
Innovative organisational culture capability and innovative product development 
capability are a part of reconfiguring capabilities. Teece (2007) refers to the process of 
reorganising both internal and external resources for radical product innovation as “asset 
orchestration”; Teece considers this (asset orchestration) as part of a company’s 
reconfiguring capabilities. As companies introduce new products and learn from them, 
their resources can be developed and strengthened (Danneels, 2002; Leonard-Barton, 
1992; March, 1991). However, they can also trap them on a certain trajectory; this 
phenomenon is commonly referred to as “core rigidities” (Leonard-Barton, 1992), “path 
dependencies” (Teece, 2007), or “structural and cultural inertia” (Tushman & O’Reilly, 
1996). Justification for reconfiguration is aptly summarised by Teece (2007): 
A key to sustained profitable growth is the ability to recombine and to reconfigure 
assets and organisational structures as the enterprise grows, and as markets and 
technologies change, as they surely will. Reconfiguration is needed to maintain 
evolutionary fitness and, if necessary, to try and escape from unfavourable path 
dependencies. (p. 1335) 
Both innovative organisational culture capability and innovative product development 
capability allow the companies to reorganise their resources such that they can pursue 
new product categories (i.e. radical product innovations). Innovative organisational 
culture capability enables companies to cope with high uncertainties associated with 
radical product innovation while innovative product development capability enables 
companies to develop radical products. Consequently, innovative organisational culture 
capability and innovative product development capability are essential for organisational 
transformation and are linked to reconfiguring capabilities. 
In addition, Teece (2007) demonstrates that there exists a structural relationship between 
the three core components of dynamic capabilities and sustainable competitive 
advantage: sensing → seizing → reconfiguring → sustainable competitive advantage; this 
structural relationship has been supported by an empirical study (Chiu, Chi, Chang, & 
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Chen, 2016). This structural relationship, depicted as Figure 3.10, shows the theoretical 
basis of the researcher’s conceptual framework. 
As shown in Figure 3.10, the five identified determinants of radical product innovation 
(italicised in the figure) are sequentially arranged as causal antecedents to explain 
sustainable competitive advantage via the three elements of dynamic capability. Radical 
product innovation is linked to the sustainable competitive advantage because when a 
company chooses radical product innovation as the key strategy, the competitive 
advantage is accomplished through the capability bundle presented in Figure 3.10 








Figure 3.10: The structural model linking the determinants of radical product 
innovation via dynamic capability 
3.4.6.3 The conceptual model on radical product innovation phenomenon 
The conceptual model shown in Figure 3.11 is developed by augmenting the structural 
relationship discussed in the previous section. The conceptual model depicts the 
relationships between the five identified determinants and product innovativeness 
(depicted as “Radical Product Innovation” in the conceptual model). Furthermore, the 
conceptual model reveals additional interrelationships between the five identified 
determinants not shown previously. The relationships for each of the five determinants 
and product innovativeness are explained using each determinant as a causal antecedent 











































Figure 3.11: The conceptual model linking radical product innovation to its 
determinants 
Top management innovation capability as a causal antecedent 
Top management innovation capability is considered the most important determinant of 
radical product innovation. Top management have responsibilities that can affect the 
whole organisation (Cooper, 2011; Earle et al., 2001; Leifer et al., 2000). These 
responsibilities include setting the company’s overall business and product development 
strategy, product development process, resource allocation, and product development 
capability (Earle et al., 2001). Subsequently, top management are expected to set them in 
such a way that enable radical product innovation (Cooper, 2011). In addition, they need 
to establish expectations, organisational culture, facilitating organisational mechanisms, 
and goals and reward systems that are supportive of radical product innovation (Leifer et 
al., 2000). As a result, it is proposed that top management innovation capability can 
influence internal innovation capability, external networking capability, innovative 
organisational culture capability, and innovative product development capability. The 
proposed relationships are explained below. 
Firstly, top management can influence the internal innovation capability through product 
development/innovation strategy (Cooper, 2011; Earle et al., 2001). As Cooper (2011) 
asserts “product innovation strategy guides the business’s product development direction 


















innovation strategy determines what resources are available for the development of the 
company’s in-house technological and market competencies needed for product 
innovation and what types of project or product innovation are pursued (in this case, 
radical product innovation). In addition, by selecting innovative projects, managers can 
discover deficiencies or dysfunctionalities in their existing competencies and capabilities, 
leading to the development of new competencies and capabilities (Danneels, 2002; 
Leonard-Barton, 1992). This relationship between top management innovation capability 
and internal innovation capability is similar to the relationship between “senior 
leadership” and “organisational characteristics” posited by Slater et al. (2014) in their 
model. Therefore, it is proposed that top management innovation capability has a positive 
relationship with internal innovation capability. 
Secondly, top management can influence external networking capability by building 
relationships with external partners. According to Verganti (2009), top management have 
a vital role in developing the design-driven innovation capabilities or establishing their 
company’s position in the design discourse (a network of external partners involved in 
the development of new product meanings and design languages). Similarly, top 
management can pursue alliances, contracts, or partnership with other companies to share 
resources and reduce risks (McDermott, 1999; Olleros, 1986; Teece, 1986). This 
relationship is similar to Slater et al.’s (2014) model that shows “senior leadership” 
having a direct relationship with “organisational characteristics” (i.e. reliance on 
partners). As a result, it is proposed that top management innovation capability has a 
positive relationship with external networking capability. 
Thirdly, top management can influence their organisational culture through their goals 
and reward systems (Leifer et al., 2000). Culture is usually driven from the top (Cooper, 
2011; Slater et al., 2014). By rewarding and recognising innovators, top management are 
creating incentives for employees to take risks and pursue radical product innovation for 
the company (Cooper, 2011; Leifer et al., 2000). At the same time, by setting radical 
product innovation goals, top management are demonstrating to the whole organisation 
their commitment and expectations that can affect individual employee’s attitude towards 
radical product innovation (Cooper, 2011; Leifer et al., 2000). This relationship is similar 
to the “senior leadership” and “organisational culture” relationship captured in Slater et 
al.’s (2014) model. It is noted that the relationship, as shown in Slater et al.’s (2014) 
model, is a bidirectional relationship because they argue organisational culture can also 
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influence new top leaders. For this study, the proposed relationship is taken as a 
unidirectional relationship to make the conceptual model a recursive model, so that it can 
be tested empirically with cross sectional data (the correlational research technique used 
by the researcher does not allow testing bidirectional/nonrecursive causal relationships). 
Thus, it is proposed that top management innovation capability has a positive relationship 
with innovative organisational culture capability. 
Fourthly, top management can influence the product development practices by 
establishing the formal product development process in their organisation, such as the 
Stage-Gage system (Cooper, 2008). Furthermore, top management can also engage in 
Go/No Go decisions of radical projects, while leaving day-to-day activities/decisions to 
the project team (Cooper, 2011). This is similar to the direct relationship between “senior 
leadership” and “radical product innovation process” shown in the Slater et al.’s (2014) 
model. Therefore, it is posited that top management innovation capability has a positive 
relationship with innovative product development capability. 
Lastly, it is argued that top management do not have a direct relationship with radical 
product innovation. To say that they have a direct relationship with radical product 
innovation is to say that top management are responsible for personally conducting 
radical product development, which is not true in the majority of companies. Instead, top 
management act as the primary cause of radical product innovation in that they drive the 
other four determinants that lead to radical product innovation. 
Internal innovation capability as a causal antecedent 
Internal innovation capability is the internal technological and market competencies that 
a company can develop and utilise for radical product innovation. They are a result of 
collective learning and co-ordination of resources in the organisation (Prahalad & Hamel, 
1990). In addition, internal technological and market competencies can determine (to a 
certain degree) what the company can do in the future because of path dependency 
(Danneels, 2002; Teece, 2007). As a result, internal innovation capability can influence 
external networking capability, innovative organisational culture capability, and 
innovative product development capability. 
Firstly, internal competencies can determine how well the organisation identify, access, 
and utilise external resources for product innovation, according to the absorptive capacity 
of the company. Absorptive capacity, as mentioned before, is the company’s ability to 
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evaluate the true value of external resources (such as knowledge about a new technology) 
and utilising them for commercial ends (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990). According to Cohen 
and Levinthal (1990), absorptive capacity is a function of the company’s level of prior 
related knowledge; the more diverse and accumulated knowledge held by individuals in 
the company, the better the company is overall at recognising new valuable external 
resources and utilising them for product innovation. This relationship is supported by 
Maes and Sels (2014) who have empirically demonstrated direct positive relationships 
from “knowledge diversity capability” and “knowledge sharing capability” to 
“exploratory learning”, “transformative learning”, and “exploitative learning”. 
Nevertheless, Cohen and Levinthal (1990) also point out that too much emphasis on 
internal competencies can lead to the pathology of the not-invented-here (NIH) 
syndrome, which is defined as “the tendency of a project group of stable composition to 
believe it possesses a monopoly of knowledge of its field, which leads it to reject new 
ideas from outsiders to the likely detriment of its performance” (Katz & Allen, 1982, p. 
7). Given that some prior studies in the food and beverage industry have emphasised the 
importance of strong internal competencies for absorbing and utilising external 
knowledge (Martinez & Briz, 2000; Siriwongwilaichat & Winger, 2004), it is argued that 
internal innovation capability has a positive relationship with external networking 
capability. 
Secondly, internal competencies can determine how well the organisation copes with 
uncertainty. For example, many companies leverage their existing competencies to cope 
with technical and market uncertainty when developing radical products (Kleinschmidt 
& Cooper, 1991; McDermott & O’Connor, 2002). This is supported by Herrmann et al. 
(2006) who found “non-specific investments” and “market-focused core-competencies” 
had positive relationships with “abandon investments”. However, Slater et al. (2014) 
suggest that the said relationship is in the opposite direction. Their argument is that 
culture has a significant effect on the company’s cross-functional integration and reliance 
on partners (both of which they consider components of organisational characteristics). 
For this study, cross-functional integration is covered in innovative product development 
capability and reliance on partners is covered in external networking capability; thus, their 
relationships are already considered by other determinants. Consequently, it is proposed 
that internal innovation capability is positively related to innovative organisational 
culture capability. 
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Thirdly, internal competencies can influence how well the company conducts radical 
product development. This is because internal competencies are used by companies to 
develop new technologies and value propositions. In other words, they are core 
competencies or core capabilities for solving technical and marketing problems in product 
development (Danneels, 2002; Leonard-Barton, 1992). Thus, companies with strong 
internal innovation capability can conduct predevelopment, technological, and marketing 
activities more proficiently, improving radical product success (Kleinschmidt & Cooper, 
1991). Furthermore, companies with strong internal innovation capability can determine 
what product development practices are possible. For example, a multi-disciplinary team 
can be utilised by having a diverse set of skilled employees. The said relationship (internal 
innovation capability → innovative product development capability) is supported by 
Slater et al.’s (2014) model that shows “organisational characteristics” having direct 
relationships with “radical product innovation process” and “product launch strategy”. 
Therefore, it is proposed that internal innovation capability has a positive relationship 
with innovative product development capability. 
Lastly, it is argued that internal innovation capability does not have a direct relationship 
with radical product innovation. The internal innovation capability simply represents the 
internal resources owned by the company. These resources by themselves do not bring 
about radical product innovation. Companies need innovative organisational culture 
capability and innovative product development capability to utilise their internal 
innovation capability for radical product innovation. 
External networking capability as a causal antecedent 
External networking capability is the company’s ability to collaborate with external 
partners (i.e. outside individuals or companies) to pursue radical product innovation. 
Rarely does a company possess all the resources for radical product innovation 
(McDermott & O’Connor, 2002). Companies can use their external networking capability 
to access the valuable resources controlled by external partners to fill their resource gaps. 
As a result, external networking capability can influence innovative organisational culture 
capability and innovative product development capability. These relationships are 
explained below. 
Firstly, external networking capability provides companies with an access to valuable 
external resources, such as production facility or consumer knowledge, that can be used 
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to reduce uncertainties associated with radical product innovation. More often than not, 
all it takes to reduce uncertainty is simply knowing who to call (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; 
McDermott, 1999). By developing and maintaining a network with valuable external 
partners, companies can fall back on their external networks (when needed) to help reduce 
uncertainty. This relationship is supported by Herrmann et al. (2006) who found a positive 
relationship between “supplier and customer clusters” and “abandon investments”. 
However, the direction of this relationship is opposite to the direction suggested by Slater 
et al. (2014) who argue that organisational culture can affect a company’s reliance on 
partners. It is suggested that Slater et al.’s argument is based on a different construct 
definition, where they define “organisational culture” as the values, beliefs, and 
assumptions of the company; this study defines “innovative organisational culture 
capability” as the ability to cope with uncertainty, which has a somewhat similar meaning 
to Slater et al.’s conceptualisation but is not identical. Thus, the researcher contends that 
external networking capability is positively related to innovative organisational culture 
capability. 
Secondly, external networking capability can influence how well a company conducts 
radical product development. Similar to internal innovation capability, this capability 
determines what external resources a company can access and utilise for radical product 
development. A company that possesses a rich external networking capability will know 
who they can call for help to solve their product development problems; this can be very 
important when the company does not have the necessary resources in-house. For 
example, if the company cannot acquire a certain production facility or reach their target 
customers for a certain radical project, they are unlikely to be successful with their new 
product development project (Olleros, 1986; Teece, 1986). Sometimes, knowing whom 
and when to invite to participate in radical product development is also very important 
because their inputs may be valuable at certain times, but inhibiting at others (Coviello & 
Joseph, 2012; McDermott & O’Connor, 2002). This relationship is supported by Slater et 
al.’s (2014) model which depicts “organisational characteristics” as having direct 
relationships with “radical product innovation process” and “product launch strategy”. 
Thus, it is argued that external networking capability has a positive relationship with 
innovative product development capability. 
Lastly, it is argued that external networking capability does not have a direct relationship 
with radical product innovation. Like internal innovation capability, external networking 
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capability is simply providing access to resources belonging to external partners. 
Companies need innovative organisational culture capability and innovative product 
development capability to utilise them for radical product innovation. 
Innovative organisational culture capability as a causal antecedent 
Innovative organisational culture capability is the company’s ability to cope with high 
uncertainties created by radical product innovation. It is the first determinant in the 
conceptual model to have a direct relationship with radical product innovation. Radical 
product innovation is difficult because of high and multifaceted uncertainties associated 
with its development (O’Connor & Rice, 2013). Hence, it is posited that a company with 
high tolerance to uncertainties is more likely to pursue radical product innovation as well 
as to improve its proficiency at radical product development. Notwithstanding strong top 
management support and incentives, employees in a company that does not possess an 
innovative organisational culture can still be reluctant to pursue radical product 
innovation because that goes against their ingrained skills and culture (Tushman & 
O’Reilly, 1996). Consequently, it is argued that innovative organisational culture 
capability directly influences innovative product development capability as well as 
radical product innovation. The relationships are explained below. 
Firstly, innovative organisational culture capability can influence the innovative product 
development capability because organisational culture captures the company’s overall 
values, beliefs, and assumptions—companies with cultures favourable to radical product 
innovation are more likely to conduct radical product development (Chandy & Tellis, 
1998). Furthermore, such cultures can promote the adoption of radical product 
development practices across the organisation (Cooper, 2011; Tushman & O’Reilly, 
1996). Therefore, innovative organisational culture capability does have a positive 
relationship with innovative product development capability. This relationship is 
consistent with Slater et al.’s (2014) model that shows “organisational culture” having a 
direct hypothesised relationship with “radical product innovation process” and “product 
launch strategy” (both are combined as radical product development practices). However, 
this relationship goes against Herrmann et al.’s (2006) model that posits a reverse 
direction from “product champions” and “market-focused organisation” to “abandon 
investments”. Since this study has identified top management innovation capability as the 
driver of innovative organisational culture capability (similar to Slater et al.’s (2014) 
view), whereas Herrmann et al. (2006) has not considered so, the earlier proposition is 
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chosen. Thus, it is proposed that innovative organisational culture capability has a 
positive relationship with innovative product development capability. 
Lastly, innovative organisational culture capability is directly related to radical product 
innovation. Culture can influence a company’s behaviour and attitude towards the 
adoption of radical product innovation (Chandy & Tellis, 1998; Tushman & O’Reilly, 
1996). As a result, it is suggested that companies that lack this capability will prefer to 
pursue incremental product innovation instead of radical product innovation. The 
innovative organisational culture capability can be characterised through other 
capabilities identified in the literature such as “abandon investments” (Herrmann et al., 
2006), “transformation of competencies and markets” (Herrmann et al., 2007), 
“autonomy capability” (Chang et al., 2012), and “entrepreneurial capabilities” (Kyrgidou 
& Spyropoulou, 2013). These capabilities all share a common sentiment of coping with 
uncertainties and are linked directly and positively to radical product innovation in their 
respective models. Thus, it is proposed that innovative organisational culture capability 
has a positive relationship with radical product innovation. 
Innovative product development capability as a causal antecedent 
Innovative product development capability allows a company to conduct product 
development of a radical product. It is the second determinant in the conceptual model to 
have a direct relationship with radical product innovation. Radical product innovation 
requires different product development practices because of its high degree of 
innovativeness (Cooper, 2008; Garcia & Calantone, 2002; Holahan et al., 2014). As a 
result, companies need the innovative product development capability to develop radical 
products. Consequently, the innovative product development capability is likely to have 
a positive relationship with radical product innovation. This relationship is further 
explained below. 
As covered in the previous discussion in section 3.4.5, the current best radical product 
development practices are a full-time project leader, a project champion, a multi-
disciplinary team, a compelling business case, well executed product development 
activities, and a well-structured product development process. These practices have been 
identified as important success factors of radical product development by many 
researchers (e.g. Booz et al., 1982; Cooper, 2011; Cooper & Kleinschmidt, 1987; Holahan 
et al., 2014; McDermott & O’Connor, 2002). These practices are captured in the “radical 
product innovation process” and “product launch strategy” posited by Slater et al. (2014) 
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and “experimentation capability” posited by Chang et al. (2012), who have linked them 
directly and positively to radical product innovation in their models. Therefore, it is 
proposed that innovative product development capability has a positive relationship with 
radical product innovation. 
3.5 Company Characteristics 
Company characteristics are the attributes of a company that could affect its degree of 
product innovativeness. These characteristics are generally inherent within the company 
itself and difficult to change quickly. As previously discussed in section 2.2.6.1, six 
company characteristics that could determine radical product innovation include 
company age, company size, national culture, industry phase, willingness to cannibalise, 
and company orientation. 
Both company age and company size are included in the analysis because they are 
common organisational characteristics utilised by researchers to study product 
innovativeness in the global food and beverage industry. National culture, conceptualised 
as the company foreign ownership in this study, is included in the analysis in order to 
understand if foreign ownership (i.e. by companies or individuals from overseas) of New 
Zealand food and beverage companies could affect their product innovativeness 
performance. The foreign ownership is a relevant issue for the New Zealand food and 
beverage industry, given the increasing foreign investments and purchases of New 
Zealand food and beverage companies (Wilkinson et al., 2015). Increasing foreign 
ownership could change the culture and product innovativeness performance of the 
acquired companies. 
The latter three company characteristics (industry phase, willingness to cannibalise, and 
company orientation) are not included in the analysis. Industry phase is not included 
because it requires an industrial level of analysis which is beyond the scope of this study 
(which is a company level of analysis). Willingness to cannibalise and company 
orientation have been captured in the innovative organisational culture capability which 
is included in the conceptual model. Hence, they are not included in this analysis. 
In summary, the company characteristics that could affect product innovativeness in this 
study are company age, company size, and company foreign ownership. They are 
discussed in the following sections. 
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3.5.1 Company age 
Company age is the number of years since the company was founded. It is closely related 
to the concept of industry entrant (i.e. young) and industry incumbent (i.e. old) (Chandy 
& Tellis, 2000). 
The company age reflects the accumulation of its valuable resources (such as 
competencies, capabilities, and knowledge) that happens as a natural process of 
organisational learning (Balasubramanian & Lee, 2008). This process of resource 
accumulation is necessary for improving efficiency and competitiveness as the companies 
and their markets mature (Abernathy & Utterback, 1978; Tushman & Anderson, 1986). 
However, it can also inhibit the companies from pursuing radical product innovation due 
to core rigidities, path dependencies, or organisational inertias (Leonard-Barton, 1992; 
Teece, 2007; Tushman & O’Reilly, 1996). These factors make a revolutionary change or 
major transformation (necessary for radical product innovation) very costly and difficult 
(Abernathy & Utterback, 1978; Foster, 1986; Tushman & Anderson, 1986). As a result, 
older companies (or incumbents) simply have no incentive to pursue radical product 
innovation, given the significant revenues they earn from existing products based on their 
current valuable resources (Chandy & Tellis, 2000). Instead, younger companies (or 
industry entrants) are more driven to innovate for market share and growth since they 
don’t earn such revenues (Abernathy & Utterback, 1978; Chandy & Tellis, 2000; 
Christensen & Raynor, 2003; Tushman & Anderson, 1986). 
Like other industries, company age can influence product innovativeness in the food and 
beverage industry. However, Rama and Tunzelmann (2008), from their assessment of 
major findings in the global food and beverage industry, see that accumulated resources 
and good R&D experience could foster product innovativeness in the industry. Both 
Martinez and Briz (2000), Ziggers (2005), and Capitanio et al. (2010) have identified 
accumulated resources as an important determinant of radical food product innovation. 
Nevertheless, it is possible these accumulated resources are a function of company size 
instead of the company age. For example, Capitanio et al. (2010) found a weak negative 
relationship between company age and new product adoption in the Italian food industry 
and Martinez and Briz (2000) did not investigate company age. Furthermore, the 
accumulated resources and good R&D experience could still be insufficient for food 
product innovation success (Rama & Tunzelmann, 2008). Consequently, the effect of 
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company age on product innovativeness in the global food and beverage industry appears 
inconclusive. 
In the New Zealand food and beverage industry, it is suggested that younger companies 
are more likely to pursue radical product innovation because they already have access to 
accumulated resources provided by the government funded research organisations, higher 
education institutions, and innovation hubs; whereas older companies are likely to suffer 
path dependencies or organisational inertias given the conservative nature of food 
consumers. As a result, it is proposed that younger New Zealand food and beverage 
companies are more accepting of radical product innovation than older New Zealand food 
and beverage companies. 
3.5.2 Company size 
Company size is the number of full-time employees a company currently employs. It 
reflects the number of personnel a company has for product innovation. In a simplistic 
view, larger companies should be capable of introducing more radical product 
innovations than smaller companies because they have more personnel to assign to the 
projects. However, this relationship is not always straightforward. This is because 
companies need more organisational mechanisms as they hire more employees to manage 
them. These organisational mechanisms can lead to bureaucracies and inhibit radical 
product innovation. 
Originally, smaller companies were considered in the literature to be more innovative 
than larger companies because of their nimble and entrepreneurial characteristics (i.e. 
they had less bureaucracies) (Schumpeter, 1934). However, Chandy and Tellis (2000) 
found after World War II that the source of radical product innovation has changed from 
small and medium companies to large companies. They suggest two possible causes: 
dynamic organisational climates that allow large companies to become more 
decentralised, increasing competition among business units; and strong technological 
capability that allows large companies to develop and commercialise increasingly 
complex technologies. Indeed, major radical product innovation barriers specifically for 
SMEs are lack of incubation competencies, insufficient resources, and paucity of external 
finance (Sandberg & Aarikka-Stenroos, 2014). As a result, larger companies no longer 
suffer as much from bureaucracies as they had in the past. Furthermore, this has allowed 
them to leverage their size advantages for radical product innovation by using their 
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monopoly power to defend against industry entrants (Schumpeter, 1942) or expertise in 
distribution, production, and management to enter new markets (Tellis & Golder, 1996). 
As a result, larger companies are now more capable than smaller companies at radical 
product innovation. 
Given that the global food and beverage industry is going through similar changes with 
increasing competition, changing consumer demands, and more complex food product 
development (e.g. for functional foods), more resources are probably needed for radical 
food product innovation as well. Rama and Tunzelmann (2008) conclude that larger food 
and beverage companies generally have more innovations and innovative intensity 
(innovation relative to sales, assets, or employees) than smaller companies. They cite 
Galizzi and Venturini’s (1996) study of product innovation in the U.S. food industry who 
suggest that the poor performance is not because of the lack of R&D resources (SMEs 
can conduct R&D like large companies) but a lack of marketing and advertising 
resources, which indicates a minimum company size is required to successfully launch 
new products (although they did not specify what size). They conclude that once the 
minimum company size is surpassed, there are no differences in innovative intensity 
among these companies. Other empirical studies from Brazil (Tomas et al., 2014), Italy 
(Capitanio et al., 2010), Netherlands (Ziggers, 2005), Spain (Martinez & Briz, 2000), and 
UK (Baregheh, Rowley, Sambrook, & Davies, 2012) tentatively support this view. 
In the New Zealand food and beverage industry context, small company size can be more 
detrimental due to the small local population and distance to major markets. Indeed, many 
New Zealand companies reported lack of resources and skilled employees as major 
barriers to innovation (Statistics New Zealand, 2011). New Zealand serial product 
innovators, such as Fonterra, Zespri, and Silver Fern Farms, are large companies with 
monopoly power and strong production and marketing expertise. Furthermore, as food 
product development becomes more sophisticated, more skilled personnel are likely to be 
needed. Consequently, larger New Zealand food and beverage companies are more likely 




3.5.3 Company foreign ownership 
Company foreign ownership is the degree of overseas ownership of a New Zealand food 
and beverage company. National culture can affect a company product innovativeness 
performance by influencing the company entrepreneurial characteristics (Hayton et al., 
2002). Entrepreneurial orientated companies have been found to be more innovative (Hult 
et al., 2004). 
Few studies have investigated the effect of foreign ownership on product innovativeness 
in the food and beverage industry. Siriwongwilaichat and Winger (2004) found “Thai-
owned companies (both private and public) tended to favour introducing imitation or 
“me-too” food products while foreign owner-dominated companies were more likely to 
focus on product improvements” (p. 242). However, they found no significant 
relationship between the company foreign ownership and product innovativeness. 
Sadowski and Sadowski-Rasters (2006) examined the effect of foreign ownership on 
product innovativeness of 4,780 manufacturing companies (including food companies) 
that took part in the Community Innovation Survey for 1996 in the Netherlands. They 
found that foreign subsidiaries were more innovative than domestic companies, partly 
because they utilised external knowledge transferred from associated companies. Another 
similar study investigated the effect of foreign ownership on innovation performance in 
the 2,800 Spanish manufacturers (including food and beverage manufacturers) 
(Guadalupe, Kuzmina, & Thomas, 2012). They found overseas companies often acquired 
the best (high performance) domestic companies and investing in or transferring to them 
superior technologies and organisational practices, which improved the innovation 
performance of the acquired companies (this is consistent for all manufacturing sectors). 
However, they only measured product and process innovation and not their degree of 
innovativeness. On the whole, the effect of company foreign ownership on product 
innovativeness in the global food and beverage industry seems inconclusive. 
In New Zealand, there is a national culture of “No. 8 wire” and “kiwi ingenuity” that 
come from our agricultural background and is linked to our business success (Anderson, 
2011; Bridges & Downs, 2000; Riddet Institute, 2011). Subsequently, some New Zealand 
food and beverage companies have been purchased by overseas investors or companies 
over the past few years because of their success. For example, Shanghai Maling Aquarius 
(from China) acquired 50% of Silver Fern Farms in 2015; BayWa (from Germany) 
acquired 73% of T&G (Turners and Growers) in 2012; and Affinity Equity Partners (from 
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Singapore) acquired 100% of Tegel in 2011 (Wilkinson et al., 2015). Of the top 100 New 
Zealand food and beverage companies by revenue, 64% are New Zealand owned and 
37% (sic) are overseas owned by companies that are 42% from Asia, 23% from Americas, 
22% from Europe, and 13% from Australia (Wilkinson et al., 2015). 
Given that the New Zealand government promotes the industry to overseas investors 
(Wilkinson et al., 2015), it is considered the government sees foreign investments as 
positive for the industry. This is possibly to grow the competitiveness of New Zealand 
companies as well as giving them access to more external finance. Nevertheless, from the 
view of a radical product innovation determinant, a question arises if having an overseas 
ownership can influence the culture (i.e. entrepreneurial characteristics) of the acquired 
companies and make them less innovative in the long run. None of the three studies 
previously listed considers the impact of foreign ownership on the company’s culture. 
Considering New Zealand’s innovation strengths and weaknesses, it is proposed that New 
Zealand owned companies are more innovative than overseas owned companies given 
New Zealand’s innovative culture and strong scientific research base and training. 
3.6 Research Hypotheses 
Two sets of research hypotheses are presented in this section. The first set of research 
hypotheses were meant to predict and explain the radical product innovation 
phenomenon. Here, the author represents the relationships between the five identified 
determinants (causally related predictors or cause variables) and radical product 
innovation (response or the effect), based on the conceptual model developed in section 
3.4.6.3. The second set of research hypotheses are meant to elucidate the relationships 
between company characteristics that could affect product innovativeness in the New 
Zealand food and beverage industry, based on the three company characteristics 
identified in section 3.5. The two sets of hypotheses are discussed in section 3.6.1 and 
3.6.2 respectively. 
3.6.1 Hypothesised model on radical product innovation phenomenon 
A hypothesised model, which identifies the research hypotheses related to radical product 
innovation determinants and their relationships with each other and product 
innovativeness, is presented in Figure 3.12. The model is simply the conceptual model 
(previously presented as propositions without a numbering system) with hypotheses 













Figure 3.12: Hypothesised model on radical product innovation 
Top management innovation capability is considered the most important determinant 
because it drives the other four determinants (two of which are directly connected to 
radical product innovation). Top management have the responsibility to establish the 
product innovation strategy (resource allocation and project selection), build external 
networks, set appropriate culture, and implement innovative product development 
practices, based on the discussion provided earlier (section 3.4.6.3). However, as argued 
earlier, the researcher maintains that top management innovation capability has no direct 
effect on radical product innovation, because top management do not conduct product 
development activities. Consequently, the research hypotheses related to top management 
innovation capability as a predictor/causal antecedent are as follows: 
H1: Top management innovation capability has a positive effect on internal 
innovation capability.  
H2: Top management innovation capability has a positive effect on innovative 
organisational culture capability.  
H3: Top management innovation capability has a positive effect on innovative 






























H4: Top management innovation capability has a positive effect on external 
networking capability. 
Internal innovation capability is hypothesised to be causally related to three other 
determinants. Internal innovation capability determines what internal competencies are 
available for radical product innovation and affect the company’s ability to collaborate 
with external partners, cope with uncertainty, and conduct product development, as 
previously discussed (section 3.4.6.3). However, internal innovation capability represents 
only in-house assets that need to be utilised; as such, this capability is not hypothesised 
to be directly related to radical product innovation. Consequently, research hypotheses 
related to internal innovation capability are as follows: 
H5: Internal innovation capability has a positive effect on innovative 
organisational culture capability. 
H6: Internal innovation capability has a positive effect on innovative product 
development capability.  
H7: Internal innovation capability has a positive effect on external networking 
capability. 
External networking capability is hypothesised to be causally related to the other two 
determinants. External networking capability provides access to external resources 
needed for radical product innovation; this can enhance a company’s overall ability to 
deal with uncertainty in conducting product development, based on the previous 
discussion (section 3.4.6.3). Much in the same way as internal innovation capability 
represents internal assets, external networking capability represents only external assets 
that need to be utilised. Therefore, external networking capability is not hypothesised to 
be directly related to radical product innovation. Consequently, research hypotheses 
related to external networking capability are as follows: 
H8: External networking capability has a positive effect on innovative 
organisational culture capability. 
H9: External networking capability has a positive effect on innovative product 
development capability. 
Innovative organisational culture capability is hypothesised to be causally related to 
innovative product development capability and radical product innovation. Innovative 
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organisational culture capability determines the company’s ability to cope with high 
uncertainty and can improve the company’s ability to conduct product development and 
propensity for radical product innovation, as discussed previously (section 3.4.6.3). 
Consequently, research hypotheses related to innovative organisational culture capability 
are as follows: 
H10: Innovative organisational culture capability has a positive effect on radical 
product innovation. 
H11: Innovative organisational culture capability has a positive effect on 
innovative product development capability. 
Finally, innovative product development capability is hypothesised to be causally related 
to radical product innovation. Innovative product development capability determines the 
company’s ability to conduct radical product development. Therefore, this capability has 
a direct relationship with radical product innovation, based on the previous discussion 
(section 3.4.6.3). Consequently, the research hypothesis related to innovative product 
development capability is as follows: 
H12: Innovative product development capability has a positive effect on radical 
product innovation. 
3.6.2 Hypotheses on the effects of company characteristics on radical 
product innovation 
Given the five determinants of radical product innovation, company characteristics that 
could potentially affect product innovativeness in the New Zealand food and beverage 
industry are identified in section 3.5. These are company size, company age, and company 
foreign ownership. The hypotheses involving these characteristics are formulated as 
follows. 
Firstly, it is proposed that younger New Zealand food and beverage companies are more 
accepting of radical product ideas relative to their older counterparts because younger 
companies are not inhibited by accumulated experience and resources, based on the 
previous discussion provided in section 3.5.1. As a result, younger companies are also 
more driven to innovate in order to grow and gain market share. Hence: 
H13: There is a greater level of acceptance for product innovativeness in younger 
New Zealand food and beverage companies than in older companies. 
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Secondly, it is proposed that larger New Zealand food and beverage companies have less 
barriers to radical product innovation because of their resources and monopoly power, 
based on the previous discussion provided in section 3.5.2. This is particularly so given 
the New Zealand context of small population and local market. Hence: 
H14: Larger New Zealand food and beverage companies are more likely to have 
a higher level of product innovativeness than smaller counterparts. 
Thirdly, it is proposed that New Zealand majority owned companies are more innovative 
than overseas majority owned companies because of New Zealand’s innovative national 
culture and strong scientific research and training on food process technology, based on 
the previous discussion provided in section 3.5.3. Foreign ownership can introduce new 
culture to an acquired company; this can change the entrepreneurial characteristics, 
reducing the company’s product innovativeness in the long run. Hence: 
H15: New Zealand owned food and beverage companies are more innovative than 
overseas owned companies. 
3.7 Chapter Summary 
This chapter covered the development of models needed to answer the four research 
questions. Firstly, a product innovativeness model was developed to measure product 
innovativeness and identify radical product innovation. Product innovativeness is defined 
as “a measure of the potential discontinuity a product (process or service) can generate in 
the marketing and/or technological process” (Garcia & Calantone, 2002, p. 113). In 
keeping with definition, product innovativeness is measured by considering the 
technological newness of the new product as well as the marketing newness, from both 
market and company perspective. A radical product is identified as a new product with 
both new-to-market and new-to-company core technology and core value proposition. 
Secondly, a product innovation process model was developed to identify the predominant 
stages in a product innovation process. The product innovation process model is used to 
assist the design of qualitative interview structure (details in section 4.4.2). The final 
product innovation process model presented (Figure 3.9), consists of six stages: 
opportunity recognition, idea development, business analysis, development, testing & 
validation, and commercialisation. 
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Thirdly, a conceptual model was created to analyse the interrelationships between radical 
product innovation determinants and product innovativeness. The model identifies five 
determinants: top management innovation capability, internal innovation capability, 
external networking capability, innovative organisational culture capability, and 
innovative product development capability. They are developed based on the resource-
based view on competitive advantage (including the concepts of that theory) and extant 
literature on organisational capabilities pertaining to radical product innovation, within 
the New Zealand food and beverage industry context. 
Fourthly, company characteristics that could affect product innovativeness in the New 
Zealand food and beverage industry—company age, company size, and company foreign 
ownership—were elicited and discussed. It is proposed that younger companies are more 
likely to accept innovative products because of their entrepreneurial characteristics; larger 
companies have more resources and monopoly power to introduce innovative products; 
and, New Zealand owned companies are more innovative than overseas owned 
companies given our national culture and strong scientific research and training. 
Finally, the research hypotheses were presented in section 3.6. In Chapter 4, the 
methodology of the study is presented. This includes the design of a qualitative interview 
and quantitative surveys (data collection instruments and data collection approaches) to 
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CHAPTER 4 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
4.1 Chapter Overview 
The purpose of this research is to explain the radical product innovation phenomenon in 
the New Zealand food and beverage industry. The study has been conducted to encourage 
more radical product innovation in the New Zealand food and beverage industry by being 
able to demonstrably explain what causes radical product innovation. The research 
methodology used to answer the research questions is presented in this chapter. The 
research questions are (section 1.5): 
RQ1 What are the determinants of radical product innovation in the New 
Zealand food and beverage industry? 
RQ2 How do the identified determinants of radical product innovation relate to 
one another in predicting and explaining product innovativeness? 
RQ3 What company characteristics affect product innovativeness in the New 
Zealand food and beverage industry? 
RQ4 What are the salient features of a highly innovative New Zealand food and 
beverage company? 
Section 4.2 presents how a particular research paradigm was chosen from the research 
paradigms used in social research. Then the chosen paradigm “pragmatism/mixed 
methods research” is described in section 4.3. Following this, the qualitative interview 
design and quantitative survey design to collect and analyse data are provided in section 
4.4 and 4.5 respectively. The generalisation considerations of the research are then 
provided in section 4.6. Lastly, the research’s ethical considerations associated with data 
collection process are discussed in section 4.7. 
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4.2 Research Paradigms 
A researcher’s philosophical assumptions (research paradigm) will influence his or her 
view of reality (worldview/paradigm) and choice of research method (Collis & Hussey, 
2014; Creswell, 2014; Holden & Lynch, 2004). 
4.2.1 Constituents of a research paradigm 
A research paradigm consists of a set of specific interrelated philosophical assumptions. 
There are five common philosophical assumptions that underline most research 
paradigms: ontological, epistemological, axiological, rhetorical, and methodological 
assumptions (Bryman & Bell, 2015; Collis & Hussey, 2014). They are explained in turn. 
Ontological assumption is concerned with the nature of social reality. There are two 
widely subscribed, yet polar opposite views of social reality: objectivism and 
constructionism (Bryman & Bell, 2015). Objectivism sees social reality as an objective 
reality where reality is external to the participants and can be observed without prejudice 
(hence reality is singular) (Holden & Lynch, 2004). Constructionism on the other hand 
sees social reality as subjective realities constructed by the participants themselves 
making the research subjective and context-dependant (hence multiple realities) (Guba & 
Lincoln, 1994). 
Epistemological assumption is concerned with what is considered acceptable knowledge. 
An objectivist view considers only objective evidences (phenomena that are observable 
and measurable) as acceptable knowledge, while a constructionist view considers social 
meanings given by participants in a given context as acceptable knowledge (Bryman & 
Bell, 2015; Collis & Hussey, 2014). 
Axiological assumption is concerned with the role of values. Researchers could consider 
themselves either un-biased/value-free, which is the case with objectivism’s view; or 
biased/value-laden, which is the case with constructionism’s view (Collis & Hussey, 
2014; Guba & Lincoln, 1994). 
Rhetorical assumption is concerned with the language of the research. A value free 
axiology follows a third person passive voice writing style, while a value laden axiology 
follows a first person active voice writing style (Collis & Hussey, 2014). 
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Methodological assumption is concerned with the process of data collection and analysis, 
which depends on the researcher’s ontological and epistemological assumptions (Collis 
& Hussey, 2014; Guba & Lincoln, 1994). 
4.2.2 Types of research paradigms 
The contrasting sets of philosophical assumptions (section 4.2.1) lead to two contrasting 
research paradigms: positivism (or postpositivism, which is a less objective form of 
positivism) and constructivism. 
Positivism (postpositivism included) would view reality as objective and singular 
(ontology), would rely on objective evidence to gain knowledge (epistemology), would 
be value free (axiology), and would follow a value free rhetoric (Guba & Lincoln, 1994). 
Invariably, positivism supports the use of scientific methods to study social reality. 
Hence, positivism (postpositivism included) attempts to understand the world through 
deductive reasoning and conducts scientific experiments (or alternative methods such as 
survey research that enable statistical hypothesis testing) to test proposed hypotheses in 
order to advance new theories or knowledge. Positivism/postpositivism is generally based 
on the following principles (Bryman & Bell, 2015): 
1. The principle of phenomenalism – only observable and measurable 
phenomena can be considered knowledge.  
2. The principle of deductivism – phenomena can be reduced to testable 
hypotheses in order to explain it. 
3. The principle of inductivism – knowledge is obtained through gathering of 
facts and evidences.  
4. Objectiveness – that science can be conducted in a way that is value free. 
5. Scientific statements – there is a clear distinction between scientific and 
normative statements and scientists use scientific statements.  
Constructivism (or interpretivism) is the antithesis of positivism. Proponents of 
constructivism believe that reality is subjective and multiple (ontology) in the sense that 
people interpret and understand the world they live and work in by giving subjective 
meanings towards objects and things. Their context, culture, background, and interaction 
with others also influence their interpretation of reality. This leads to many interpretations 
of reality. Consequently, constructivist researchers who aim to understand social reality 
often use open-ended research questions to encourage their participants to share their 
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view and meaning within a given context. A researcher’s experience and background also 
influence how they interpret their findings, making the research value-laden. Through 
gathering of different interpretations, new knowledge or meaning can be obtained 
(Creswell, 2014; Guba & Lincoln, 1994; Holden & Lynch, 2004). 
In addition to positivism and constructivism, Creswell (2014) identifies two other 
relevant paradigms on social research: transformative and pragmatism. Transformative is 
a research paradigm that promotes the application of change in order to better help the 
marginalised minority in society. The proponents of transformative feel that the 
constructivism does not sufficiently capture the worldview of a marginalised victim in 
society or the issues related to power and social justice, discrimination, and oppression. 
They challenge some assumptions of constructivism and aim to cause change through 
their research (Creswell, 2014). 
Pragmatism, as the name implies, focuses on problem solving without being too 
paradigm locked. Consequently, pragmatic researchers are open to use all possible 
research approaches/methods to understand and solve their research problems. Their 
philosophical belief borrows the elements of other paradigms (Morgan, 2007). 
Consequently, pragmatism allows for the possibility of multiple streams of data collection 
and analysis (e.g. quantitative data followed by qualitative data or vice versa). Creswell 
(2014), a leading advocate of pragmatism and the use of mixed methods, asserts that 
because pragmatism does not have a set of strong underlying philosophical assumptions, 
researchers need to carefully outline their approach and philosophical assumptions.  
The major elements of the four research paradigms are summarised in Table 4.1.  




• Empirical observation and 
measurement 
• Theory verification 
• Understanding 
• Multiple participant meanings 
• Social and historical construction 
• Theory generation 
Transformative Pragmatism 
• Political 
• Power and justice oriented  
• Collaborative 
• Change-oriented 
• Consequences of actions 
• Problem-centred 
• Pluralistic 
• Real-world practice oriented 
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For positivism, the research is often based on collecting large quantitative data through 
methods such as surveys and experiments due to the principle of “phenomenalism” 
(Bryman & Bell, 2015, p. 28). Alternatively, for constructivism the research is often based 
on collecting qualitative data from a small sample through methods such as interviews 
and case studies due to the belief that reality is a social construct (Guba & Lincoln, 1994). 
Transformative and pragmatism are research paradigms that utilise both qualitative and 
quantitative approaches due to their flexibility (Creswell, 2014; Mertens, 2007). 
Philosophical assumptions related to two major research paradigms (positivism and 
interpretivism) are provided in Table 4.2. It compares how the five philosophical 
assumptions differ between the two research paradigms. According to Collis and Hussey 
(2014), both research paradigms represent two extreme end of world views and that other 
research paradigms exist between the two. For example, transformative and pragmatism 
could be said to exist between the two paradigms because they borrow the elements of 
both. In section 4.2.3, the researcher’s research paradigm is chosen, and his philosophical 
assumptions are stated. 
Table 4.2: Positivism and Interpretivism Philosophical Assumptions (Collis & 






nature of reality) 
Social reality is objective and 
external to the researcher.  
Social reality is subjective and 
socially constructed. 





Knowledge comes from 
objective evidence about 
observable and measurable 
phenomena. 
Knowledge comes from 
subjective evidence from 
participants. 
The researcher is distant from 
phenomena under study. 
The researcher interacts with 
phenomena under study. 
Axiological 
assumption (the role 
of values) 
The researcher is independent 
from phenomena under study. 
The researcher acknowledges that 
the research is subjective. 
The results are unbiased and 
value-free. 




language of research) 
The researcher uses the passive 
voice, accepted quantitative 
words and set definitions. 
The researcher uses the personal 
voice, accepted qualitative terms 
and limited a priori definitions.  
The researcher takes a deductive 
approach.  








process of research) 
The researcher studies cause and 
effect, and uses a static design 
where categories are identified 
in advance. 
The researcher studies the topic 
within its context and uses an 
emerging design where categories 
are identified during the process. 
Generalisations lead to 
prediction, explanation and 
understanding.  
Patterns and/or theories are 
developed for understanding. 
Results are accurate and reliable 
through validity and reliability.  
Findings are accurate and reliable 
through verification. 
4.2.3 The researcher’s paradigm 
In the previous chapter, the researcher formulated two sets of research hypotheses 
(section 3.6). The researcher could go on to test these two sets of research hypotheses 
using survey (quantitative) data. Thus, one could view this type of research as positivist 
research. 
However, the researcher found that there is not sufficient knowledge available to conduct 
the research in rigid positivistic (or even postpositivistic) form. For example, 
development of the measurement scales of theoretical variables (constructs) required 
industry engagement, as there wasn’t sufficient published literature to develop 
measurement scales (the survey instrument), solely from extant knowledge. As such, this 
research was conducted within the pragmatic research paradigm. 
Pragmatism is a research paradigm that adopts from other research paradigms depending 
on the needs of the research itself rather than a particular philosophical belief (Creswell, 
2014; Morgan, 2007). A pragmatic research paradigm was most relatable to the researcher 
compared to the other three research paradigms because it allowed him to borrow 
elements from both positivism (e.g. empirical observation and measurement, theory 
verification) and constructivism (e.g. understanding the full meaning of concepts for the 
purpose of measurement through interviews of multiple participants). 
To be more specific, the researcher believed that the world was governed by cause and 
effect relationships and that the relationships could be explained through deductive 
reasoning. Nevertheless, how close to the absolute truth he might never know. He also 
recognised that humans gave meaning to things and objects around them and that these 
meanings were influenced by their context, culture, background, and interaction with 
people. For deductive reasoning to be effective, he needed to understand the meanings 
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his participants gave to their world (or context) in his attempt to understand their 
worldview. 
Consequently, his research called for both qualitative and quantitative data collection and 
analysis method. A qualitative research method was needed first to understand the 
interpretation his research participants gave in an attempt to understand their worldview 
or context. Later, a quantitative research method was needed to test his proposed two sets 
of research hypotheses deduced through the qualitative research. By using valid and 
reliable data collection and analysis methods, methodological bias could be reduced. 
However, the researcher’s personal bias (experience and background) could influence his 
interpretation of the findings and needed to be accounted for. This led him to favour a 
postpositivism research paradigm over positivism research paradigm. Postpositivism is a 
less objective form of positivism because it challenges the positivism’s traditional notion 
of the absolute truth of knowledge and recognises that we cannot be positive about our 
claims of knowledge when studying human behaviours and actions (Creswell, 2014). 
Given the previous explanation of the researcher’s worldview, he had a strong belief in 
the postpositivism research paradigm with some elements of constructivism research 
paradigm. The research also called for a mixed methods research. Consequently, 
pragmatism was the most appropriate research paradigm for this research. The chosen 
pragmatic research paradigm was defined as a research paradigm primary based on 
postpositivism with some elements of constructivism. 
Subsequently, it was important to clearly state the researcher’s philosophical assumptions 
due to the pragmatism’s weakness regarding its potential for unclear philosophical 
assumptions. Table 4.3 provides a summary of the researcher’s philosophical 
assumptions based on the five philosophical assumptions identified by Collis and Hussey 







Table 4.3: The Researcher’s Philosophical Assumptions (Adopted from Collis & 
Hussey, 2014, p. 46) 
Philosophical 
assumption 
Researcher’s research paradigm (pragmatism) 
 
Ontological assumption 
(the nature of reality) 
Social reality is objective and external to the researcher. 





Knowledge comes from both objective evidence about observable 
and measurable phenomena and subjective evidence from 
participants. 
The researcher is distant from phenomena under study. 
Axiological assumption 
(the role of values) 
The researcher is independent from phenomena under study. 
The results are unbiased and value-free. However, the researcher’s 
experience and background can influence the interpretation of the 
results. 
Rhetorical assumption 
(the language of 
research) 
The researcher uses the passive voice, accepted quantitative words 
and set definitions. 
Methodological 
assumption (the process 
of research) 
The researcher takes both an inductive and deductive approach. 
The researcher used a mixed methods research to study the topic 
within its context and later to study cause and effect relationship. 
Generalisations lead to prediction, explanation and understanding. 
Results are accurate and reliable through validity and reliability.  
4.3 Mixed Methods Research 
Mixed methods methodology was chosen for this research because it was best suited for 
a pragmatic research paradigm. Mixed methods research is a research method that 
combines both quantitative and qualitative methods. There are many types of mixed 
methods. They are typically classified based on the priority (which methods are the 
principle data collection tool) and sequence (which order the methods are conducted) 
between quantitative and qualitative methods (Bryman & Bell, 2015). According to 
Creswell (2014), there are three widely used mixed methods used in social sciences4: 
• Convergent parallel mixed methods – a form of mixed methods design where 
both quantitative and qualitative methods are conducted simultaneously, with 
                                                 
4  Creswell (2014) explains three others less widely used complex mixed method designs. Coverage of 
these designs is beyond the scope of this study as these methods do not become potential candidates 
for this research. 
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equal priority. The researcher then compares and/or merges quantitative and 
qualitative data in order to provide a comprehensive analysis of the research 
problems or to integrate the research findings. 
• Explanatory sequential mixed methods – a form of mixed methods design 
where quantitative research (quantitative data collection and analysis) is 
conducted before qualitative research (qualitative data collection and analysis). 
Qualitative research is conducted to explain or elaborate the findings of the 
quantitative research. 
• Exploratory sequential mixed methods – a form of mixed methods design 
where qualitative research is conducted before quantitative research. The purpose 
of conducting qualitative research before quantitative research is to make 
quantitative research (typically survey research) possible by exploring areas that 
are not very well known to the researcher. Qualitative data collection and analysis 
may be required to test the completeness of the variables to be included in the 
quantitative study, develop scales for variables (i.e. to develop the survey 
instrument) and/or expand the researcher’s horizon to enable the researcher to 
formulate hypotheses (Creswell, 2014). Quantitative research is then conducted 
to test the hypotheses or deploy the research instrument to obtain numerical 
information to explain a social phenomenon. 
Looking at the research questions, the first research question (RQ1) requires eliciting a 
finite number of variables that determine the phenomenon of interest, namely radical 
product innovation. The second research question (RQ2) concerns cause and effect 
relationships between theoretical variables (this covers both formulation and testing the 
cause and effect hypotheses). RQ2 can only be answered through empirical observation 
and measurement. Exploratory sequential mixed methods was chosen as the appropriate 
mixed methods design platform for this research because the study prioritised quantitative 
research for data collection and analysis, for which views of participants were obtained 
prior to the development of the research instrument. Figure 4.1 shows a summary of the 









Figure 4.1: Mixed methods research process (Adopted from Creswell & Clark, 
2011, cited in Bryman & Bell, 2015, p. 647) 
Thus, in keeping with the exploratory sequential design platform, in the first phase, a 
qualitative interview was conducted. The purpose of this phase was to validate the 
research hypotheses (proposed in section 3.6) with selected New Zealand food and 
beverage companies and assist in operationalising survey items. Qualitative research was 
needed due to the limited information on the determinants of radical product innovation 
in the New Zealand food and beverage industry. Furthermore, the researcher’s limited 
understanding and experience in the industry also contributed to the need for qualitative 
research. The findings served as a preparation for quantitative survey research that was 
conducted in the second phase. The qualitative interview design is described in detail in 
section 4.4. 
In the second phase, quantitative survey research was conducted. The aim of this phase 
was to test the research hypotheses (proposed in section 3.6). A quantitative survey design 
was appropriate because it allowed the development of the measurement scales for the 
determinants of radical product innovation (independent variables) and product 
innovativeness (dependent variable) in the New Zealand food and beverage industry 
(context). Quantitative survey design also included company characteristics as 
categorical variables. The quantitative data collected enabled the researcher to fit these 
data to statistical models to assess the goodness-of-fit (Ornstein, 2013). Quantitative 
research also has a higher degree of external validity making it possible to generalise the 
research findings (Bryman & Bell, 2015). The quantitative findings (supported 
hypothesis and unsupported hypothesis) were used to finalise the researcher’s theory 
(theoretical model). The model was then used to discuss and recommend practices for 
radical product innovation within New Zealand food and beverage companies. The 









4.4 Qualitative Interview Design 
In this section, the qualitative interview design is explained. The purpose of the interview 
was to validate the research hypotheses (listed in section 3.6) and assist in the 
operationalisation of survey items in section 4.5.2. Qualitative data were obtained from 
five selected companies in the New Zealand food and beverage industry. These 
companies have a demonstrable track record of radical product innovation, having 
launched and sustained successful and innovative food and beverage products. The 
second criterion for company selection was the locality. Only companies in the 
Manawatu-Wanganui region of New Zealand were considered for interviews due to 
logistical and budgetary constraints. The final and more obvious criterion for selecting 
companies/interview participants was availability and willingness/consent of the 
potential participants contacted. In the following sections, the participant selection, 
interview structure, and interview analysis are explained. The analysis of interview data 
is presented in Chapter 5. 
4.4.1 Participant selection 
The New Zealand Food & Beverage Directory was used to search and obtain the contact 
information of the selected companies. The directory was a part of the New Zealand Food 
& Beverage Information Project that aimed to provide a comprehensive directory of over 
1,000 companies in the New Zealand food and beverage industry (Ministry of 
Business  Innovation and Employment, n.d.). 
There were many food and beverage companies located in the Manawatu-Wanganui 
region that had successfully developed and commercialised radical product innovation. 
This was due to the region’s long history of food scientific research and education. 
Snowball sampling and personal suggestion were also used to select additional 
companies. The selected food and beverage companies were manufacturers, processors, 
producers, and wholesalers of diverse food and beverage products for which New Zealand 
remains very competitive. To be specific, the first company interviewed was a processor 
of blackcurrants, the second company interviewed was a manufacturer of honeys, the 
third company interviewed was a wholesaler of sweet products, the fourth company 
interviewed was a manufacturer of confectionaries, and the fifth company interviewed 
was a manufacturer of dairy products. 
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Selected companies were first contacted with an invitation email sent, addressed to the 
company director. See Appendix A for the interview invitation letter. The company 
director or personnel directly involved in product innovation or new product development 
project were invited to participate in the interview. A follow up call was made a week 
after sending the invitation email to personally invite the company director or get 
recommendation to a relevant person in their company for an interview. Only one 
participant from each participating company was interviewed. Two arguments are given 
for selecting only one participant from each company. Firstly, the unit of analysis of this 
study is the organisation (not its people). Secondly, because all constructs (theoretical 
variables) covered in this study are strategic in nature, it was assumed that the top 
manager on product innovation would provide far more reliable and trustworthy 
information than middle-level managers, low-level managers, or floor-level workers. 
4.4.2 Interview structure 
A semi-structured interview was used to question the participating companies. A semi-
structured interview enables a researcher to cover a sizable list of questions on specific 
topics (Bryman & Bell, 2015). The other benefit of the semi-structured interview, which 
was particularly relevant to the researcher who uses English as the second language, was 
the benefit of knowing what exactly needs to be asked from each respondent, because in 
a semi-structured interview, interview questions are prepared ahead of time (Rabionet, 
2011). 
Thirty interview questions were developed and presented in Appendix B. These interview 
questions were reviewed by food technologists and academic staff at Massey University 
who had food industrial experience. The interview questions were structured into six 
sections as presented below. 
• About the company – this section covered questions 1 to 5 on the company 
characteristics and its background. Responses to questions in this section provided 
the information needed to analyse the company characteristics that could affect 
product innovativeness. 
• About the interviewee – this section covered question 6 on the interviewee’s 
responsibility. Responses to questions in this section ensured the interviewee’s 
suitability for the interview. 
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• About the company’s product development process – this section covered 
questions 7 to 9 on the company’s product development activity, process, and 
motivation. Responses to questions in this section provided information about 
how and why the company develops new products. 
• About the company’s radical product innovation strategy – this section 
covered questions 10 to 26 on the company’s radical product innovation 
background, definition, motivation, and determinants across each stage of the 
product innovation process model from opportunity recognition, idea 
development, business analysis, development, testing & validation, and 
commercialisation. Responses to questions in this section provided information 
on the definition and determinants of radical product innovation in the New 
Zealand food and beverage industry, as perceived by the interviewee. 
• Testing for other drivers – this section covered questions 27 to 29 on other 
determinants of radical product innovation that may had not been identified by 
the interviewee through answers to earlier questions. Responses to questions in 
this section ensured that other potential determinants would be given due 
consideration in the quantitative survey design, depending on the tenacity and 
veracity of the answer. 
• Ending questions – this section covered question 30 on the interviewee’s 
feedback on how the research could benefit their business. Responses to questions 
in this section helped the researcher to align the research outcomes with business 
interests. 
The interview was designed to take approximately one hour. It was conducted face-to-
face at a time and place that was convenient for the participant. Prior to the interview, the 
respondent was briefed on the objectives of the study and how the interview would help 
the researcher to achieve his research objectives. The data were collected through hand-
written notes and an audio recording (prior permission was sought from the respondent 
to record the interview). The audio recording was transcribed and analysed together with 
the hand-written notes after the interview. The interview was conducted in accordance 
with the human ethics guidelines of Massey University (details in section 4.7). 
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4.4.3 Interview analysis 
After the interview data were collected, they were processed manually using different 
colours (highlighter pen) to highlight common themes for each question. This analysis 
enabled the researcher to identify generalisable facets (e.g. common themes) based on 
textual information. This enabled the researcher to understand common meanings of 
theoretical concepts (as used in the industry), challenges in operationalising theoretical 
constructs (i.e. develop measurement scales), and determinants that were perceived to be 
significant for radical product innovation. The latter were then cross-referenced with the 
research hypotheses and discussed in section 5.3. 
4.5 Quantitative Survey Design 
In this section, the quantitative survey design is explained. The purpose of the survey was 
to collect data on the operational definitions of the constructs underlying the research 
hypotheses proposed in section 3.6. Registered New Zealand food and beverage 
companies were targeted in the survey. In the following sections, the participant selection, 
development of the survey questionnaire, pilot testing of questionnaire, and survey data 
analysis method are explained. 
4.5.1 Participant selection 
Registered New Zealand companies in the food and beverage industry were the target 
population in the survey. This included manufacturers, processors, producers, and 
wholesalers of food and beverage products. A sampling frame included New Zealand 
food and beverage companies that were listed in the New Zealand Food & Beverage 
Directory. The directory was a part of the New Zealand Food & Beverage Information 
Project that provided a comprehensive list of over 1,000 New Zealand companies in the 
food and beverage industry (Ministry of Business  Innovation and Employment, n.d.). In 
total, 1,144 New Zealand food and beverage companies from the directory were 
contacted. Figure 4.2 indicates how the sampling frame stacks up against the target 














Figure 4.2: Target participating companies (not to scale) 
Having developed the sampling frame, the next was to identify who should be invited in 
each company to participate in the survey. The Managing Director or relevant personnel 
responsible for the company’s new product development projects was chosen to be 
invited to participate in the survey. A tabulated directory of personnel contact information 
for all the companies in the directory was provided by Kompass, the company responsible 
for maintaining the directory at the time of the survey. 
4.5.2 Survey questionnaire development and administration 
The survey questionnaire was developed to consist of two parts. In the first part, six 
survey items were included to gather information about the respondent and their 
company. In the second part, thirty-one seven-point Likert scale (1: strongly disagree; 
.....; 7: strongly agree) survey items were included to operationalise the six constructs 
underlying the research hypotheses. Thus, in keeping with the Likert format, each survey 
items in part two was represented as a statement covering a certain facet of the construct, 
for which the agreement of the respondent was sought in a scale of 1 to 7. Table 4.4 
depicts the sources that were used to derive the operational definitions of the constructs. 
Some of the facets under each construct (Table 4.4) also emerged from interview data 
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companies at Feb 2016 
(n = 515,046) 
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Table 4.4: Literature Review Summary Chart for Operationalising the Theoretical 
Constructs 













































with the project 
TMIC_1 Company A, B, 




TMIC_2 Company A, B, 





TMIC_3 Company A, B, 






TMIC_4 Company A, B, 






TMIC_5 Company A, B, 








IIC_1 Company A, C, 












IIC_3 Company A, C, 


























Outsourcing ENC_2 (Olleros, 1986) Research article 










































































































higher level of 
uncertainty) 




The validity of the contents of part two of the survey questionnaire (content validity) was 
established by giving the draft questionnaire to five Massey academics experienced in 
new product development for review. Content validity establishes the fact that the survey 
content covered under each construct is a reasonable representation of the domain the 
construct is supposed to cover (Haynes, Richard, & Kubany, 1995; Nunnally & Bernstein, 
1994; Straub, Boudreau, & Gefen, 2004). Content validity is a matter of judgement based 
on expert opinion; as such content validity is not a statistical matter as such, although 
statistical theory can be used to judge whether or not a particular survey question was 
judged to be relevant by members of an expert panel by chance (Lawshe, 1975). 
The questionnaire (including the pilot testing stage) was administered through the 
“Google Forms” platform electronically by inviting each respondent to participate in the 
study by providing them the link (URL) containing the questionnaire. Although Google 
Forms is a freeware, it is a widely used electronic platform to launch quantitative survey 
research (Mallette & Barone, 2013). Two weeks were given for participants to respond 
to the survey. A day before the expiry of the two-week period, a reminder was sent to all 
participants extending the deadline by two weeks. The survey invitation that was sent to 
invite companies is provided in Appendix C and the survey questionnaire that was used 
to collect data is provided in Appendix D. 
4.5.3 Pilot survey 
In a pilot survey, a researcher administers the survey instrument within a small sample, 
prior to launch of the survey instrument to the full sample. This is to identify any shortfalls 
of the questionnaire as a risk avoidance strategy (Rea & Parker, 2014). Eight companies 
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in the Manawatu-Wanganui region from the sampling frame were selected for pilot 
testing. At the pilot testing stage, respondents were asked to complete the survey and 
comment on any particular survey items that were either unclear or irrelevant for their 
company. Surprisingly, all comments received from the respondents were 
complementary, which meant that no changes were required to the draft survey 
instrument in any shape or form. 
4.5.4 Survey data analysis 
One of the most important checks that need to be conducted in self-administered surveys, 
in particular, is checking that the responses are not tainted by “common method bias”. 
Common method bias is the bias that comes from systematic error caused due to the 
measurement instrument (including the method used in administering that instrument) 
rather than random measurement error associated with measures underlying the 
constructs (Conway & Lance, 2010; Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee, & Podsakoff, 2003). 
Harman’s single factor test (Harman, 1976) was used to show that the measures in part 
two of the questionnaire resolve into multiple (nine) factors (Eigenvalues of these factors 
being: 7.26, 2.65, 2.13, 1.82, 1.68, 1.48, 1.27, 1.19, and 1.02 in the un-rotated solution) 
via Principal Components Analysis (PCA) of survey data. This suggested that common 
method variance (bias) is substantially absent in survey data (Conway & Lance, 2010; 
Harman, 1976). The PCA was performed using Minitab 18 software. 
A partial least squares path modelling (PLSPM) approach was used to test the 
hypothesised theoretical relationships between constructs. It was chosen over covariance-
based path modelling (CBPM) because this research is an exploratory research to develop 
theories rather than to confirm (or reject) theories, making PLSPM more appropriate 
(Hair, Hult, Ringle, & Sarstedt, 2017). Grigg and Jayamaha (2014) note that a PLSPM 
approach is more prevalent in PhD research in evolving social research disciplines (as 
opposed to more established path modelling techniques used in psychology) due to the 
flexibility afforded by that technique, such as having a small sample size and non-
normally distributed data (Hair et al., 2017). Subsequently, the researcher ensured that all 
the latest guidelines on PLSPM (e.g. Hair et al., 2017) were followed in the data analysis. 
PLSPM was performed using SmartPLS 3 software (Ringle, Wende, & Becker, 2015). 
By definition/default, the constructs are modelled as directly unobservable variables (i.e. 
latent variables) that are indirectly captured using the operationalisations (measurement 
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items) used for each construct (Chin, 1998; Hair et al., 2017). PLSPM is a regression 
modelling approach involving latent variables (factors), where a series of locally 
optimised least squares regression models are fitted to data on the measures (Grigg & 
Jayamaha, 2014). These regression models cover both measurement models and 
structural models. A measurement model is a model that represents the statistical 
relationships between the latent variable (typically the predictor) and its underlying 
measurement items (typically the responses) while a structural model is a regression 
model that predicts one latent variable through one or more predictor latent variables 
(Chin, 1998; Grigg & Jayamaha, 2014). 
It is important to note that in PLSPM, validity of the constructs—construct validity in the 
form of convergent validity and discriminant validity—is established parallel to testing 
the hypothesised theoretical relationships between the constructs (Hair et al., 2017), 
which is different from conventional path modelling where validity of the constructs is 
established (using a construct confirmation procedure known as confirmatory factor 
analysis) before testing the hypothesised theoretical relationships (Hair et al., 2017). 
Multifactor analysis of variance—in Minitab 18 software, this is presented under module 
General Linear Model—was used to test whether or not the hypothesised company 
characteristics affect product innovativeness in the New Zealand food and beverage 
industry. The three hypothesised company characteristics (and therefore the three factors) 
were age, size, and foreign ownership (identified in section 3.5). Hypothesised company 
characteristics were separated into sub-groups/factor levels: company age (the year 
company was founded) was separated into “before 1900”, “1900 – 1950”, “1951 – 2000”, 
and “2001 to present” (four levels); company size (the number of full-time employees) 
was separated according to Cameron and Massey (1999) into “0 – 5”, “6 – 49”, “50 – 
99”, and “99 +” (again four levels); lastly, company foreign ownership (the majority 
ownership base) was separated into “fully New Zealand owned”, “partially overseas 
owned”, and “overseas majority owned” (three levels). In analysis of variance (ANOVA), 
means of each factor level are compared. The null hypothesis (H0) is that all means are 
the same while the alternative hypothesis (H1) is that all means are not the same. For 
example, for the factor company size, H0 is “product innovativeness (mean value) is the 
same across all four company sizes” while H1 is “product innovativeness (mean value) is 
not the same across all four company sizes”. A statistically significant F value (95% 
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confidence level was used in this study), rejects the H0 in favour of H1 (Kutner, 
Nachtsheim, Neter, & Li, 2005). ANOVA was performed using Minitab 18 software. 
Table 4.5 depicts the statistical operations conducted by the researcher (using survey data) 
to answer his research questions (RQ1, RQ2, and RQ3). The test results of the 
hypothesised relationships between the determinants of radical product innovation and 
product innovativeness (i.e. PLSPM results), ANOVA results, and qualitative data 
analysis were triangulated to identify the salient features of a highly innovative New 
Zealand food and beverage company (RQ4). Triangulation is the use of two or more data 
sources, methods, investigators, theoretical perspectives, and approaches to study a 
phenomenon (Brink, 1993). Additional qualitative data were also collected from publicly 
available administrative records (e.g. websites) of the participating companies. Collected 
data include information such as the company’s background and reputation, top 
management’s role and background, product differentiation, target market, mission 
statement, values, partners, and product development process. The additional qualitative 
data are used to improve the internal validity of the answer to RQ4. 
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ANOVA Minitab 18 
RQ4 N/A N/A N/A 
Note that PCA was performed via Minitab 18 software prior to all statistical analyses to show that 




4.6 Generalisation Considerations 
Generalisability or external validity is an important consideration because it determines 
how the findings can be applied to contexts beyond the context of the study (Bryman & 
Bell, 2015; Kukull & Ganguli, 2012). Since this study adopts a mixed methods approach, 
generalisation considerations apply for both the qualitative and quantitative phases of the 
study. This is to clarify the limitations when applying the research findings beyond its 
study context, which is the New Zealand food and beverage industry. 
Applicability is the strategy being used in qualitative research to improve the 
generalisability. Applicability works by asking the researcher to provide rich detail and 
documentation of the study context so that the qualitative findings can be applied or 
transferred to other similar contexts (Leung, 2015; Noble & Smith, 2015). Hence, detailed 
overviews are provided for each of the companies interviewed to aid transferability of 
findings. 
In addition, given that only companies in the Manawatu-Wanganui region with a known 
history of radical product innovation were targeted for the interviews, there is a potential 
of selection bias associated with this study. It is argued that due to the high concentration 
of leading food and beverage companies and food research institutions being based in the 
Manawatu-Wanganui region, the companies that were selected for interviews represent 
the innovative food and beverage companies in New Zealand. Companies without radical 
product innovation were not targeted because they were considered to have low 
understanding of the determinants of radical product innovation. Logistical and budgetary 
constraints were another reason for selecting only one region to interview innovative food 
and beverage companies. 
For the quantitative part, random sampling is the strategy being used to improve the 
generalisability, in which case the researcher needs to define the population (sampling 
frame) before drawing samples from the population. Random sampling works by 
improving the chance that the samples are a true representative of the target population 
(Kukull & Ganguli, 2012; Winter, 2000). Hence, the sample distribution was compared 
with known population distribution (in section 6.3) to ensure the samples were an accurate 
representative of the food and beverage companies in New Zealand. In a strict statistical 
sense, the quantitative findings of this study are generalisable across the New Zealand 
food and beverage sector only, because the sampling frame was drawn from New Zealand 
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food and beverage companies. A pertinent question is “are the quantitative findings 
generalisable across the food and beverage industry in other countries?” An extension of 
this question is “are the quantitative findings generalisable across other industries within 
and outside New Zealand?” The short answer to both questions, especially the latter, is 
that generalisation of any study beyond the boundary of a study needs to be made with 
extreme caution (Bryman & Bell, 2015). 
Above said, as discussed elsewhere (section 2.3.1), food and beverage industry has a 
similar set of determinants of radical product innovation to other industries. This suggests 
that the findings of this study have relevance to other industries. Nevertheless, food and 
beverage companies in New Zealand face unique contextual factors of small firm size, 
small local market, and large distance from major markets. Unfortunately, these unique 
contextual factors limit the generalisation to other countries. The best way to confirm 
generalisability of a study to other contexts is to repeat this study in such contexts (Kukull 
& Ganguli, 2012). 
4.7 Ethical Considerations 
Since this research involved human participants, the human ethics guidelines of Massey 
University, which are published as Code of Ethical Conduct for Research, Teaching and 
Evaluations Involving Human Participants was followed (Massey University, 2015). 
Human participants were involved during two stages: the interview including a small 
sample (stage 1) and the online survey including a large sample (stage 2). After following 
the online application and notification procedures for human ethics (Massey University, 
2017), it was determined that a Low Risk Notification would suffice for both stages of 
the study. The acceptance letter of Low Risk Notification for stage 1—this in effect serves 
as the human ethics approval for the study—issued by the chair of the human ethics 
committee of Massey University is shown in Appendix E. The Low Risk Notification for 
stage 2 was accepted with Ethics Notification Number: 4000015815. 
The main ethical considerations for the research are summarised below: 
1. The participants were informed of the research purpose and their right to decline 
or withdraw from participation at any time without penalty or justification. 
Voluntary consent for participation and collection of information was obtained 
before conducting the research. 
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2. It was determined that the research might collect personally identifiable and 
commercially sensitive information. As a result, the information collected was 
treated as confidential and stored in the researcher’s computer that was password 
protected. Only the researcher and supervisors had access to the information. No 
personally identifiable and commercially sensitive information was published. 
3. The participants were treated with respect. Companies were selected according to 
their product innovation’s degree of product innovativeness using the product 
innovativeness model (section 3.2) and participating personnel were selected 
based on their knowledge and role relevant to product innovation in the company.   
4. The research was conducted in a professional manner. Potential for conflict of 
interest or harm to the researcher and supervisors, participants, participants’ 
companies, and Massey University’s reputation were considered and avoided.  
5. The participants interested in the outcome of the research were informed and 
given the research outcome when it was available. 
 
4.8 Chapter Summary 
Having reviewed social research paradigms, choice of the pragmatism paradigm, which 
involves mixed method research, was justified by the researcher. Thereafter, how 
qualitative data were collected from five food and beverage companies was explained. 
These data did not lead the researcher to answer any of the four research questions 
directly, but they helped the researcher to validate the research hypotheses and prepare 
the quantitative survey design. Explanation of quantitative data collection included design 
of the survey instrument, sample selection, and the techniques used in quantitative data 
analysis to answer the four research questions (also see Table 4.5). Generalisation and 
ethical considerations were provided. The researcher provides qualitative data analysis 
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CHAPTER 5 QUALITATIVE INTERVIEWS ANALYSIS 
AND DISCUSSION 
5.1 Chapter Overview 
The purpose of the qualitative interviews was to analytically validate the proposed 
research hypotheses (i.e. provide a practical basis for the hypotheses) and prepare the 
researcher for the quantitative survey, in terms of drafting the right statements that have 
a practical basis and have some practical grounding for the hypotheses. Five innovative 
food and beverage companies located in the Manawatu-Wanganui region of New Zealand 
participated in the interview. The company overviews are presented first in section 5.2. 
The interview results, analysis, and discussion are then provided in section 5.3. They are 
arranged according to the research hypotheses previously proposed in section 3.6. At the 
very outset, it is acknowledged that qualitative data were not collected to test hypotheses; 
hypothesis testing is a statistical matter that falls under Neymen-Pearson’s logic of 
rejecting (or failing to reject) a null hypothesis (Neyman & Pearson, 1928). Hypothesis 
test results are covered in the next chapter with quantitative data. Qualitative data, the 
focus of this chapter, were nonetheless useful in verifying that none of the case studies 
provided evidence that contradict the hypotheses. 
5.2 Company Overviews 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, the five companies were selected based on their 
seemingly innovative product innovations (they had at least one radical product 
innovation in their history), locality (within the Manawatu-Wanganui region), and 
willingness to participate. Table 5.1 shows a summary of the characteristics of the 
participating companies including the position of the participant interviewed and their 
radical product innovation(s). Afterwards, a detailed overview of each company (from 







Table 5.1: A Summary on Participant Companies 
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5.2.1 Overview of Company A 
Company A is a young, micro sized, and fully New Zealand owned processor of New 
Zealand blackcurrants. The company is a joint venture between two New Zealand 
companies. The first company is a producer of New Zealand blackcurrants, while the 
second company is a pharmaceutical company specialising in biochemical extraction and 
purification. Their products (blackcurrant extracts) are sold to pharmaceutical and 
nutraceutical manufacturers around the world. These manufacturers transform the 
products into final end products (such as health capsules and functional foods and 
beverages) to sell to the end consumers. 
The participant, the Technical and Operations Manager of the company, has been 
performing his role since the beginning of the company and is responsible for product 
development and resolving technical issues. He has worked in the second company, in a 
similar position. 
The company’s products are blackcurrant extracts obtained from New Zealand 
blackcurrants using the company’s innovative extraction process. According to a 
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nutritional analysis carried out by the Plant & Food Research (A Crown Research 
Institute), New Zealand blackcurrants have a higher content of anthocyanins and other 
phytochemicals than blackcurrants grown elsewhere. This gives New Zealand 
blackcurrants (including its extract) higher antioxidant properties as well as several 
unique health benefits. 
The company’s competitive advantage comes from its unique New Zealand blackcurrants 
and the extraction process. The growing, harvesting, and extraction process of 
blackcurrants are difficult to accomplish without lowering the anthocyanins content in 
the fruit. The company therefore harvests blackcurrants from their specially developed 
blackcurrant cultivars grown in the company farm located in the South Island of New 
Zealand. In addition, the company developed its own innovative manufacturing system 
to press and extract the blackcurrants. This allows the company to extract a higher content 
of anthocyanins, which it treats as a trade secret. The resultant products (blackcurrant 
extracts) are clinically tested to prove their health benefits. 
At the time of the interview, the company was focused on improving their extraction 
process (i.e. to increase the yield and lower cost) and finding new health benefits and 
applications of the blackcurrant extracts. The company considers itself a leader in the 
research and development of blackcurrant extracts. The company maintains a high quality 
and safety standard through its in-house quality assurance laboratory. The company 
manufactures its products in a state-of-the-art production facility in the Manawatu-
Wanganui region. 
5.2.2 Overview of Company B 
Company B is a young-middle aged, micro sized, and fully New Zealand owned 
manufacturer of New Zealand honeys. The company has a contract with a local New 
Zealand honey producer who harvests, packs, and exports honeys for the company. The 
company sells the final products to retailers all over the world. 
The participant is the Director of the company who has extensive experience as an 
apiarist. She started the company to sell New Zealand honeys when the honey industry 
was going through a transformation process: transforming from low-value bulk honey 
export to high-value packaged honey export. This director is responsible for the majority 
of business activities, including product development. However, she leaves most of the 
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production and distribution activities to other companies, which she has business 
contracts with. 
The company’s innovative products are the mono-floral honeys that the company 
pioneered, such as Clover honey, Manuka honey, and Rewarewa honey. Mono-floral 
honey is produced by placing bee hives in areas with high concentration of the desired 
floral source. Each mono-floral honey (i.e. honey attributable to a particular plant species) 
typically has unique features and health benefits. Some honeys, such as the Manuka 
honey, can only be produced from the Manuka tree unique to New Zealand. 
The company’s competitive advantage comes from its unique branding and reputation in 
the industry. When the company first started, most of New Zealand’s honey exports were 
in bulk or barrel form. To differentiate, the company packed the bulk honey into packaged 
mono-floral honeys and started selling them directly to retailers as consumer food 
products. The company is one of the first companies in New Zealand to identify the health 
benefits of mono-floral honeys. The company emphasises the importance of product 
traceability back to its origin, for food safety. The company played an active role in 
organising successful seminars run by a New Zealand scientist to present research 
findings on New Zealand Manuka honey to Japanese audiences; this boosts the export of 
New Zealand honey to the Japanese market. 
At the time of the interview, the company was experimenting with a new product line 
based on another bee by-product. The experiments are conducted by the Director herself. 
The Director conducts product development on a case by case basis by identifying new 
opportunities in the marketplace, and then experimenting with different formulations and 
packaging. Over the years, she has introduced several successful honey products and 
established a notable reputation of high-quality New Zealand made honey for the 
company. 
5.2.3 Overview of Company C 
Company C is a young, small sized, and fully New Zealand owned wholesaler of gelatos 
(Italian-style ice cream), sweets, and drinks. The company operates a shop in the 
Manawatu-Wanganui region that sells its products directly to domestic retailers and 
consumers. The shop is a result of the company’s attempts to expand their restaurant 
business. They moved to the current location after it became available. 
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The participant is the manager of the company who also happens to be the director of the 
company. He has extensive experience in operating restaurant and café businesses; he is 
responsible for managing the employees who operate the shop. The participant (manager) 
conducts product development during his free time and builds new business relationships 
with suppliers and customers. 
The company’s innovative products are its range of gelato flavours that they develop. The 
company was also the first to introduce gelato to their marketplace (within the Manawatu-
Wanganui region). Gelato is different from the traditional ice cream sold in the 
marketplace. Gelato is made by combining milk, cream, and sugar plus other ingredients 
such as fruits, sweets, or beverages—all being churned at a slow speed. This gives gelato 
a denser (it contains less air), less fat, and richer flavour than traditional ice cream. 
However, because gelato contains less air, it needs to be kept in a lower temperature ice 
cream display. 
The company’s competitive advantage comes from its location and continuous product 
development. The company’s shop is located in a high traffic area opposite to a well 
subscribed restaurant. The shop is decorated with fancy items and furniture to attract 
customers to sit in and enjoy the atmosphere. Furthermore, the company imports genuine 
Italian ingredients from Italian ice cream makers and produces fresh gelato at their shop 
in small batches to ensure freshness and variety of flavours. In addition, the company 
experiments with adding New Zealand ingredients to invent their own unique gelato 
flavours. The company uses social media and social events to promote their new flavours 
and products. 
At the time of the interview, the company was experimenting with new gelato flavours 
and introducing new sweet and drink products (from both local and overseas suppliers) 
to be sold in the shop. The company attempts to pursue new and innovative products in 
order to differentiate themselves from the generic and brand competitors. However, the 
company is constrained by the availability and cost of ingredients (some ingredients are 
seasonal), and local consumer taste and buying habits (the locals tend to be conservative 
and cost conscious, being a low-income region in New Zealand). The company regularly 
conducts market research to improve their products and services. By offering appealing 
products, maintaining good services, and controlling cost, the company has achieved 
success within their target market. 
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5.2.4 Overview of Company D 
Company D is a young-middle aged, small sized, and fully New Zealand owned 
manufacturer of confectionaries. The company offers a large variety of classical and 
modern confectionaries in categories such as eclairs, nougats, fudges, caramels, and 
liquorices. They manufacture their products in their own modern production facility in 
the Manawatu-Wanganui region. They sell their products to distributors and wholesalers 
all over New Zealand, who in turn sell the products to retailers, to be sold to the end 
consumer. 
The company has gone through several changes of ownership. The company originally 
started as a backyard confectionery operation around the 1950s. In the 1970s, the 
company grew into a full-scale factory operation supplying products countrywide, before 
being sold to the second entrepreneur. Subsequently, the company was sold again to a 
third entrepreneur in the 1980s. The third entrepreneur grew the company even further 
before transferring the ownership to his son who now acts as the director of the company. 
It was this person who acted as the participant for Company D. 
The director (participant) carries out product development by coming up with new 
product variations or flavours, conducting test runs, and evaluating them—all being done 
within the company production facility. The director also travels to visit customers 
(distributors and wholesalers) in order to get feedback and sell the new products. 
The company’s innovative products are its range of unique confectionaries. Most of these 
confectionaries are developed by the company itself over the years; the company’s 
product formulations are protected as trade secrets. However, the company has developed 
some brands and formulations by acquiring other companies. By investing in expanding 
their production capability and buying newer machines, the company has grown to offer 
a very wide product range in large volume. 
The company’s competitive advantage comes from their existing production facility and 
distribution network. The production facility is monitored by their own Hazard Analysis 
and Critical Control Points (HACCP) food safety programme, to ensure the product 
quality and food safety. Furthermore, the company has established a long-term 
relationship with its core customers, who promote the company’s products to end 
consumers. 
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At the time of the interview, the company was experimenting with new flavours and 
variations of their existing products. They also have started to expand their customer base 
beyond New Zealand (currently only to Australia). The constant introduction of new 
products, sales techniques, and sales outlets enables the company to achieve steady 
growth. The company attributes their success to the passion they have for the 
confectionery industry and strict quality control. 
5.2.5 Overview of Company E 
Company E is a young, large sized, and fully New Zealand owned manufacturer of dairy 
products. The company manufactures various categories of dairy products ranging from 
dairy milk, cheese, milk powder, infant formula, supplements, and ice cream. These dairy 
products are marketed with the company’s own brands; their products are exported to 
many overseas countries. The company operates dairy production and research facilities 
in key markets around the world. Through these facilities, the company has pioneered 
many commercially successful dairy products. 
The participant is one of the Technical Managers of the company. This manager has had 
long work experience in the dairy industry as a dairy production manager and a 
researcher. He is responsible for leading a small team of technologists and technicians 
conducting product development within one category of the company’s dairy products. 
Since the participant was responsible for only one category of the company’s dairy 
products, the innovative products were limited to that category. The company’s 
innovative products include a low-fat cheese product and an entirely new production 
process that significantly shortens production time. These products were developed over 
several years within the company’s research facilities. The company is highly successful 
and have earned innovation awards regularly, both as a company as well as a 
team/individual (participant included). 
The company’s competitive advantage comes from its dairy production facilities, dairy 
research facilities, and brand recognition. The company has several dairy production and 
research facilities located in its targeted markets. Its primary dairy research facility began 
its functions before the company itself. As a result, researchers in the facility have the 
luxury of extensive knowledge and experience in dairy research and development. The 
researchers in the facility also collaborate with universities and Crown Research Institutes 
to develop new dairy technologies. This leads to the introduction of many new dairy 
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products and process improvements. The company has also developed and acquired many 
well-known dairy brands to differentiate their products and build reputation in their 
marketplace, both locally and internationally. 
At the time of the interview, the participant was actively involved in the development of 
new dairy products. However, he could not provide much detail due to confidentiality 
reasons. On the whole, the company is very strategic in their product innovation effort, 
given they have limited resources and high competition. The company also has a formal 
product development process that the Technical Managers and their teams follow. The 
company’s product innovation strategy and formal product development process result in 
many new product successes for the company. 
5.3 Interview Results, Analysis, and Discussion 
This section provides the interview results, qualitative data analysis, and discussion, with 
regard to the practical perspectives (e.g. the relevance of the hypotheses to the food and 
beverage context) of research hypotheses (section 3.6). The first five sections (section 
5.3.1 to 5.3.5) cover the five determinants of radical product innovation and their 
interrelationships. Section 5.3.6 discusses the company characteristics that could affect 
product innovativeness in the industry. Lastly, section 5.3.7 presents other potential 
moderators (called “other drivers” in the interview structure, section 4.4.2) not considered 
by the research hypotheses. Cross-comparisons are made to find similarities and 
differences between the participating companies and whether or not the interview results 
are consistent with the research hypotheses. 
5.3.1 The role of top management in radical product innovation and top 
management innovation capability as a causal variable 
Top management (e.g. directors, executives, or managers) were found to be playing a role 
in radical product innovation in all five participating companies. However, their degree 
of involvement depended on the company size and the stages of radical product 
innovation. For micro to small companies (Companies A, B, C, and D), top management 
seem to be taking a frontstage role in conducting radical product development in most 
stages. Whereas, in the large company (Company E), top management seem to be taking 
a backstage role, leaving radical product development in the hands of Technical Managers 
and their teams. In this large company, top management were actively involved in 
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formulating the product innovation strategy as well as monitoring the effectiveness of 
strategy implementation, and employee performance metrics; they were also involved in 
formal product development process when required. 
In Company A, top management were found to be directly participating in radical product 
innovation during the opportunity recognition, business analysis, and testing and 
validation stages. According to the participant (Technical and Operations Manager), the 
idea of selling New Zealand blackcurrant extracts came from a blackcurrant farmer, who 
was the director of a blackcurrant farm (Company A1). He first approached a 
pharmaceutical company (Company A2) and asked for investment and production 
expertise. This was the perfect timing for Company A2 since they were interested in 
expanding their business. Together, they formed a joint venture (Company A) to pursue 
the business opportunity. According to the participant: 
We were interested in a new product using New Zealand raw material. One of the 
ideas was berries. Blackcurrants and how its anthocyanin extract might help our 
health. So, I started a pilot project to see if we could extract substantial 
anthocyanin out of blackcurrants. And sure, we came up with a method. At the 
same time, [Company A1], operated by another group of people were also 
interested in blackcurrant extracts. They too came up with a method of 
blackcurrant extraction. But they didn’t have enough investment to make their 
idea successful. A Development Manager [Company A2] eventually made contact 
with these people. Because, you know, his job was to get new work (laughing). He 
found out that they wanted an investment and we moved ahead together like that. 
Top management of the company were found to be involved during the business analysis 
stage. When asked whether or not Company A conducts any market research to test their 
radical product ideas, the participant said: 
Yes. Originally, we had [name concealed], one of our executives solely for market 
research. He did all the market research. He was the marketing guy for the team. 
In addition, top management were found to be responsible for allocating the resources 
needed to set up a new production line, and open sale offices in key markets during the 
testing and validation stage. Quoting the participant: 
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At the start, we actually opened offices in key parts around the world. We made 
sure that these offices focused on our products. That is what you have to do to 
establish the market demand. 
When asked specifically if top management took part in the radical product development, 
in any shape or form, the respondent replied: 
Certainly, when we were focusing on creating the market for blackcurrants, the 
team managing director [name concealed], played a huge role in that. The 
management team were interested. They wanted it to succeed. They created a plan 
and they organised resources and opened offices. 
For Company B, the director was directly responsible for conducting radical product 
development across most stages of product innovation. She had a different vision from 
most of the New Zealand honey companies at the time. She explained her vision as 
follows. 
Just to give you the background. When I first started, honey was being sold in bulk 
drums. 300 kg drums. It was always identified as being very good quality honey. 
It was used for blending with lower quality honey and as a consequence, lost its 
New Zealand identity. Honey to me was always precious. I was a beekeeper at 
that time. I always think that even just a little bit of honey coming from a flower 
was beautiful. So, I wanted to promote the idea of origin—the flower—and from 
New Zealand and take it to the customer. So, I went into mono-floral honey rather 
than just general honey. Making stories about each of the sources… At the time, 
there weren’t really too many people doing that sort of thing. 
The director mentioned that she did not have all the knowledge and assets to harvest, 
pack, and export the end products herself and therefore, she subcontracted a local honey 
producer to manufacture her products for export. She explained: 
[Company B1] is the producer. They make Manuka honey. But when I first started, 
there was very little export of packed honey in New Zealand. It was always bulk. 
They were very supportive of me. 
[Company B1] have their own brand. [Company B1’s brand]. I always allow 
them to use [Company B’s brand] in some markets, for example, the Middle East. 
They have been selling [Company B] brand because our labels and things were 
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developed for the export markets. They have access to them. They also sold in 
Hong Kong and some other markets. And I concentrated on the Japanese market. 
According to the director, exporting to the Japanese market was difficult in the beginning, 
due to limited market knowledge and access to retailers. As a result, she visited Japan 
herself and was able to establish the first customer (retailer) for the company. She said: 
I was lucky with my first trip to Japan. I found a company that was selling exotic 
gifts for tourists and it was a suitable gift shop to sample what I produced. That 
really was the start that I needed to build the customer base. 
For Company C, the manager (who also was the director) was found to be directly 
involved in most stages of product innovation. According to the manager, Company C 
started as a way to expand the company’s restaurant business. It also was a result of the 
company’s previous attempts at opening a chocolate café. He went on to say: 
We opened a chocolate café. It was all about chocolate in hot drinks, similar to 
Starbucks, but we did not take on Starbucks. Starbucks’ speciality is the coffee, 
but we are specialising in chocolate. Different flavours of chocolate: vanilla 
chocolate, caramel chocolate, mint chocolate, and so on. After we moved to the 
right place, we wanted to expand the business and improve the chocolate café, 
and we considered trialling with ice cream. 
According to the manager, they were the first to introduce gelato to the marketplace. At 
the beginning, they also imported authentic gelato ingredients from Italian suppliers. He 
explained: 
We imported our ingredients direct from Italy at the beginning. One such supplier 
is [Supplier]. They are the oldest chocolate company in Italy. Their speciality is 
chocolate. 
The manager also told that he self-learned how to make gelato. According to him, this 
helped his company to develop unique gelato flavours from New Zealand ingredients. He 
stressed: 
Actually, each company has their own recipes and their secret recipes. I myself 
learned how to make gelato in Thailand from an American guy. They had a class 
to teach how to make gelato. This helped me in my dealings with the gelato chef, 
because I’ve had a little bit of background on how to make gelato. 
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The manager still remained in contract with the original suppliers, and at the same time, 
searched for new suppliers. He said: 
They still supply us ingredients. Many companies in Italy supply ingredients to 
gelato shops around the world. But some companies are good at chocolate. Some 
companies are good at fruit flavour. Some companies are good at vanilla flavour. 
So, you have to choose which company you want to work with. That is why you 
need to go to the gelato fair to try their products. You need to think which one is 
going to sell in New Zealand. Because everybody has their own recipes, you have 
to choose which supplier is the best. 
Lastly, the manager explained the taste and buying habits of New Zealand consumers. He 
gained these insights from his restaurant experience. He explained how these insights 
influenced his product design decisions and sale techniques—and why coming up with a 
new product is difficult. 
This is from experience. We have been studying customer behaviour for many 
years. Keeping things simple is a safe option in the food industry. People expect 
something simple here in New Zealand. Fish and chips and salads are always 
popular. If you produce something really fancy, people will be hesitant to try that 
out. Because they have to pay for something that looks very different, often it is 
hard to get the customer buy-in for radically different offerings. They are not there 
to try. They are for real. That is why radical innovations are hard to come by. 
For Company D, the director of the company was responsible for product development 
across most stages of product innovation. However, he did not consider the 
confectionaries developed by his company very radical or innovative. He explained: 
New products for us are not necessarily new products to the market. Sometimes, 
we are developing products that may already be on the market. 
According to the director, the company did not pursue radical product innovation because 
most of their available equipment and machines are very specialised. He explained the 
process his company adopts in identifying and selecting new products as follows. 
For us specifically, producing or manufacturing confectionery is very machine-
orientated. We need to have the right machinery to produce certain products. I 
cannot think about a radically new product idea and decide how to make them. 
We would first decide which new product might be a good fit for our machinery 
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and equipment. We would then decide what the sales potential is. Then, we would 
generally have a chat with some of my customers just to see if they have a need or 
demand for that product. Getting customer buy-in is usually challenging. 
The director said that the company primarily pursued incremental product innovation, 
where the new product is either a new variation or flavour of an existing product. Only in 
rare cases would the company acquire new equipment or machines to pursue radical 
products. The director stressed: 
Unless somebody comes to me with a very large business proposition, I won’t look 
to produce the product. I won’t pursue radically new ideas unless I have got the 
right machinery. If there is a very attractive or a very large business proposition, 
then I might consider investing in the equipment. Otherwise, I just use existing 
equipment with slight modifications. 
He then gave an example of successful incremental product innovation: 
We do a lot of variations of our existing products. Something that has gone pretty 
well for us lately is Nougat. I don’t know if you are familiar with Nougat. It is an 
aerated confection. The different variations have different centres or different 
inclusions. And that is going pretty well for us. We have developed quite a big 
range of different flavours. 
Since the company primarily developed new products for their existing customers (i.e. 
established wholesalers and distributors), it was easy for the company to introduce new 
products. He explained: 
We have been manufacturing confectionaries for a very long time. So, our 
customers are generally very long-standing customers. They have been around 
for a long time. It is not very often that we start up a new distributor. I don’t really 
go and look for new customers. I am generally producing more products for my 
existing customers. 
The director emphasised the importance of getting product quality and the processes right. 
He elaborated on his view: 
I find that I am much more critical than others. Product quality is very important, 
and everybody knows it but nothing much happens. Whereas, I would tend to say 
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“no, it is still not good enough”. I do listen to what other people have to say, but 
if I feel they are not being critical enough, I will just do what I think is right. 
For Company E, top management had a hands-off approach to radical product innovation. 
In Company E, the technical managers and their teams were responsible for conducting 
radical product development across most stages of product innovation. Nevertheless, top 
management established the product innovation strategy, oversaw formal product 
development processes, and formulated employee performance metrics as part of 
performance monitoring. According to the participant (Technical Manager), the company 
product development activities followed a strategic approach. The participant explained: 
It is about strategy. We can’t do everything. We are a big company, but the world 
is big as well. We will only compete in products that fit our competencies where 
opportunities can be exploited. Probiotic, for example, is an area we want to use 
our brands to our advantage… Strategy is very important. 
In Company E, top management were very committed to provide financial resources for 
product innovation as well as process innovation. Their product innovation strategy was 
in alignment with the company’s overall business strategy. The participant said: 
We are committed. We have put a lot of capital into new plants. We have just spent 
32 million dollars upgrading the process cheese plant in [New Zealand] to make 
more cheese slices, doubling the capacity. It is the same with mozzarella around 
new technologies. We invested 64 million and doubled that a year ago. We are 
looking at plans to increase the volume to create more cheese. We double the 
capacity at [Plant]. Those are the sort of things we are doing. Also creams as 
well. UHT cream is pretty big and growing rapidly in China. 
The participant gave an overview about the company’s formal product development 
process and how top management were very involved during gate reviews. He explained: 
We have a very structured gating system, stage gate system. And we stick rigidly 
to that. To do any work, we have to ensure our projects will go through that gate 
and get approval by senior managers before we start on anything. 
Lastly, he pointed out the role top management play in setting the employee performance 
metrics. These employee performance metrics influence the product development 
activities in the company. He went on to say: 
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We have a very strict criterion. You know [name concealed]? He was working for 
[another research institute] for a while. He was in charge of Ingredients [a major 
business area of the company] for a while. Under his stewardship, he had some 
very strict KPIs. We were trying to have a dollar value on how many dollars we 
would make on new products developed and commercialised over three years. 
Overall, the analysis of interview results presented and discussed above reveal the 
important roles top management play in radical product innovation; this is consistent with 
the literature (Cooper, 2011; Earle et al., 2001; Leifer et al., 2000). Top management were 
found to be highly involved with radical projects. They provided radical project direction, 
encouraged and motivated radical project teams, allocated resources, and built 
relationships with external partners. Following this, the research hypotheses that involve 
top management innovation capability as a causal variable are listed and discussed below. 
H1: Top management innovation capability has a positive effect on internal 
innovation capability. 
In the majority of the companies, top management seemed to have a positive effect on 
the internal innovation capability, through resource allocation and project selection. For 
example, in Company A, top management were willing to set up a new production line 
and open sale offices in key markets; in Company B, top management were determined 
to pursue a new product category against the industry trend and visited potential retailers 
in overseas markets; in Company C, top management were willing to open a new shop 
and visit gelato fairs; and in Company E, top management formulated product innovation 
strategy, product development criteria, and employee performance metrics; and were 
committed financially to investing in new plants. By comparison, top management of 
Company D were not as committed financially to pursue radical product innovation. As 
a result, the majority of their product innovations were incremental. This provides 
practical credibility to H1. 
H2: Top management innovation capability has a positive effect on innovative 
organisational culture capability. 
Given only three of the participants (Companies B, C, and D) were top managers, it was 
difficult to verify whether or not top management innovation capability had any impact 
on the organisational culture in these companies. In regard to Company A, some evidence 
was found on top management innovation capability. Their Technical and Operations 
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Manager told of how hard their top management pursue radical products. In regard to 
Company E, the Technical Manager stated that the company is “committed” to investing 
in new technology and plants as well, and that they follow top management’s strict criteria 
and metrics on new product performance, although the top management kept an arm’s 
length approach as far as their involvement is concerned. Thus, there is no qualitative 
evidence to refute H2. 
H3: Top management innovation capability has a positive effect on innovative 
product development capability. 
In Companies A, B, C, and D, top management were found to be highly involved with 
radical product development activities. In these cases, top management acted as both the 
leader and innovator by conducting product development themselves. In other words, 
they carried within them the company’s innovative product development capability, and 
their commitment to innovation drove their product development effort. Although, this 
situation appeared to happen mainly in smaller companies where product development 
personnel are limited. In the case of Company E, top management were not highly 
involved, but they established the formal product development processes which the 
product development team followed. 
H4: Top management innovation capability has a positive effect on external 
networking capability. 
Only the top management in Companies A, B, C, and D were building relationships with 
external partners, while in Company E, relationships were established by the Technical 
Managers and their teams. This piece of evidence does not imply that top management 
innovation capability has no positive effect on external networking capability. What this 
evidence seems to imply is that external networking capability could sometimes be 
developed without top management innovation capability, thanks to the capability of the 
middle management. 
5.3.2 Internal innovation capability as a causal variable 
All of the participating companies had in-house technological and market competency for 
radical product innovation. These internal competencies resided within the company’s 
top management, employees, and assets (e.g. machinery, information system, brand, and 
facility). The internal innovation capability enabled these companies to conduct radical 
product innovation and gain competitive advantage. 
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For Company A, internal innovation capability came from their expertise in blackcurrant 
cultivation and extraction. At the start of the interview, the participant pointed out the 
advantage of having New Zealand farmers with experience in blackcurrant cultivation: 
Right at the start, the big differentiation was the fact that our fruit was growing 
in New Zealand. The fact that New Zealand berries and New Zealand farming are 
of very high standard means that our products have a very high quality. If you go 
to the wrong area, you will find a high level of pesticides, for example. We know 
that our farmers control that sort of stuff very well. Also, we have a good variety 
of blackcurrants with a high anthocyanin level. 
We harvest berries from a number of farmers. One of the guys who started 
[Company A] was a blackcurrant farmer and he still is a blackcurrant farmer. 
Having a blackcurrant farmer is obviously an advantage. 
The company had its own in-house research laboratory, which according to the 
participant, was responsible for developing new products and improving their existing 
processes (i.e. increase yield and lower cost). The participant pointed out how investing 
in their own research laboratory and clinical testing helped the company establish a 
competitive advantage: 
If I said that my blackcurrant extract is good for eyesight, someone out there who 
also makes a blackcurrant extract cannot say the same, because they have no 
proof. Plenty of proof for my product. Others do not know what my procedure is, 
and their procedures are different. If no one knows what our processes are, they 
can’t make that same product and therefore make the same type of claim. 
For Company B, internal innovation capability came from their knowledge about New 
Zealand honey and Japanese consumers. The director explained how her understanding 
of Japanese consumers evolved over time. 
It is interesting. When they had a honey shop, it would always be the old people 
in their 70s and 80s patronising. I used to think that Japan would move towards 
quick breakfasts. Their old-style breakfast was a full meal with miso soup, pickles, 
egg, rices, and salad. And I thought, “oh yeah, they’re probably wanting just a 
bit of toast.” And I was completely wrong. Actually, they do have some now. Many 
people do have a quick toast. BUT, not with sweets. Because their PALATE is 
accustomed to a savoury taste. Very often toast with ham or something like that. 
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For Company C, internal innovation capability came from their restaurant and café 
management experience. The manager mentioned that one of the company’s previous 
shops was not very successful due to poor location. The learning from that shop 
contributed to the success of the new gelato shop. The manager explained: 
In the past, we had one ice cream shop in [location], but it was not there very 
long. The location is quite important for success. The shop was doing very well 
during the summer time, but during the winter time, it was hard to get customers 
because the shop was cold. But the new shop is different because it is in the 
building, which is quite warm; people do not feel the cold. Attracting customers 
all year round did not become a problem anymore. And we are not just selling the 
ice cream; we sell hot chocolate as well to counter seasonal effects and even out 
sales. More food and hot drinks in the winter and more ice cream in the summer. 
The manager also pointed out how the company’s knowledge in gelato making allowed 
them to develop unique gelato flavours using New Zealand ingredients, some very 
successfully and some not so successfully: 
We used to have red wine and beer ice cream, but it was hard to sell that stuff. 
One reason is that we could not sell these ice creams to minors. So, our 
experiments with red wine and beer ice cream did not last long. V gelato and 
sorbet that contain the energy V drink we make now, on the other hand, is very 
popular because people already know what V tastes like. 
For Company D, internal innovation capability came from their knowledge in 
confectionery making and the available production facility. The director explained how 
he himself gained knowledge by working in the company: 
This is the only place I have ever worked. My first job here, pretty much after 
leaving school was out on the production floor doing manufacturing, engineering, 
and packing. Then I went out on the road to do some selling, which enabled me 
to relate the customer to product development and production much better. I have 
pretty much done all aspects of operations in this company. 
He also clarified why he focused on exploiting available production facility instead of 
exploring for something radical. He said: 
If you shoot for anything too radical, you have got to have the right machinery to 
produce it. What we do is that we play with different variations of the same 
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Nougat, where we use the same based formulation and just put in different 
inclusions. 
For Company E, internal innovation capability came from their dairy research and 
production facilities. For example, one of the company’s radical product innovations, a 
low-fat cheese product, was originally developed by the company’s research facility in 
Australia. The company’s primary research facility in New Zealand then conducted the 
technical development. The final product was produced and commercialised in Australia 
by the Australian office. The Technical Manager explained how they came up with the 
idea: 
Our Australia office sensed opportunities with reduced fat and lighter products 
for the Australian market. And they said “the area in cheese is fairly limited. 
There are some products… but people are not buying them.” “Why don’t they buy 
them?” “Because they taste terrible.” They asked, “if we make reduced fat 
cheese, to whom would that appeal?” They did some demographic work and some 
consumer survey work… The key is trying and making something that appeals 
better and appeals more. 
The company then utilised their New Zealand dairy research facility to develop the 
product, saving both time and money. The Technical Manager explained how they 
developed the product from idea to commercialisation: 
Because the trend in reduced fat has been around for a while, we actually have 
done some work in the new technology development to try and see what we can 
do, in terms of our starter culture and our cheese technology. We actually 
developed prototypes some years before but stopped that work a while later. So, 
it was a case of picking up the pieces, fine-tuning it in the pilot plant, and 
commercialising it. All being done while getting feedback from Australia. 
When asked how they made sure the taste was right, the Technical Manager answered: 
Largely, it was about our experience and knowing what the competition was like. 
We tasted and evaluated competing products. We knew that our product was 
better than what was on the market. Then, it was a case of doing some sensory 
work in Australia with our commercial trial product and fine-tuning it 
accordingly. We just basically launched from there. We also put in a lot of 
marketing and advertising behind the launch. 
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Although, the company was not the first to introduce low-fat cheese to Australia, their 
existing dairy research and production facilities gave them significant product 
differentiation and advantage. The Technical Manager said: 
We could do some unique flavours. When you make cheese, you have to use starter 
bacteria. These are special bacteria. Think of them as good bugs. We produce all 
our starter bacteria here on site in [New Zealand]. Our big cheese plants will 
make about three hundred thousand tonnes of cheese in New Zealand. Also, we 
have got two plants in Australia… We have other starters that we can add to give 
new flavours. Our knowledge and management of these starters means that we 
can develop and produce new flavours quickly. 
Overall, the analysis of interview results is in line with the hypothesis that internal 
innovation capability is an enabler of radical product innovation. All the participating 
companies had strong in-house technological competency (Companies A, C, D, and E) 
and market competency (Companies B, C, and E). These internal innovation capabilities 
were utilised for radical product innovation by leveraging and/or exploiting them; this is 
consistent with the literature (Danneels, 2002; Prahalad & Hamel, 1990; Tellis & Golder, 
1996). In many cases, the radical product innovation ideas appeared to borrow from the 
previous radical product innovations: biochemical extract to blackcurrant extract 
(Company A), bulk honey to packaged honey (Company B), traditional ice cream to 
gelato (Company C), and cheese to low-fat cheese (Company E); this is consistent with 
the finding by Golder et al. (2009). These radical product innovations also had high 
synergies with the existing resources and skills of the innovating companies, supporting 
the conclusion by Kleinschmidt and Cooper (1991). Following this, the research 
hypotheses related to internal innovation capability as a causal variable are listed and 
discussed below. 
H5: Internal innovation capability has a positive effect on innovative 
organisational culture capability. 
In all cases, strong internal innovation capability allowed the companies to cope with high 
uncertainties associated with radical product innovation. Strong internal innovation 
capabilities were called upon in the form of knowledge (or expertise) and physical 
facilities to help solve problems. For example, in Company A, their blackcurrant 
cultivation and extraction expertise were utilised to achieve high anthocyanins yield; in 
Company B, their industry insight and consumer knowledge were leveraged to develop 
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and commercialise mono-floral honeys; in Company C, their restaurant and café 
management knowledge was used to successfully open the gelato shop; in Company D, 
their confectionary making knowledge and available production facility were exploited 
to develop new products; and in Company E, their dairy research and production facilities 
were called upon to develop and commercialise new products quickly and successfully. 
The above findings provide legitimacy to H5. 
H6: Internal innovation capability has a positive effect on innovative product 
development capability. 
On the whole, based on the information provided by the participants, the internal 
innovation capabilities of their companies enabled the companies to conduct radical 
product development more effectively. This included developing compelling business 
cases and proficiency in executing product development activities. However, it seems that 
internal innovation capabilities do not necessarily encourage the companies to utilise all 
the best practices of radical product development. 
H7: Internal innovation capability has a positive effect on external networking 
capability. 
In all cases, the internal innovation capability assisted the companies in establishing 
alliances with external partners. In Company A, their expertise in blackcurrant harvesting 
and extraction allowed them to work effectively with “Plant & Food Research” for 
clinical testing and health research. In Company B, their reputation gave them the 
credentials to form a long-term alliance with the local New Zealand honey producer. In 
Company C, their gelato making knowledge allowed them to select and work with best 
gelatos suppliers. In Company D, their superior production facility meant that their 
customers often come to them for new orders. Lastly, in Company E, their reputation 
allowed them to attract external partners who were willing to share expertise and 
resources in developing new technologies. 
5.3.3 Role of external partners and external networking capability as a 
causal variable 
External partners seemed to be powerful allies in radical product innovation for all 
participating companies. The external partners provided resources that the innovating 
companies lacked or were incapable of acquiring themselves. According to McDermott 
(1999), there are three reasons for companies to pursue long-term relationships 
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(alliances): market-driven reasons, manufacturing-driven reasons, and R&D-driven 
reasons. All of the participating companies match with one or more of these reasons. 
For Company A, the reasons for alliances are R&D-driven and market-driven. According 
to the participant, they work together with Universities and Crown Research Institutes 
(e.g. Plant & Food Research) to conduct clinical tests and health research. He explained 
the company’s reasons for forming R&D-driven alliances: 
It is incredibly expensive to develop in-house R&D and a lot of money is being 
funded by the New Zealand government for the benefit of the whole blackcurrant 
industry. I think the government also funds other berries under the same funding 
scheme, such as boysenberries and blueberries. There is no single berry that is 
more important that the other. 
The company also leverages their relationships with distributors to promote new 
products. At the beginning, the company opened their own sale offices to educate the 
market about New Zealand blackcurrants. Afterwards, they relied on their distributors to 
drive sales. The participant went on to say: 
We now rely on the distributors. For most areas, we use the distributors of 
[Company A2] because they are people that we know. People who have 
confidence and trust in our ideas. 
For Company B, their reasons for alliances are manufacturing-driven and market-driven. 
The director considered building relationships vital for her business success. She 
established a manufacturing-driven alliance with a local New Zealand honey producer 
(Company B1). This long-term relationship allows the company to harvest, pack, and 
export their products. Company B1 continues to work with the company even though 
they have their own competing products. The director said: 
Back in the day, if you want to have security in that supply, all you have to do is 
keep producing. Now, the demand for Manuka honey totally EXCEEDS supply. 
So, anybody that has the supply can sell it to customers without difficulty. So 
[Company B1] who works with me sell all their honey several times over. Of 
course, they still support me for the goodwill. But they don’t need me now. They 
have their own customers to pull their demand. 
Furthermore, she attributed the company’s early success in the Japanese market to find 
the right retailer who was willing to buy their products. The director pointed out that the 
186 
biggest growth potential came after a New Zealand scientist discovered the antiseptic 
properties of Manuka honey. Subsequently, she established a contact with the scientist, 
took him to Japan, and organised a seminar on New Zealand Manuka honey to teach the 
Japanese people about its health benefits. She explained: 
The biggest growth potential came after the research by [Scientist] on Manuka 
honey. That was the defining moment. In this country, we are lucky to have 
scientists who do such wonderful research. [Scientist] was doing research and 
nutritional research on Manuka honey and found high antibacterial levels… I 
took him to Japan with me. We had a two-day seminar in Japan. I organised that. 
The seminar was effective. 
Moreover, she mentioned that she had some help from Crown Research Institutes, a 
private laboratory, and the New Zealand Trade & Enterprise for product testing and 
research grants. But these relationships were short term in nature. 
For Company C, their reason for alliances is manufacturing-driven. According to the 
manager, he was fortunate to have an Italian brother-in-law who helped him overcome 
the language and cultural barriers. He told a story how this led to the first contract with 
an Italian supplier for the company: 
We went to the gelato fair held in Rimini. Rimini is a seaside city. Usually, Italian 
people are not very good at English and they are not interested to sell to overseas 
companies because their local market is really big. Fortunately, I had got my 
brother-in-law. He is an Italian. So, he became the interpreter. He translated as 
I spoke to the supplier. They were really happy to do business because during that 
time, the financial crisis was starting to hit Europe. So, they wanted to expand 
their business to other countries. That helped us to bring some Italian ingredients 
to New Zealand. 
Furthermore, this relationship was a mutually beneficial one. He explained: 
Actually, we depend on each other. We have to give them feedback about how 
Kiwis like the ice cream, so they could improve the quality by changing 
ingredients and their proportions to suit the Kiwi taste. 
For Company D, their reason for alliances is market-driven. The company has established 
a long-term relationship with several of their customers (i.e. distributors and wholesalers). 
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These customers often bring new businesses and product ideas to the company. The 
director described how the company discover new product ideas: 
New ideas? To be honest, most of the new ideas come from the market. My 
customers often bring new ideas… They would quite often ask whether we can 
make such and such a product. We would do a quick assessment and if we see a 
market, we decide whether or not we have the ability or the equipment to make 
the product. And if we do, we would give it a go. 
When asked how the company normally launched a new product into a market, he 
answered: 
Most of the time, the launch of a new product is taken care of by my customers… 
I will produce a product and then give it to the customers to let them launch it 
rather than us. We don’t have any marketing or sales expertise really within our 
business. I guess my personal strength is probably more on the manufacturing 
side. 
The company outsourced product packaging design to a design consultant in Auckland. 
The director also consulted with his family and friends for product feedback. Sometimes, 
he paid for technical assistance from food scientists and food technology consultants. 
For Company E, their reason for alliances is R&D-driven. It is likely that the company 
has market-driven and manufacturing-driven alliances as well. However, the participant 
did not give any specific examples because he was solely involved with R&D. The 
participant gave an example of the Primary Growth Partnership (PGP), which was a joint 
venture between the New Zealand government and primary industry to invest in long-
term innovation. This partnership allows the company to explore new technologies or 
areas that could lead to new products and processes. The participant gave reasons for the 
PGP: 
That is a Primary Growth Partnership. We develop contacts in that space for 
radical technology or areas we don’t know quite as much. It is quite good to get 
PGP postgrads doing some of that work. 
Overall, external partners seem to play an important role in radical product innovation for 
all companies. All the participants are able to easily communicate with external partners, 
which indicates the presence of large informal networks (McDermott, 1999). Some 
companies prefer to outsource when developing new products and collaborate with 
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existing customers, which is consistent with the literature (Coviello & Joseph, 2012; 
Olleros, 1986). For Company A and E, cluster effect (Porter, 1998) comes into play 
because these companies rely on many external partners. Often, the companies seem to 
form long-term relationships (alliances) with key external partners such as suppliers, 
Crown Research Institutes, and distributors. Following this, the research hypotheses 
related to external networking capability as a causal variable are listed and discussed 
below. 
H8: External networking capability has a positive effect on innovative 
organisational culture capability. 
All participating companies relied on external partners to overcome radical product 
innovation challenges. Their reasons for long-term relationships are either market-driven 
(Companies A, B, and D) or manufacturing-driven (Companies B and C) or R&D-driven 
(Companies A and E) or a combination of these. They also have short-term relationships 
for assistance when needed. Thus, field data provide credibility to H8. 
H9: External networking capability has a positive effect on innovative product 
development capability. 
The external partners seem to assist the companies in predevelopment (Company D), 
technological activities (Companies A, B, C, and E), and marketing activities (Companies 
A, B, and D) of radical product development. Somewhat surprisingly, they did not help 
the companies with other best practices. 
5.3.4 The importance of innovative organisational culture and innovative 
organisational culture capability as a causal variable 
All of the participating companies seem to experience challenges with radical product 
innovation. According to O’Connor and Rice (2013), these radical product innovation 
challenges are caused by four categories of uncertainty: technical, market, organisational, 
and resource. The major uncertainties experienced by each company and how they cope 
with them are discussed below. 
For Company A, the major uncertainties are technical, market, and resource. According 
to the Technical and Operations Manager, many products failed due to technical and 
market uncertainty. He explained: 
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Because we are a pharmaceutical company, many of our failed products are due 
to technical issues. For example, we created a product which an overseas 
pharmaceutical company wanted for their pharmaceutical development. We sold 
the product to them for five years. Unfortunately, they reached a stage where their 
pharmaceutical development was not going anywhere. They had to stop buying 
the product… We could not find a market for the product elsewhere. At the end of 
the day, if there is no market for a product, no matter how good your engineering 
is, you aren’t going to succeed. I can give you plenty of examples. Part of the 
reason why pharmaceuticals are so expensive is because everything we test, are 
expensive and many of our tests end up being failures. 
He explained how the company coped with the technical and market uncertainty by 
having the right equipment and perseverance: 
For process development, there are normal difficulties you can get around, as 
long as you have the right equipment. For market development, the biggest 
challenge is creating demand. Our first market was Japan. The biggest challenge 
there I think was the fact that no one in Japan really knew what a blackcurrant 
was… So, you really have to work hard in educating the consumer. 
According to him, the company was approached by another bigger company for a 
partnership. This greatly reduced resource uncertainty for the company. The participant 
said: 
We were helped in Japan in the early days. We worked with a company that was 
very big and very interested in the project. They had a lot of resources. However, 
they weren’t as successful as we would have liked. Even though, they spent a lot 
of money educating the consumer, they were probably not the main player in 
Japan. 
In addition, he referred to their R&D alliance with Plant & Food Research and how they 
helped the company reduce technical, market, and resource uncertainty. He elaborated: 
We partner with Plant & Food to cope with uncertainty. For example, there is 
some good work being done on the benefits of blackcurrants on sport 
performance. This is something that blackcurrants have never been used for 
before. Being able to make that information available to our customer gives our 
customer an opportunity to market their products using the new information. 
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There is plenty of information now to show that blackcurrant extracts help you to 
concentrate and think. 
There was some organisational uncertainty faced by the company. For example, they 
needed to set up a new production line and open overseas sale offices. However, the 
participant could not provide much input since he was not involved in these activities. 
For Company B, the major uncertainties are market and resource. The director gave an 
overview of the biggest challenges she faced during product development: 
There is always the cost. Until you’ve got a product, you are not sure if it’s going 
to be successful or not. There is a risk. A risk in you putting time and money into 
a product that is to be developed. Will it work? Now it is becoming increasingly 
difficult to develop and sell a new product. The range of choices is so immense. 
She gave an example of a market barrier she faced when commercialising a new product 
line in Japan. She mentioned that more effort is needed in commercialisation to overcome 
barriers. She explained: 
One of the things I am most interested in is propolis. Propolis is a product from 
beehives. It is collected by the bees from resin. Resin from a tree… Although 
Japanese people were very accustomed to propolis, they were buying it from 
Brazil, paying a very high price. Honey companies in Japan operate in a very 
controlled market; the companies were contracting for the propolis from Brazil. 
Brazilian suppliers had the Japanese market REALLY secure, even though I could 
prove that our propolis was superior. And I had research to back my claims. It 
was impossible to break through the barrier. In the minds of the Japanese, if it is 
propolis, it is from Brazil. 
For Company C, the major uncertainties are technical, market, and resource. The manager 
gave an overview of the difficulties associated with selling sweet products to New 
Zealand consumers: 
Sometimes, it is hard because sweetness is always the second priority. The food 
is always the number one priority. 
He recalled the first time the company introduced gelato. As mentioned earlier, the 
company hired an Italian chef to educate the local consumer about gelato as well as to 
train the company staff about gelato making. He said: 
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At the beginning, we hired an Italian chef from Italy. We wanted him to create an 
impression on people who come to eat ice cream, that they had a chance to talk 
with an Italian who knows a thing or two about gelato… It was the best way to 
educate the customer. We also wanted our staff to understand more about gelatos 
and how to make them. 
In addition, he went on to explain the technical uncertainty with developing new gelato 
flavours: 
The biggest challenge with making gelato is to make it stable. Sometimes, when it 
comes out it might be a flop—it is not stable. You need to find the right ingredient 
proportions and process parameters. 
Lastly, the company copes with market and resource uncertainty by constantly 
monitoring their competitors and suppliers to keep their menu fresh and cost competitive. 
He explained the process as follows. 
Usually, we try to think about the raw material first by using something simple 
and seasonal. If you import an ingredient such as a type of cheese, it is going to 
be hard to get your supply when you want them, and the cost of the menu is going 
to be very high. So, when you set up the price it is going to be really hard for the 
customer… We try to check and monitor the menus of our competitors all the time 
to keep our menu right, quality and price wise. We also often try our competitors’ 
food to improve the quality of our food. The freshness of the raw material is quite 
important. 
For Company D, the major uncertainties are technical and resource. The director 
explained the technical uncertainty faced by the company: 
With confectionery, it is probably getting a stable product or the right 
formulation. For us, a lot of the time, we use trial and error to get the formulations 
right. Once the formulation is right, it is about ensuring that the formulation can 
be processed easily through the machinery that we have. If we see potential in the 
product, we might make some adaptations to the machinery. The physical 
production is another big challenge that we face. 
He also explained how the company was constrained by available resources (time, effort, 
and machines): 
192 
We are constrained by machines, time, and how busy we are. Generally, we are 
pretty busy doing what we are doing. It is a much more efficient to produce 
variations of what we already produce rather than trying to recreate something 
entirely new. Having said that, producing a variation of what we already produce 
is not entirely easy either. I have got a product that I am working on at the 
moment, which is a slight variation of what we already produce. So far, we have 
had 47 trials and we think the formulation is still not quite right. 
For Company E, the main uncertainties are technical, market, organisational, and 
resource. The company reduces resource uncertainty through their product innovation 
strategy and formal product development processes. The Technical Manager explained 
how the company reduces resource uncertainty: 
Our new product development process is integrated across the company. We have 
to prioritise what we do before we start any project because we often have more 
projects in the pipeline than we have people to do the R&D. We use multiple 
criteria to prioritise projects. One important criterion is “How big is the 
project?” Another is “How big is the volume of potential products that we make?” 
Each project also has to be in a strategic area that we want to develop… We don’t 
sit around and sort of say “this is a new technology, let’s go and do this.” If we 
are doing anything radical, it must be linked to our strategy. 
In addition, the company faces several technical and market uncertainties. These include 
meeting technical performance, creating market demands, and complying with 
regulations. Many of the company’s new products failed because of low market demand. 
Consequently, they attempted to involve people who had to sell, buy, and consume the 
new product during product development. They also used their formal product 
development processes to identify and kill failing projects early, through review at each 
gate. The participant explained the importance of gates: 
What usually happens is that we kill projects early. After going through a gate, if 
we find that we might have a very sound technical product, but we aren’t going 
to sell very much because there is no value proposition for the consumer, we’d 
say, “Nah. We will stop it now.” 
He clarified the difficulties with regulations as follows. 
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Regulations pose problems everywhere. In individual markets, we have individual 
regulations. We have got to be compliant across all these regulations. If we are 
going for something new, maybe like putting in an ingredient that is new, we have 
got to make sure that it is approved and sometimes that is quite difficult. That is 
one of the challenges. The other is in the intellectual property space. You have to 
make sure that you are not going across somebody else’s patent. That is 
sometimes quite tricky. 
Lastly, he explained the organisational uncertainty he had experienced in R&D. These 
included getting buy-in from other departments, collaborating and communicating within 
the company, and setting up appropriate employee performance metrics. He clarified: 
The key is that you have got to get the right people in the market and sales to 
commit to something new. How do you do that? Well, they have to put it in their 
budget and say (clapped his hands) “we are going to sell 100 tonnes of this new 
product next year.” We hold them accountable to their actions, but we delegate 
them the necessary authority and support them to achieve the goals. If you just 
wait for things to happen, you are not going to get anywhere. Even within a big 
company like ours. 
You have got to make sure that you have got a matrix structure where you can get 
the projects moving fast. During NPD, it is all about teams. Everybody has a 
different discipline. It is not just about the researchers. 
Yeah. We do [have employee performance metrics]. I have been in this game for 
a long time and I have seen various KPIs around R&D. That is very difficult… 
Our KPIs are around how many projects we have, and delivery timelines and they 
are very strict. Yes, KPIs are very important. 
Overall, the analysis of the interview results indicates the importance of innovative 
organisational culture capability in coping with high uncertainties created by radical 
product innovation. All the companies experienced to a greater or lesser extent: technical 
uncertainty (Companies A, C, D, E), market uncertainty (Companies A, B, C, E), 
organisational uncertainty (Company E), and resource uncertainty (Companies A, B, C, 
D, E). Their ways of coping with these uncertainties included persevering, forming 
partnerships, improving/expanding existing products, monitoring competitors, trial and 
error, having product innovation strategy, following formal product development 
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processes, establishing collaborative organisational structure, and setting appropriate 
employee performance metrics, which are consistent with the literature (Cooper, 2011; 
Gatignon & Xuereb, 1997; Hult et al., 2004; Leifer et al., 2000; Tellis & Golder, 1996). 
Interestingly, all radical product innovations were either competency enhancing 
(Companies D, E) or stretching (Companies A, B, and C), and not destroying. As a result, 
no willingness to abandon investments was required in these cases. Following this, the 
research hypotheses related to innovative organisational culture capability as a causal 
variable are listed and discussed below. 
H10: Innovative organisational culture capability has a positive effect on radical 
product innovation. 
In all the companies, their ability to cope with the high level of uncertainties resulted in 
successful radical product innovation, evidencing the legitimacy of H10. 
H11: Innovative organisational culture capability has a positive effect on 
innovative product development capability. 
The innovative organisational culture capability helped the companies to tolerate high 
levels of uncertainty when preparing a compelling business case and conducing 
predevelopment, technological, and marketing activities. Nevertheless, they did not cause 
the companies to adopt all best practices. In addition, it was revealed that innovative 
product development capability could have a positive effect on innovative organisational 
culture capability as evidenced in Company E, where they used their formal product 
development process to reduce technical, market, and resource uncertainty. This 
suggested that the relationship between the two determinants might be a bidirectional one, 
something Slater et al. (2014) did not consider in their model, but suggested by Herrmann 
et al. (2006). 
5.3.5 The application of innovative product development practices and 
innovative product development capability as a causal variable 
All the participating companies had in some shape or form an innovative product 
development capability. From the previous discussion in section 3.4.5, current best 
radical product development practices are a full-time project leader, a project champion, 
a multi-disciplinary team, a compelling business case, well executed product 
development activities, and a well-structured product development process. How many 
of these practices are utilised and in what form are discussed below. 
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Company A had a full-time project leader committed to product/process development 
(e.g. Technical and Operations Manager). They also had a project champion in the form 
of the Marketing Executive. The project was carried out by a multi-disciplinary team 
consisting of the top management and technical staff. The company had a compelling 
business case based on the upfront work they did to understand the technological and 
market potential. And lastly, the product development activities were well executed given 
their upfront work, harvesting and extraction expertise, research facility, market-driven 
and R&D-driven alliances, production facility, and sale office. However, the company 
did not have a well-structured product development process. The participant gave an 
overview of what he considered important for new product success. 
There are always two sides to getting a successful product in the market: 
developing the process and developing the market. Process development is just 
something you learn fairly quickly whether it is going to succeed or not. Market 
development I think is more difficult. But you can succeed as long as you apply 
yourself and make a good choice upfront. A lot of this is about treating upfront. 
Do you want to do this? If you want a product that feels good, you might succeed 
(laughing). You might not. But you can see that there is an opportunity out there 
in the market. And you have got your data to support that opportunity. You have 
got to believe in that opportunity and then you can go out and create a market. 
Company B did not have a full-time project leader, a project champion, and a multi-
disciplinary team since product development was carried out by the Director. The 
company did have a compelling business case given the Director’s industry insight. The 
product development activities were conducted effectively by exploiting the Director’s 
work experience and leveraging external partners. Nevertheless, the company did not 
have a well-structured product development process. When asked what factors she 
believes make her business successful, she replied: 
Good relationships. I build up trust. I always reply really promptly and carefully. 
And quality of the product is absolutely critical. If there is a problem, sort it out. 
Sometimes at your cost but sort it out. 
Company C did not have a full-time project leader, a project champion, and a multi-
disciplinary team because product development was conducted by the Manager. The 
company did have a compelling business case given the Manager’s learning and market 
research. The product development activities were carried out well by utilising the 
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Manager’s knowledge in restaurant management and gelato making, a collaborative 
relationship with suppliers, and advertisements. However, the company did not have a 
well-structured product development process. The participant gave a summary of 
important success factors as follows. 
Location is number one key to success. Second is the service. If your food is OK 
but your service is terrible, people will not be coming back. If the food is just 
average, but you have a good service, people would still come back because in 
the service industry customer perception is very important. In our business, 
freshness of the ingredients and the right pricing are also important. 
Company D did not have a full-time project leader, a project champion, and a multi-
disciplinary team because the director conducted product development himself. The 
company did have a compelling business case due to the director’s discerning taste, 
business analysis, and confirming demand with his customers. The product development 
activities were well executed because of the director’s confectionary manufacturing and 
development expertise, reliance on customers to promote new products, and available 
production facility. Still, the company did not have a well-structured product 
development process. When asked what factors he believes make his new products 
successful, he replied: 
The product has to be good for a starter (laughing). You can’t put a product into 
the market which is not fit for purpose or doesn’t last or doesn’t have good flavour 
or good texture. Number one, the product has to be right. And number two, there 
has to be a demand for it. Here, I pretty much rely on my customers to generate 
that demand. 
Company E had a full-time project leader and a multi-disciplinary team to conduct 
product development. They did not appear to have a project champion since the project 
leader or team member acted as the champion, and each project was supported by top 
management. The company had a compelling business case through their product 
innovation strategy and strict project selection criteria. Their product development 
activities were carried out proficiently through sufficient resource allocation, 
knowledgeable personnel, research and production facilities, project and employee 
performance metrics, and advertisements. Lastly, only Company E had a formal (well 
structured) product development process. The participant said the formal product 
development process contributed to their product development success by eliminating 
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failing projects early to free up resources for other projects. He explained how the 
company develops and implements their product development processes: 
We developed these ourselves. You might have failed products, but the thing is 
that we try not to fail by stopping projects if we see they are going to fail. It is 
better to stop a project and start on another project that might deliver more value 
to the company than to keep pursuing a project that we know is not going to do 
very well. There are a whole lot of different criteria that you have to meet as you 
go through the process. 
Overall, the analysis of the interview results support applying innovative product 
development practices for radical product innovation. The best practices utilised, 
arranged in order of popularity, were a compelling business case (Company A, B, C, D, 
and E), well executed product development activities (Company A, B, C, D, and E), a 
full-time project leader (Company A and E), a multi-disciplinary team (Company A and 
E), a project champion (Company A), and a well-structured product development process 
(Company E). An interesting finding was that many companies conducted radical product 
development using an informal product development process. This showed that a flexible 
product development process could work for radical product innovation. Nevertheless, it 
is pointed out that Company E (who had a well-structured product development process 
as well as being the largest and well trained in product development) has a significantly 
greater number of radical product innovations than the other companies. It is suggested 
that a formal or well-structured product development process may lead to more radical 
product innovations because the available resources are utilised more productively, 
ignoring the company size and training effect. Following this, the research hypothesis 
related to innovative product development capability as a causal variable is listed and 
discussed below. 
H12: Innovative product development capability has a positive effect on radical 
product innovation. 
All the participating companies had utilised some or a majority of the best practices for 
radical product innovation. This gives credibility to H12. 
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5.3.6 The influence of company characteristics 
5.3.6.1 Company age 
Based on the interviews conducted, company age seems to have a negative effect on 
product innovativeness for Companies A, B, and C. As they grew older, they appear to 
have focused more on incremental product innovation. 
For Company A, at the time of the interview, the participant was focused on “process 
development” which included increasing yield and lowering cost. They were also 
working with Plant & Food Research (a New Zealand crown research institute) to find 
new health applications for their existing products. However, they did not appear to have 
considered new product categories. It is possible they had not reached the limit of their 
blackcurrant extraction technology or it could be that they didn’t want to compete with 
Company A2, who still owned the company and had their own product ranges. 
For Company B, after many years in the business, the director has slowed down to spend 
more time with her family. She pointed out that she never wanted to “build an empire.” 
At the time of the interview, she was only experimenting with improvements/revisions to 
existing products and adding a new product line. She also opined that by having a single 
supplier (Company B1) has constrained the growth of her company. 
For Company C, their current focus was on improving their product offering and 
controlling cost. They also relied on their manager and suppliers to provide them with 
new recipes. At the time of the interview, the manager said that he has a new idea for 
combining his restaurant business with the shop (Company C), in order to reduce cost 
and improve service, but that idea is not as radical as his idea of introducing gelato back 
then. 
On the other hand, Company D, despite being an incrementally orientated company, 
continued to introduce new products with a spur of innovative products from time to time 
via purchases of other companies or through new machines. Moreover, the company had 
started expanding their distribution into Australia. This indicated that the company was 
able to maintain their level of product innovativeness. 
Company E was much the same. They continued to strengthen their internal innovation 
capability and introduced innovative products. This suggested that having an innovative 
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product innovation strategy and strong research facilities could maintain radical product 
innovation for a large established company. 
Overall, the interview results give legitimacy to the research hypothesis that younger 
companies are more accepting of innovative products than older companies (H13). Older 
companies become less innovative due to success, maturity, and accumulated resources. 
However, it is possible for a company to escape this orientation through a relentless 
innovation culture (Tellis & Golder, 1996), an innovative/bold product innovation 
strategy (Cooper, 2011), and a strong/radical research facility (Leifer et al., 2000). 
5.3.6.2 Company size 
Based on the interviews conducted, company size seems to have a positive impact on 
product innovativeness. The interview results suggest that all companies, regardless of 
their sizes are capable of radical product innovation. However, their size seems to 
influence the total number of radical product innovations being introduced in these 
companies. 
Micro and small sized companies (Companies A, B, C, and D), have had only one or two 
radical product innovations over the time of their existence. As they become successful, 
they seem to have focused more on incremental and moderate product innovations to stay 
competitive. Due to limited personnel, these companies seem to have become tied up with 
incremental and moderate projects. On the other hand, the large sized company (Company 
E) does not suffer from these factors due to more personnel being available and having a 
product innovation strategy that directs top management attention and resources towards 
radical projects. 
Overall, the interview results give credibility to the research hypothesis that larger New 
Zealand food and beverage companies are more likely to introduce radical products than 
smaller companies (H14). The reasons for this are that they have more resources and top 
management attention to conduct radical product development. A minimum size of 50+ 
full-time employees (between small and medium sized company) could be the threshold 




5.3.6.3 Company foreign ownership 
Since all the participating companies were fully New Zealand owned, it was not possible 
to make comments regarding foreign ownership (H15). Few companies were willing to 
participate in the interview; it was not possible to find a willing fully overseas owned 
innovative food and beverage company in the Manawatu-Wanganui region. 
5.3.7 Potential moderators 
The interviews suggested that certain external forces (called “other drivers” in the 
interview structure, section 4.4.2) could moderate the level of innovation being achieved. 
5.3.7.1 High level of competition 
It appeared that competition could moderate the level of product innovativeness being 
achieved in all companies. 
Company A faced “plenty of competition” and consequently, had to rely on their internal 
innovation capability and R&D-driven alliances to differentiate their products to stay 
competitive. 
Company B also benefitted from competition because they had to use “perceived quality” 
as a strategy to differentiate because they could not compete with cheaper products in the 
same market. The director had to innovate through additions to existing product lines and 
repositioning to stay competitive. However, by her own admission, she was not very 
successful as she lost some customers to low cost competitors. 
Company C faced competition from other shops that had introduced similar products. 
However, the company stayed competitive by regularly monitoring their competitors and 
introducing new flavours and products. The manager also considered combining the shop 
with their restaurant business to lower cost and improve service to stay in competition. 
Company D did not face much competition. The director explained that New Zealand 
confectionary manufacturers tended to focus on their own product ranges. This low level 
of competition may further explain the director’s weak desire to pursue radical product 
innovation. 
Company E found it tough to compete in mature overseas markets. As a result, they began 
targeting emerging overseas markets that had high growth. This strategy required 
investing in new production and marketing infrastructures and leveraging their internal 
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innovation capability to develop new products specifically for these markets. So far, this 
strategy had been successful in driving growth for the company. 
Overall, a high level of competition can drive a company to be more innovative. However, 
achieving sustainable competitive advantage is difficult because they often compete with 
larger overseas companies. In most cases, they gain long-term competitive advantage 
from their internal innovation capability and alliances. This indicated the importance of 
developing and utilising their internal innovation capability and alliances, not only for 
enabling radical product innovation, but for sustainable competitive advantage. 
5.3.7.2 Made in New Zealand Branding 
Being made in New Zealand, as a manufacturing context, is seen in the literature as an 
unfavourable situation for product innovativeness due to geographical isolation and small 
local population (Hong et al., 2016; OECD, 2007). Despite that, Companies A, B, and E 
(who are all exporters) leveraged on made in New Zealand branding. 
For Company A, having their products being labelled “made in New Zealand” gave them 
competitive advantage. The participant explained the superiority of the New Zealand 
environment for growing blackcurrants: 
New Zealand is a pretty good place to grow blackcurrants. We get in [Location] 
and South Island strong frost, which means that we get fruit set and a strong level 
of sunlight which are believed to be associated with a high level of anthocyanin. 
For Company B, made in New Zealand branding for Manuka honey created consumer 
trust and a superior perceived quality. When asked about the importance of made in New 
Zealand branding, the participant said: 
Yes. Oh, very important. One of the things about Manuka honey’s success is that 
people know that it is New Zealand honey. No honey is allowed to come to New 
Zealand. So, there is no chance of mixing. 
For Company E, New Zealand branding promoted their products by creating a “clean and 
green image” to the customer. The participant said: 
Yeah, it does. I think we probably don’t do it quite enough. The old clean and 
green branding. I think the New Zealand brand is important particularly in Asian 
countries. I also think being grass-fed adds value as well, in some parts of the 
world. You see cows in a paddock rather than being in a barn. 
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For Company C and D who sold their product domestically, made in New Zealand 
branding was less important. 
Overall, New Zealand as a manufacturing context can be a plus as well as a minus. On 
the negative side, the distance to overseas markets and a lack of skilled employees create 
resource uncertainty for New Zealand food and beverage companies. On the positive side, 
the relative geographical isolation gives New Zealand food and beverage companies a 
unique ecology, leading to unique food products such as the New Zealand Manuka honey 
and New Zealand blackcurrant products. This emphasises the importance of protecting 
the New Zealand environment and food safety reputation for the whole industry. 
5.3.7.3 Market education 
In all companies, market education is critical during the commercialisation stage of 
radical product innovation. The word “educate” was repeated by most participants. 
Market education is different from the marketing activities involved in incremental 
product innovation because radical product innovation involves a new core technology 
and core value proposition that are discontinuities from other products in the marketplace. 
As a result, radical product innovation requires companies to educate the consumer about 
the discontinuities. 
For Company A, the participant referred to the need to set up sale offices and working 
with a larger company to educate the Japanese consumers about the health benefits of 
New Zealand blackcurrants. This effort to create market demand also benefited their 
competitors. They also had to compete with other functional foods such as blueberries 
and bilberries. 
For Company B, the participant talked about the challenge of convincing retailers to buy 
packaged honey instead of bulk honey. She also organised a seminar to educate the 
Japanese people about New Zealand Manuka honey. She believed her new product 
(propolis) was not doing well, despite being scientifically better, due to a failure to 
educate the market. 
For Company C, the Manager talked about hiring an Italian chef to help educate the local 
consumer about gelato. Despite gelato being known in other marketplaces, the company 
still needed to educate the market about the difference between traditional ice cream and 
gelato. 
203 
For Company D, the company relied on external partners to conduct marketing activities. 
Nevertheless, the director talked about a new product that failed due to a lack of market 
education. The director said: 
That was an example of me believing there was a demand for the product. It was 
a variation of another popular product. This other popular product still sells and 
continues to sell very well, since it has been in the market for a long time. I thought 
an adaptation or a slight variation on that popular product would have worked 
but didn’t. I think probably the main reason for that is people didn’t really know 
or understood what the product was. 
For Company E, the Technical Manager talked about the market knowledge that was 
needed to introduce the low-fat cheese product into Australia. He also gave an example 
of an innovative product that failed due to a lack of market knowledge. He said: 
We probably were the first to put a probiotic cheese into the Australian market. It 
went quite well for a while, but people weren’t prepared to pay more money for 
it. Consumers had more of a mindset on cultured yogurt having probiotic than 
they did with cheese. If we launched that today, it might go much better because 
people are more aware nowadays. 
Overall, the field observations indicate the importance of market education in radical 
product innovation. Customers, like companies, can have a low absorptive capacity. 
Subsequently, more resources (investment, effort, and time) are needed to give consumers 
(including relevant external partners) the knowledge about the radical product, so that 
they could discern its true value over competing products (within and across the product 
category), leading to a purchase decision or market demand (which could benefit all the 
companies in the product category). This factor is particularly relevant for the food and 
beverage industry because consumers are more conservative (e.g. reluctant to try new 
products). 
5.3.7.4 Government regulations 
Government regulations seem to have had some negative impact on product 
innovativeness in the companies. This is somewhat expected because food and beverage 
products are highly regulated. This adds both technical and resource uncertainty. 
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Technical uncertainty includes ensuring their product and process innovations comply 
with the health and food safety regulations. For Company E, this includes ensuring that 
their products will not infringe intellectual property of others. 
Some companies also seem to experience resource uncertainty as a result of changing 
regulations. The director of Company B gave an example of how a government regulation 
change caused them to lose a product stock. She recommended more consultation and 
advance notice from the government—particularly for smaller companies who have 
limited resources—to avoid future problems. Company D didn’t have such an issue since 
few regulation changes happened in confectionery manufacturing. 
Overall, many companies are affected to a certain extent by government regulations. This 
reflects the power government has in either incentivising or retarding radical product 
innovation. 
5.4 Chapter Summary 
This chapter presented the interview findings with an accompanying discussion. In total, 
five food and beverage companies in the Manawatu-Wanganui region of New Zealand 
participated in the interviews. These companies were successful in their markets and had 
introduced several innovative products. 
The analysis of the interview results reaffirmed the importance of all five identified 
determinants of radical product innovation and provided legitimacy and practical context 
to research hypotheses that were developed from the literature in a previous chapter. For 
these companies, company characteristics, company age (negatively) and company size 
(positively) seemed to have had an effect on product innovativeness, providing some 
practical context to the corresponding hypotheses. As mentioned at the beginning of this 
chapter, findings from qualitative field data were used to prepare the survey questionnaire 
(Chapter 4); these field data were also used in some instances to interpret quantitative 
data analysis results (the next chapter) from a practical perspective. 
In addition, qualitative data analysis suggested that a high level of competition (seemingly 
positively), made in New Zealand branding (seemingly positively), market education 
(seemingly positively), and Government regulations (seemingly negatively) could be 
potential moderators of radical product innovation. There are not sufficient grounds to 
consider the above moderators to augment the theoretical model derived earlier (e.g. this 
is a small case study). A smaller model is always chosen over a larger model in science 
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(i.e. parsimony) unless the latter can provide additional explanation of the explained 
variable. As a result, these potential moderators will not be considered in the theorisation 
of radical product innovation. 






CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 






CHAPTER 3 MODEL 
DEVELOPMENT 





CHAPTER 5 QUAL. INTERVIEWS 
ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION 
CHAPTER 6 QUAN. SURVEY 




CHAPTER 7 CONCLUSIONS 
PART 3: DATA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION 
207 
CHAPTER 6 QUANTITATIVE SURVEY DATA 
ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION 
6.1 Chapter Overview 
This chapter presents the quantitative survey results and discussion. Data screening is 
presented first in section 6.2 to ensure that the quantitative data that are used in the 
statistical analysis are not influenced by outliers, irregular patterns, wrong coding (e.g. 
for Likert scales only an integer between 1 to 7 is acceptable) or a large number of missing 
values. Descriptive statistics on the survey participants and their companies are presented 
in section 6.3. Test results of hypotheses that involve statistical techniques partial least 
squares path modelling (PLSPM) and a general linear model (multi-factor ANOVA) are 
analysed in sections 6.4 and 6.5 respectively. Discussion of the data analysis test results 
(i.e. the results of hypothesis testing) from a theoretical and practical standpoint are 
covered in section 6.6. Finally, section 6.7 provides a chapter summary that highlights 
how the research questions have been answered through the quantitative survey data 
analysis. 
6.2 Data Screening 
From 1,144 companies that were invited to participate in the online survey via Google 
Forms, 145 responded. Out of this, 137 responses were usable (see section 6.2.1), 
resulting in a 12% usable response rate, which is a satisfactory outcome (Evans & Mathur, 
2005; Manfreda, Berzelak, Vehovar, Bosnjak, & Haas, 2008). More importantly, 137 
valid cases meet the minimum sample requirement; the minimum sample size required 
for testing the researcher’s hypothesised theoretical model on radical product innovation 
(Figure 3.12) is 84 cases, based on the guidelines provided by Cohen (1992) on power 
analysis for multiple regression involving four predictors5 for a medium effect size (i.e. 
a medium actual R2 value of 0.13, as defined by Cohen (1992)). 
  
                                                 
5  The most complex (the least parsimonious) predictor-response regression equation is the regression 
equation that predicts Innovative Product Development Capability; this variable is predicted by four 
predictors (see Figure 3.12 or Figure 6.5). The more complex the equation becomes, the greater the 
sample size required to attain the desired statistical power (J. Cohen, 1992). 
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6.2.1 Testing for unusual data entries 
In the initial step of data analysis, the data were screened for data entry errors, non-target 
responses, suspicious response patterns, and missing data. No outliers were found to exist, 
which may be attributable to the 1 to 7 scale being used—for example, few respondents 
strongly agreeing to some statements (i.e. a score of 7) has to be expected, in the context 
of the research and therefore cannot be treated as an unusually high score warranting 
removal. 
Next, data entry errors were inspected. Any data with unusual characters and/or out of 
range values were rejected. The only acceptable characters for the part two of the survey 
relevant to the seven-point Likert scale were integers from 1 to 7. As expected, all 
responses (excluding missing data) contained integers 1 to 7, meaning that Google Forms 
has correctly auto-coded the responses. Thus, no response had to be removed. 
Next, non-target responses (responses that did not belong to the target industry) were 
inspected. All responses were classified according to the Australia New Zealand Standard 
Industry Code (ANZSIC) 2006 industrial classification. Two responses were removed for 
not being in the food and beverage industry (they were manufacturers of non-food 
products) and one response was removed for not being a registered New Zealand 
company. 
Suspect response patterns were inspected next by eyeballing the data to find any 
repeating, increasing, decreasing, and switching response patterns that could indicate 
unengaged responses (Downes-Le Guin, Baker, Mechling, & Ruylea, 2012). No response 
had to be removed as no suspect response pattern was found. 
Lastly, data were analysed for missing values. Usually, a case (a data row/response) is 
rejected if the number of missing values exceeds 15%, although for PLSPM, lower 
thresholds have been recommended (Hair et al., 2017; Kim & Curry, 1977). Since, there 
were thirty-one seven-point Likert scale survey items, a response with 5 or more missing 
values was removed from the survey data. Five responses were removed for having 
significant missing values (more than 4 missing values). Next came the question of 
missing values per data field/column (indicator). Hair et al. (2017) recommended that a 
reasonable level of missing values for partial least squares path modelling (PLSPM) is 
less than 5% missing per indicator. Table 6.1 shows that indicator (IOCC_6) has the 
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highest number of missing values at 3 (3/137 = 2.2% missing). Consequently, no response 
had to be removed on the grounds of the high proportion of missing data of an indicator. 
Table 6.1: Summary of Missing Values for Indicators 
Indicator Missing Valid N 
N Percent 
(N*100/137) 
IOCC_6 3 2.2% 134 
IPDC_1 2 1.5% 135 
IPDC_6 2 1.5% 135 
IIC_1 2 1.5% 135 
PI_1 1 0.7% 136 
IOCC_1 1 0.7% 136 
IOCC_5 1 0.7% 136 
IOCC_7 1 0.7% 136 
IOCC_8 1 0.7% 136 
IPDC_3 1 0.7% 136 
IIC_4 1 0.7% 136 
ENC_3 1 0.7% 136 
 
In total, out of the 145 responses received, eight responses were removed: three for non-
target responses and five for significant missing values, resulting in 137 usable responses. 
6.2.2 Testing for common method bias 
As mentioned earlier elsewhere (section 4.5.4), Harman’s single factor test (Harman, 
1976) was used to test for common method bias via Principal Components Analysis 
(PCA) of the survey data. If the PCA of the survey items results in a single factor 
(component), the responses are deemed to suffer from common method bias (Conway & 
Lance, 2010; Podsakoff et al., 2003). 
The PCA analysis, performed via Minitab 18 software on the survey data containing 
Likert style responses resulted in nine factors, based on Kaiser Criterion of Eigenvalues 
> 1.0 (Kaiser, 1958); the Eigenvalues of nine factors were found to be 7.26, 2.65, 2.13, 
1.82, 1.68, 1.48, 1.27, 1.19, and 1.02 in the un-rotated solution. In addition, the first 
component extracted only 23.42% (7.26/31) of the total variability of the measures, 
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suggesting that no single common factor exists (Podsakoff et al., 2003). Thus, the PCA 
suggested that the responses were free from common method bias. 
6.2.3 Testing for non-normal distribution 
PLSPM is a nonparametric statistical method. This means that in a strict sense, PLSPM 
does not rely on the parametric assumption of normally distributed data. Nevertheless, it 
is important to examine the distribution of the data to ensure no extreme non-normality 
exists; significant non-normal data can distort/bias the PLSPM analysis (Hair et al., 
2017). The other justification for investigating significant departures from normality is 
because the general linear model (GLM) used to test some hypotheses (hypotheses related 
to RQ3) relies on parametric assumptions, although GLM is sufficiently robust for minor 
departures from normality (Mardia, 1971; Morrison, 2005). 
In order to test for non-normal distribution, Hair et al. (2017)  recommend examining two 
measures of distribution: skewness and kurtosis. Skewness is a measure of distribution 
symmetry (typically a skewness value greater than +1 or lower than -1 indicates a skewed 
distribution), and kurtosis is a measure of distribution width (typically a kurtosis value 
greater than +1 means the distribution is too peaked, and less than -1 means it is too flat). 
Variables with skewness and kurtosis values exceeding these guidelines are considered 
to have non-normal distributions and should be examined carefully (Hair et al., 2017). 
Table 6.2 shows descriptive statistics of all the indictors. Most indicators have their 
skewness and kurtosis values within the +1 and -1 range (Table 6.2) which mean they 
have a normal distribution. Nevertheless, a few indicators show extreme values (skewness 
and kurtosis > +/-1.5) out of the recommended range: TMIC_1 (-1.52, 2.55), TMIC_2 (-
1.26, 1.60), TMIC_3 (-1.49, 1.86), TMIC_5 (-1.74, 3.77), and IOCC_3 (-1.28, 2.69). 
The non-normal distribution for TMIC_1, TMIC_2, TMIC_3 and TMIC_5 indicate that 
the construct Top Management Innovation Capability (TMIC) suffers from a non-normal 
distribution. The negative skewness indicates that many participants viewed their top 
management’s capability for managing innovation very positively (6s and many 7s in the 
seven-point Likert scale). The high kurtosis also suggests that many companies had a 
similar perception of themselves as the data were closely focused (peaked) around the 
high mode value. This non-normal distribution of the construct TMIC could be caused by 
the participants’ tendency to see their top management team or themselves (if they were 
the top manager) as more innovative, leading to higher value answers. As previously 
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stated, PLSPM is a nonparametric statistical method so the TMIC indictors can still be 
used for analysis. 
Any bias brought about by the indicator IOCC_3 is considered benign since it is the only 
one non-normal indicator out of 8 indicators used to operationalise the Innovative 
Organisational Culture Capability (IOCC) construct. 
Table 6.2: Descriptive Statistics 
Indicator Mean StDev Skewness Kurtosis 
PI_1 5.60 1.50 -1.20 1.00 
PI_2 4.20 2.10 -0.17 -1.38 
PI_3 5.27 1.59 -1.16 0.70 
PI_4 5.04 1.71 -0.75 -0.38 
TMIC_1 6.26 0.92 -1.52 2.55 
TMIC_2 5.95 1.11 -1.26 1.60 
TMIC_3 5.74 1.51 -1.49 1.86 
TMIC_4 5.55 1.23 -0.33 -0.99 
TMIC_5 6.02 1.22 -1.74 3.77 
IOCC_1 5.52 1.57 -1.10 0.48 
IOCC_2 4.29 1.84 -0.22 -1.00 
IOCC_3 5.94 1.08 -1.28 2.69 
IOCC_4 4.93 1.39 -0.35 -0.23 
IOCC_5 4.79 1.62 -0.42 -0.53 
IOCC_6 5.52 1.33 -0.84 0.44 
IOCC_7 5.02 1.49 -0.49 -0.39 
IOCC_8 4.20 1.73 -0.33 -0.73 
IPDC_1 4.66 1.93 -0.66 -0.76 
IPDC_2 5.18 1.49 -0.80 0.18 
IPDC_3 4.64 2.02 -0.56 -0.95 
IPDC_4 5.41 1.27 -0.81 0.55 
IPDC_5 4.55 1.57 -0.40 -0.40 
IPDC_6 4.42 1.56 -0.55 -0.09 
IIC_1 4.72 1.73 -0.50 -0.67 
IIC_2 5.45 1.37 -1.06 0.94 
IIC_3 5.66 1.31 -1.22 1.19 
IIC_4 6.10 0.85 -0.94 0.98 
ENC_1 5.59 1.29 -1.04 1.01 
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Indicator Mean StDev Skewness Kurtosis 
ENC_2 2.55 1.72 1.03 0.15 
ENC_3 4.03 1.85 -0.12 -1.07 
ENC_4 5.12 1.51 -0.80 0.32 
6.3 Descriptive Statistics on Respondents and Companies 
To ensure that the respondents are the target participants, the respondents’ designations 
(job titles) were requested in the survey. The responses range from top management 
designations such as director, owner, managing director, and executive director, to top 
product development designations such as operation manager, product development 
manager, innovation manager, R&D technologist, and marketing manager. This indicates 
that the respondents are within the target participants. 
Figure 6.1 depicts the distribution of the respondents’ companies by age. The figure 
shows that the majority of responses are from companies founded after 1951. This 
suggests that most New Zealand food and beverage companies are relatively young 
companies (there are only a few vintage companies). The lower number of vintage 
companies is consistent with the expected New Zealand companies’ survival rate where 
the number of surviving companies decrease overtime. 
 
Figure 6.1: Distribution of the companies by age 
Figure 6.2 depicts the distribution of companies by level of new product introduction over 
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have introduced at least one or more new products within the last five-year period. Only 
three companies seem to have introduced no new products during this period. This may 
not necessarily indicate these three companies have had no product innovation activity. 
The qualitative phase of the study revealed that one of the companies (Company B) did 
not introduce any new products because they had no reason to do so during the five-year 
period examined. 
 
Figure 6.2: Distribution of the companies by level of new product introduction 
Figure 6.3 depicts the distribution of companies by the level of New Zealand ownership. 
The figure shows that majority of companies that participated in the survey are fully New 
Zealand owned, whereas approximately 12% are either partially or overseas majority 
owned. This is unfortunate because not having sufficient observations in the second and 
third levels (categories) means that company ownership as a factor may fail to show the 
statistical significance in statistical tests involving that factor due to low statistical power. 
According to Wilkinson et al. (2015), around 37% of the top 100 New Zealand food and 
beverage companies (based on revenue) are overseas owned. Here, it is likely that smaller 
New Zealand food and beverage companies (by revenue) would attract less interest from 
foreign companies resulting in higher participation from New Zealand owned companies. 
Figure 6.4 depicts the distribution of the companies by size—the size being taken as the 
number of full-time employees employed in the company. According to Statistics New 
Zealand (2016), 90% of all New Zealand companies (515,046) had 0 – 5 employees, 9% 
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Figure 6.4 implies that more small and large companies are being represented in the 
sample. It may be that the New Zealand food and beverage industry has a relatively higher 
number of small and large companies given the large contribution of the industry to the 
New Zealand economy. 
 
Figure 6.3: Distribution of the companies by level of New Zealand ownership 
 
Figure 6.4: Distribution of the companies by size 
The general conclusion from the analysis of survey data on company characteristics is 


































respondents is over-represented or under-represented to suggest non-response bias of 
survey data. 
6.4 PLSPM Hypothesis Test Results to Answer RQ2 
In parametrising the statistical models, the structural model (also known as the outer 
model in PLSPM) involving the hypothesised relationships between latent variables has 
to be specified first in structural equation modelling (SEM)—in the present research, 
PLSPM is specified via SmartPLS 3 software. Based on the hypothesised theoretical 
model (previously presented in section 3.6.1, Figure 3.12), the structural model contains 
six latent variables (constructs): top management innovation capability (TMIC), internal 
innovation capability (IIC), external networking capability (ENC), innovative 
organisational culture capability (IOCC), innovative product development capability 
(IPDC), and product innovativeness (PI). 
After specifying the structural model, in SEM, the measurement model (also known as 
the outer model in PLSPM) needs to be specified to initiate parameter estimation. The 
measurement model indicates how each latent variable is operationalised via their 
corresponding measures (indicators). Traditional positivistic assumption on latent 
variables is that latent variables exist out there irrespective of their indicators and that 
indicators are mere reflections of their underlying constructs; this requires indicators to 
co-vary strongly with their underlying latent variable (Borsboom, Mellenbergh, & Van 
Heerden, 2003; Coltman, Devinney, Midgley, & Venaik, 2008; Diamantopoulos & 
Siguaw, 2006). This reflective measurement perspective (the default option in SEM) was 
adopted in operationalising all six constructs, as there was no reason to believe that they 
should be operationalised as non-traditional latent variables.6 Thirty-one survey items 
previously operationalised in section 4.5.2 were assigned to their respective constructs to 
form the measurement model. All the missing values (there were 17 of them) were 
replaced using the “mean replacement” option incorporated in SmartPLS 3 (case-wise 
deletion is the other option available). 
                                                 
6  In general, a latent variable can be classified as a non-traditional latent variable either because the 
latent variable is so abstract that two hierarchical levels (a second-order) are required to represent the 
construct or because the construct is formative in nature, in that the meaning of the construct is formed 
entirely by its underlying measures. 
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To establish reliability of the measurement models (scales), internal consistency 
reliability is assessed in section 6.4.1. Having established the reliability of the 
measurement scales, the validity of the constructs (construct validity) in terms of 
convergent validity and discriminant validity is examined in section 6.4.2. These 
assessments are necessary requirements in PLSPM as well as any other latent variable 
path modelling techniques (Gefen & Straub, 2005; Hair et al., 2017). Having established 
the reliability and validity of the measurement models, the structural model containing 
the hypothesised relationships is presented in section 6.4.3. 
6.4.1 Internal consistency reliability 
Internal consistency reliability measures how reliable the survey items are in reflecting 
their allocated constructs. Internal consistency reliability is measured using Cronbach’s 
alpha coefficient or the composite reliability coefficient. Cronbach’s alpha (Cronbach, 
1947) provides an estimate of reliability based on the intercorrelations of the indicators. 
It assumes equal weight (same outer loadings for all indicators of the construct), which is 
not entirely rational for PLSPM (Hair et al., 2017). On the other hand, composite 
reliability (Werts, Linn, & Jöreskog, 1974) takes into consideration different outer 
loadings of the indictor variables and uses the variance and covariance value of the 
indicators in the estimate. According to Hair et al. (2017), although Cronbach’s alpha 
coefficient and composite reliability coefficient are both used in reliability assessment, 
they are likely to underestimate and overestimate the internal consistency reliability 
respectively; for this reason, Hair et al. (2017) recommend the use of both measures in 
tandem because true reliability (as a single score) usually lies between the two estimated 
coefficients. According to Hair et al. (2017), a Cronbach’s alpha value and a composite 
reliability value that falls between 0.70 and 0.90 are considered satisfactory, while a lower 
acceptable threshold of 0.60 can still be accepted in exploratory research, where 
operational definition of a construct could be at early stages of development; further, 
according to them, any values below 0.60 indicates lack of internal consistency reliability. 
Figures shown in Table 6.3 indicate that all constructs that constitute the theoretical model 
(Figure 6.5) possess an adequate level of internal consistency reliability, given that this 
study is an exploratory study and most scales are being tested for the first time. It is 
important to note that some indicators had to be excluded to improve internal consistency 
reliability and scale validity. The details are given in the next sub-section (section 
6.4.1.1). 
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Table 6.3: The Reliability Statistics 




Product Innovativeness (PI) 0.62 0.78 
Top Management Innovation Capability (TMIC) 0.77 0.84 
Internal Innovation Capability (IIC) 0.63 0.78 
External Networking Capability (ENC) 0.64 0.85 
Innovative Organisational Culture Capability (IOCC) 0.79 0.86 
Innovative Product Development Capability (IPDC) 0.75 0.84 
Note: As mentioned earlier, acceptable thresholds for reliability coefficients are: ≥ 0.60 for 
exploratory research and ≥ 0.70 for established constructs. 
6.4.1.1 Exclusion of unsuitable indicators 
In a new measurement system, it is highly unlikely that all the measures that have been 
initially identified as underlying measures (hence survey items) do pass the statistical 
thresholds for acceptability on reliability and validity (Hair et al., 2017; Hinkin, 1995; 
Nunnally & Bernstein, 1994). 
Hair et al. (2017) recommend removing an indicator that returns an outer loading less 
than 0.40, meaning a correlation between the measure and its assigned construct is less 
than 0.40; it is hard to justify that a measure belongs to its assigned construct when there 
is a low correlation between the measure and its assigned construct. Further, Hair et al. 
(2017) advocate removing indicators that return outer loadings between 0.40 and 0.70 
based on their effect on convergent validity (defined in the next section), internal 
consistency reliability, and content validity. Weak outer loadings reduce internal 
consistency reliability as well as the construct’s Average Variance Extracted (AVE), 
which is a measure that is being used in assessing convergent validity and discriminant 
validity (Fornell & Larcker, 1981). 
To improve the reliability of the scale of the construct external networking capability 
(ENC), indicators ENC_1 and ENC_4 were removed (low outer loadings). Indicators 
ENC_1 and ENC_4 represent “informal networks” and “customer collaboration” 
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respectively. Exclusion of these two indicators means that ENC gets re-defined (better 
defined in a statistical sense) as “outsourcing and alliances” based on the remaining two 
indicators of ENC. In the discussion (section 6.6.1.3), it is argued that ENC continues to 
capture (if not better) the original intent for ENC. 
To improve the reliability of innovative organisational culture capability (IOCC), 
indicators IOCC_3, IOCC_4, IOCC_5 were removed (low outer loadings). The three 
indicators removed represent three organisational orientations on organisational 
innovativeness posited by Gatignon and Xuereb (1997): “customer orientation”, 
“technological orientation”, and “competitor orientation” respectively. In the discussion 
(section 6.6.1.4), it is argued that removal of the said three indicators do not significantly 
compromise the meaning of IOCC as the three organisational orientations are subsumed 
in the remaining indicators of IOCC. 
To improve the reliability of innovative product development capability (IPDC), 
indicators IPDC_2 and IPDC_4 were removed (low outer loadings). The two indicators 
removed represent “a project champion” and “a compelling business case” respectively. 
The removal of the two indicators significantly increased the reliability of IPDC. The 
implication of removal of the indicators is covered in the discussion (section 6.6.1.5). 
Finally, indicators PI_1, TMIC_5, IIC_4, and IOCC_6 were also considered for removal 
(low/moderate outer loading as shown in Table 6.4), but these indicators were not 
removed as it was desirable to retain these indicators to maintain content validity and 
internal consistent reliability. Fieldwork (Chapter 5) that preceded the survey research 
showed that TMIC_5 (“building relationships with external partners”) is an important 
indicator for capturing the role top managers play in encouraging external networking 
capability. PI_1 (“micro technological discontinuity”) was retained based on Garcia and 
Calantone (2002), who recommend using all four indicators (PI_1 to PI_4) when 
evaluating the innovativeness of a product. IIC_4 and IOCC_6 were not removed due to 
the negative impact on internal consistency reliability of their assigned constructs. 
Table 6.4 shows that all indicators except PI_1, TMIC_5, IIC_4, and IOCC_6 (as 
mentioned earlier the above named indicators were retained for content validity and 
internal consistent reliability, but still within acceptable range) return loadings greater 
than 0.70, a desired condition for construct validity (further explained in the next section 
under convergent validity) suggested by Hair et al. (2017). 
219 
Table 6.4: Loadings of the Indicators Retained and the AVE of Each Construct 
Construct Indicator Indicator Loading 
Product Innovativeness (PI) 





Top Management Innovation 
Capability (TMIC) 



















Culture Capability (IOCC) 














For all indicators, p < 0.001 
6.4.2 Convergent validity and discriminant validity 
Convergent validity refers to the extent to which measures that are being considered to 
be theoretically related to their underlying construct converge strongly enough in a 
correlational sense (i.e. high indicator loading), to suggest that they reflect the construct 
(Campbell & Fiske, 1959; Gefen & Straub, 2005). 
While a weak indicator loading (weak correlation between the indicator and its theoretical 
construct) affects convergent validity of the construct, the average variance extracted 
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(AVE) remains an important overall measure for establishing convergent validity of a 
construct (Fornell & Larcker, 1981). AVE is defined as “the grand mean value of the 
squared loadings of the indicators associated with the construct” (Hair et al., 2017, p. 
114). In other words, it is an indicator of the average amount of variance of the indicators 
explained by their assigned construct (Gefen & Straub, 2005; Hair et al., 2017). The 
generally accepted AVE value for an acceptable level of convergent validity is 0.50 or 
higher (Fornell & Larcker, 1981; Hair et al., 2017). An AVE value greater than 0.50 
indicates that the construct explains more than half of the variance of its indicators, while 
an AVE lower than 0.50 indicates that more than half of the variance of the indicators is 
explained by measurement error, rather than the construct (Chin, 1998; Fornell & 
Larcker, 1981). However, an AVE slightly less than 0.50 can be accepted so long as their 
composite reliability meets the prescribed threshold (≥ 0.60) (Fornell & Larcker, 1981). 
After all the indicators, but the excluded ones, were chosen, the reliability statistics 
(Cronbach’s alpha and composite reliability) for the six constructs of the hypothesised 
model were calculated via SmartPLS 3 (Table 6.3); these plus indicator loadings (outer 
loadings) and AVE of the constructs are shown in Table 6.4. Given that this research 
attempted to identify new determinants of radical product innovation in the New Zealand 
food and beverage industry, the threshold level of reliability for an exploratory study was 
considered; thus, Cronbach’s alpha ≥ 0.60, composite reliability ≥ 0.60, high indicator 
loadings, and an AVE ≥ 0.50 were considered acceptable. 
As shown in Table 6.3, all constructs pass the Cronbach’s alpha and composite reliability 
assessments. For AVE (Table 6.4), only two constructs (PI and IIC) return values slightly 
less than 0.50 (= 0.47). However, since they are both close to the threshold and have 
composite reliability greater than 0.60, they were considered acceptable. Consequently, 
the measurement models were considered to have acceptable internals of consistency 
reliability and convergent validity. 
Discriminant validity is an assessment to confirm that a construct is truly distinct from 
other constructs. Hair et al. (2017) recommended three criteria for assessing discriminant 
validity. 
6.4.2.1 The loading cross-loading criterion for establishing discriminant validity 
The first criterion used in establishing discriminant validity is a loading cross-loadings 
comparison. As the name implies, outer loadings of each indicator are calculated to 
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examine their loadings. It is expected that an indicator’s outer loading should be notably 
higher than its cross-loadings (i.e. an indicator’s correlations with other constructs) to 
establish discriminant validity (Gefen & Straub, 2005). Gefen and Straub (2005) 
suggested that while a loading in excess of 0.70 suggests convergent validity, a cross 
loading less than 0.60 suggests discriminant validity. If this does not become the case (i.e. 
a cross-loading that is as strong as the loading), it could be argued that a particular 
indicator could represent another construct, making discriminant validity uncertain. 
Table 6.5 provides a comparison of loadings and cross-loadings for all the indicators. It 
shows no particular concerns as loadings are higher than the cross-loadings for all 
indicators. In addition, cross-loadings are all below 0.60, providing strong evidence of 
discriminant validity. 
Table 6.5: Loadings and Cross-Loadings 
Indicator 
Construct 
PI TMIC IIC ENC IOCC IPDC 
PI_1 0.52 0.24 0.08 0.19 0.30 0.27 
PI_2 0.73 0.24 0.20 0.30 0.46 0.44 
PI_3 0.73 0.28 0.26 0.01 0.33 0.34 
PI_4 0.74 0.17 0.23 0.10 0.46 0.32 
TMIC_1 0.18 0.74 0.32 0.02 0.26 0.06 
TMIC_2 0.23 0.75 0.31 0.05 0.23 0.00 
TMIC_3 0.30 0.69 0.28 0.14 0.29 0.34 
TMIC_4 0.15 0.79 0.36 0.07 0.22 0.23 
TMIC_5 0.31 0.62 0.14 0.18 0.36 0.21 
IIC_1 0.29 0.40 0.74 -0.17 0.26 0.21 
IIC_2 0.21 0.21 0.71 -0.04 0.39 0.28 
IIC_3 0.20 0.25 0.70 -0.28 0.15 0.16 
IIC_4 0.02 0.19 0.58 -0.20 0.09 0.12 
ENC_2 0.04 0.00 -0.35 0.83 0.08 0.05 
ENC_3 0.33 0.21 -0.08 0.89 0.27 0.20 
IOCC_1 0.46 0.21 0.22 0.12 0.73 0.35 
IOCC_2 0.58 0.26 0.24 0.20 0.80 0.49 
IOCC_6 0.20 0.44 0.29 0.11 0.68 0.38 
IOCC_7 0.30 0.39 0.29 0.18 0.74 0.48 




PI TMIC IIC ENC IOCC IPDC 
IPDC_1 0.52 0.17 0.28 0.11 0.55 0.81 
IPDC_3 0.32 0.19 0.18 0.08 0.38 0.72 
IPDC_5 0.36 0.20 0.24 0.25 0.47 0.74 
IPDC_6 0.27 0.23 0.17 0.00 0.42 0.75 
6.4.2.2 The Fornell and Larcker (1981) criterion for establishing discriminant 
validity 
The second criterion used in establishing discriminant validity is the Fornell-Larcker 
criterion (Fornell & Larcker, 1981). This procedure compares the square root of the AVE 
of the construct with the correlations the construct has with other constructs. The Fornell-
Larcker criterion for discriminant validity requires the square root of the AVE of a 
construct to be greater than the highest correlation the construct has with another 
construct. This indicates that a construct correlates more strongly with its assigned 
indicators than with other constructs. The correlations in Table 6.6 clearly meet the 
Fornell-Larcker criterion for discriminant validity. 
Table 6.6: Correlations Between Constructs Relative to the Square Roots of their 
AVE Values 
  PI TMIC IIC ENC IOCC IPDC 
PI 0.69        
TMIC 0.33 0.72     
IIC 0.29 0.39 0.68     
ENC 0.23 0.13 -0.23 0.86     
IOCC 0.57 0.38 0.34 0.21 0.74  
IPDC 0.51 0.26 0.29 0.15 0.61 0.76 
Note: The diagonal elements are the square root of the AVE of the construct; non-diagonal 
elements are the correlations. 
6.4.2.3 HTMT criterion for establishing discriminant validity 
The third criterion used for establishing discriminant validity, the most recent ones being 
added to the PLSPM literature, is the assessment of the heterotrait-monotrait ratio 
(HTMT) of correlations. HTMT is defined as “the average of the heterotrait-
heteromethod correlations (i.e. the correlations of indicators across constructs measuring 
different phenomena), relative to the average of the monotrait-heteromethod correlations 
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(i.e. the correlations of indicators within the same construct)” (Henseler, Ringle, & 
Sarstedt, 2015, p. 121). According to Henseler et al. (2015) and Hair et al. (2017), HTMT 
criterion offers a more reliable way of testing discriminant validity compared to the 
previous two criteria (especially the first criterion), which tend to clear at best, marginally 
acceptable measurement scales. HTMT values above 0.90 indicates a lack of discriminant 
validity; however, a more conservative threshold value of 0.85 can also be used (Henseler 
et al., 2015). In addition, through bootstrapping at 5,000 subsamples in SmartPLS 3, a 
confidence interval of the HTMT can be determined (Hair et al., 2017). If the value 1 is 
included within the confidence interval of the HTMT, this can also indicate a lack of 
discriminant validity (i.e. two constructs not being empirically distinct) (Henseler et al., 
2015). 
Table 6.7 depicts the HTMT assessment results. The figures show all combinations of 
constructs have their HTMT values lower than 0.85 and their bias corrected 95% 
confidence intervals do not include value 1. Consequently, the HTMT values indicate 
discriminant validity. It is noted that because the HTMT criterion is new (and arguably 
has not been sufficiently scrutinised by others), it is yet to be used in research papers. 
Table 6.7: HTMT Assessment 
  PI TMIC IIC ENC IOCC IPDC 
PI       
TMIC 
0.48 






































[0.62, 0.90]  
Note: Figures within parenthesis show 95% confidence intervals of the HTMT 
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In summary, discriminant validity has been established based on all three criteria. Having 
established reliability and validity of the measurement scales, the next stage of the data 
analysis is testing the hypothesised theoretical relations in the theoretical model (section 
6.4.3). 
6.4.3 Test results on the hypothesised theoretical model 
In this section, the focus shifts from the outer model (the measurement system) to the 
inner model (hypothesised theoretical relationships between constructs).7 In testing a 
structural model, the following three questions need to be answered at a minimum (Chin, 
1998; Hair et al., 2017): 
• Does the hypothesised theoretical model as a whole fit the data well? Stated 
alternatively, is the overall goodness of fit (global goodness of fit) of the model 
to data meeting acceptable thresholds used in PLSPM? 
• Is there support to retain each of the hypothesised theoretical relationships? Stated 
alternatively, is each of the hypothesised structural relationships statistically 
significant? 
• If the answer to the second question above is yes, what are the sizes of the 
relationships and what are the sizes of direct and indirect relationships between 
the cause and effect? 
6.4.3.1 Statistical evidence on the global goodness of fit (GoF) of the model to data 
Since the PLSPM optimisation algorithm does not globally optimise the statistical 
parameters (e.g. structural regression coefficients and indicator loadings) as in traditional 
structural equation modelling, there is no widely accepted global GoF index used in 
PLSPM (Hair et al., 2017). PLSPM optimisation involves a series of locally optimised 
measurement models and structural models using the least squares regression approach 
(Grigg & Jayamaha, 2014; Hair et al., 2017). As such, in PLSPM, the global goodness of 
fit (GoF) of the model to data is argued through a series of measures that examine the 
quality of the measurement model and the structural model (Chin, 1998; Henseler & 
Sarstedt, 2013). Since the quality of the measurement model has been found to be 
                                                 
7  Strictly speaking, this statement is not correct as far as the global goodness of fit (Global GoF) of a 
model is concerned from a structural equation modelling perspective, because both the measurement 
model and the structural model contribute to the global fit. Global GoF is defined later. 
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acceptable based on a series of quality criteria mentioned earlier (e.g. in terms of internal 
consistency reliability coefficients, AVE, indicator loadings, and various criteria used for 
assessing discriminant validity), the only quality criteria considered in this section are 
those that relate to the inner model (Figure 6.5). While the coefficient of determination 
(R2) of the endogenous constructs—constructs that have been predicted by the predictor 
constructs—remains the most widely used quality criterion for assessing the quality of 
the inner model, several other criteria have also been recommended in the literature (for 
details see Henseler and Sarstedt, 2013). The latest understanding on PLSPM, which is a 
fast evolving statistical technique, is that in general, a model providing good predictive 
capabilities is considered to be a model that provides a good overall fit to data (Henseler, 
Hubona, & Ray, 2016; Henseler & Sarstedt, 2013). The R2 of the constructs and hence 
the final verdict on the overall goodness of fit of the model to data (conclusion: good), is 
covered in the next section. 
6.4.3.2 Statistical significance of the hypothesised relationships and their sizes and 
effects 
Since PLSPM is a nonparametric approach, as mentioned earlier, the statistical 
significance of model parameters in PLSPM are determined empirically, using either 
bootstrapping or jackknifing (Hair et al., 2017). Hair et al. (2017) recommend 
bootstrapping 5,000 subsamples (each subsample to be equal to the original sample in 
size), and as such, the number of subsamples was set to 5000 in SmartPLS 3. Figure 6.5 
depicts the estimated path coefficients, and their statistical significance, along with the R2 
values of the endogenous constructs. The bias corrected 95% confidence intervals of the 
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** p < 0.01 






TMIC: Top Management Innovation Capability 
IIC: Internal Innovation Capability 
ENC: External Networking Capability 
IOCC: Innovative Organisational Culture Capability 
IPDC: Innovative Product Development Capability 




Table 6.8: Model Path Coefficients and Statistical Significance 
 
Path 






(p < 0.05)? 
TMIC → IIC 0.394 4.906 0.000 [0.158, 0.518] Yes 
TMIC → IOCC 0.223 2.236 0.025 [0.005, 0.397] Yes 
TMIC → IPDC -0.013 0.127 0.899 [-0.224, 0.179] No 
TMIC → ENC 0.266 2.608 0.009 [0.017, 0.431] Yes 
IIC → IOCC 0.317 3.639 0.000 [0.126, 0.464] Yes 
IIC → IPDC 0.120 1.248 0.212 [-0.072, 0.301] No 
IIC → ENC -0.338 2.183 0.029 [-0.555, -0.057] Yes 
ENC → IOCC 0.257 3.007 0.003 [0.069, 0.409] Yes 
ENC → IPDC 0.063 0.735 0.463 [-0.109, 0.232] No 
IOCC → PI 0.422 5.762 0.000 [0.259, 0.550] Yes 
IOCC → IPDC 0.562 6.904 0.000 [0.384, 0.703] Yes 
IPDC → PI 0.247 2.863 0.004 [0.058, 0.399] Yes 
 
The p values associated with path coefficients show all the hypothesised path 
relationships being significant at 0.05 significance level (i.e. p < 0.05), except the 
following: 
• TMIC → IPDC (p = 0.899) 
• IIC → IPDC (p = 0.212) 
• ENC → IPDC (p = 0.463) 
The above non-supported structural paths suggest that top management innovation 
capability (TMIC), internal innovation capability (IIC), and external networking 
capability (ENC) do not have a direct relationship with innovative product development 
capability (IPDC). Results in Figure 6.5 suggest that instead, the aforesaid causal 
variables (the three determinants TMIC, IIC, and ENC) influence IPDC indirectly, 
through innovative organisational culture capability (IOCC). This suggests the important 
role IOCC plays as a mediator in linking IPDC with the previous three determinants. In 
addition, both IOCC and IPDC have a strong positive relationship with PI at 0.422 and 
0.247 respectively. Together they explain 37% of PI variation, which means that they 
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have a large effect on PI (based on R2 > 26% rule of thumb for a large effect, as prescribed 
by Cohen (1992)). 
The total effect of a cause construct on an effect construct (Figure 6.5) is depicted in 
Table 6.9. If one variable (say variable A) is causally related to another variable (say 
variable C) through one or more other mediating variables (say variable B), the total effect 
refers to the sum of the direct effect of the cause variable on the effect variable (e.g. A on 
C) and the indirect effect of the cause variable on the effect variable through the mediating 
variable/s (e.g. A on C through B). For example, Table 6.9 shows that TMIC has a total 
effect of 0.133 on ENC. This effect can be partitioned as follows: 
Direct effect of TMIC → ENC = 0.266 (the path coefficient shown in Figure 6.5) 
Indirect effect of TMIC → IIC → ENC = 0.394 * (-0.338) = -0.133 (relevant path 
coefficients shown in Figure 6.5) 
Thus, total effect of TMIC on ENC = 0.266 (direct) – 0.133 (indirect) = 0.133 ---- (1) 
A detailed discussion on the causal inferences implied in the path diagram (Figure 6.5) is 
covered in the discussion section (section 6.6.2). In relation to determinants of PI, results 
in Table 6.9 show that IOCC has the strongest total effect on PI at 0.561, followed by 
IPDC (at 0.247), TMIC (at 0.225), ENC (at 0.160), and IIC (at 0.153). TMIC, IIC, and 
ENC also have a strong effect on IPDC through IOCC with value of 0.257, 0.228, and 
0.208 respectively. This indicates significant interaction between determinants leading to 
PI. 
Only one effect TMIC → ENC total effect is found not significant. This is due to IIC 
acting as a negative mediator between TMIC and ENC. The negative relationship 
between IIC and ENC implies that as companies increase their IIC by investing more on 
their IIC (i.e. building up their internal competencies), they become less likely to 
collaborate with external partners; this may be because such companies already have the 
required competencies to innovate. It is possible that the effect of TMIC on ENC, through 
the mediating effect from IIC, depends on the nature of the company. These and other 





Table 6.9: Total Effects and Their Statistical Significance 






(p < 0.05)? 
TMIC → IIC 0.394 4.906 0.000 [0.158, 0.518] Yes 
TMIC → IOCC 0.382 4.057 0.000 [0.143, 0.529] Yes 
TMIC → IPDC 0.257 2.565 0.010 [0.003, 0.414] Yes 
TMIC → ENC 0.133 1.159 0.246 [-0.164, 0.307] No 
TMIC → PI 0.225 3.267 0.001 [0.065, 0.339] Yes 
IIC → IOCC 0.230 2.409 0.016 [0.026, 0.395] Yes 
IIC → IPDC 0.228 2.317 0.021 [0.003, 0.391] Yes 
IIC → ENC -0.338 2.183 0.029 [-0.555, -0.057] Yes 
IIC → PI 0.153 2.468 0.014 [0.007, 0.256] Yes 
ENC → IOCC 0.257 3.007 0.003 [0.069, 0.409] Yes 
ENC → IPDC 0.208 2.227 0.026 [0.008, 0.379] Yes 
ENC → PI 0.160 2.853 0.004 [0.033, 0.258] Yes 
IOCC → PI 0.561 11.631 0.000 [0.449, 0.642] Yes 
IOCC → IPDC 0.562 6.904 0.000 [0.384, 0.703] Yes 
IPDC → PI 0.247 2.863 0.004 [0.058, 0.399] Yes 
 
Table 6.10 summarises the hypothesis results related to RQ2 along with a brief 
justification. H3, H6, and H9 are rejected due to non-significant relationships while H7 
is rejected due to the negative relationship (a plausible explanation for this was given), 
which is contrary to the causal direction hypothesised. 




H1: Top management innovation 
capability has a positive effect 
on internal innovation capability. 
Yes The corresponding path 
coefficient (TMIC → IIC) was 
found to be positive (0.394) and 
significant (p < 0.001). 
H2: Top management innovation 
capability has a positive effect 
on innovative organisational culture 
capability. 
Yes The corresponding path 
coefficient (TMIC → IOCC) was 
found to be positive (0.223) and 
significant (p < 0.05). 
H3: Top management innovation 
capability has a positive effect 
No The corresponding path 





on innovative product development 
capability. 
found to be non-significant (p = 
0.899) at 0.05 level. 
H4: Top management innovation 
capability has a positive effect 
on external networking capability. 
Yes The corresponding path 
coefficient (TMIC → ENC) was 
found to be positive (0.266) and 
significant (p < 0.01). 
H5: Internal innovation capability has a 
positive effect on 
innovative organisational culture 
capability. 
Yes The corresponding path 
coefficient (IIC → IOCC) was 
found to be positive (0.317) and 
significant (p < 0.001). 
H6: Internal innovation capability has a 
positive effect on innovative product 
development capability. 
No The corresponding path 
coefficient (IIC → IPDC) was 
found to be non-significant (p = 
0.212) at 0.05 level. 
H7: Internal innovation capability has a 






The corresponding path 
coefficient (IIC → ENC) was 
found to be negative (-0.338) and 
significant (p < 0.05). 
H8: External networking capability has a 
positive effect on 
innovative organisational culture 
capability. 
Yes The corresponding path 
coefficient (ENC → IOCC) was 
found to be positive (0.257) and 
significant (p < 0.01). 
H9: External networking capability has a 
positive effect on innovative product 
development capability. 
No The corresponding path 
coefficient (ENC → IPDC) was 
found to be non-significant (p = 
0.463) at 0.05 level. 
H10: Innovative organisational culture 
capability has a positive effect on radical 
product innovation. 
Yes The corresponding path 
coefficient (IOCC → PI) was 
found to be positive (0.422) and 
significant (p < 0.001). 
H11: Innovative organisational culture 
capability has a positive effect on 
innovative product development 
capability. 
Yes The corresponding path 
coefficient (IOCC → IPDC) was 
found to be positive (0.562) and 
significant (p < 0.001). 
H12: Innovative product development 
capability has a positive effect on radical 
product innovation. 
Yes The corresponding path 
coefficient (IPDC → PI) was 
found to be positive (0.247) and 
significant (p < 0.01). 
 
A comprehensive answer to RQ2 has been provided in section 6.6.2, upon discussion of 
the above results. 
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6.5 Test Results on Multi-factor Analysis of Variance to Answer RQ3 
Since multiple factors (company ages, company size, and type of ownership) were 
hypothesised to have an effect on product innovativeness (this is in addition to IOCC and 
IPDC posited in the theoretical model), a multi-factor analysis of variance (ANOVA), in 
the form of a general linear model (GLM), was conducted in Minitab 18 to test the effect 
of individual company characteristics—age, size, and ownership—on the response 
variable, product innovativeness (PI). For the purpose of the GLM, the score of PI was 
taken as the arithmetic mean of all four indicators of PI: micro technological 
discontinuity, macro technological discontinuity, micro marketing discontinuity, and 
macro marketing discontinuity. This provided a single product innovativeness score in a 
scale between 1 and 7 (since the constituent variables of PI are also in a 1 to 7 scale, and 
the scores are averaged) for each of the companies (i.e. each respondent). 
Since ANOVA of any form is based on parametric assumptions, it requires the response 
variable to have an approximately normal distribution. It is well known that single factor 
ANOVA (i.e. one-way ANOVA) and multi-factor ANOVA are robust for a certain degree 
of departure from normality (Harwell, Rubinstein, Hayes, & Olds, 1992; Mardia, 1971; 
G. Norman, 2010). Prior to multi-factor ANOVA, the scores of PI were tested both 
parametrically (Anderson-Darling normality test) and graphically (histogram and normal 
probability plot) for normality to examine to what extent PI meets a normal distribution. 
Figure 6.6 indicates that PI follows a non-normal distribution because the p value is less 
than 0.005.8 The histogram of PI scores in Figure 6.7 shows the distribution of PI 
compared to the normal distribution, which suggests that the distribution is not too far 
from normal. As such, given the robustness of ANOVA methods for violations from 
normality, it was decided that the departure from normality was not too substantial to 
consider any scale transformation. However, the multi-factor ANOVA presented in this 
section was repeated for a transformed scale (the scale transformation was done to make 
the non-normal scale of PI almost normal) to verify that the conclusions made in this 
                                                 
8  The null hypothesis of the AD test is that data come from a normal distribution and the alternative 
hypothesis is that data come from a non-normal distribution. The AD index reported in Figure 6.6 is 
also informative because at 5% significance level, any AD value that exceeds 0.752 is considered non-
normal (D’Agostino, 1986). 
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section remained the same for the transformed scale (see Appendix F for results based on 
the transformed scale). 
 
Figure 6.6: Probability plot and Anderson-Darling test of PI 
 
Figure 6.7: Histogram plot of PI against the normal distribution for the same mean 
and standard deviation 
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Table 6.11 shows the factorial ANOVA table based on Minitab 18 output displayed on 
the session window. 
Table 6.11: Factorial ANOVA Results 
Source DF Adj SS Adj MS F-Value P-Value 
  Age 3 18.364 6.1213 4.76 0.004 
  Size 3 16.717 5.5724 4.33 0.006 
  Ownership 2 1.257 0.6287 0.49 0.615 
Error 128 164.666 1.2865 
  
  Lack-of-Fit 16 13.721 0.8575 0.64 0.848 
  Pure Error 112 150.945 1.3477 
  
Total 136 191.960 
   
R2 = 14.22%; Adjusted R2 = 8.86% 
 
The ANOVA results indicate that age and size have a significant effect on PI (p = 0.004 
and p = 0.006 respectively) while ownership does not (p = 0.615). Equally importantly, 
both age and size seem to have a similar effect (in size) on product innovativeness because 
both factors result in similar F ratios: 4.76 and 4.33 respectively9. The model’s Lack-of-
Fit is also not significant (p = 0.848), which along with the residual plots (Figure 6.8) 
mean that the model is adequate10. The coefficient of determination (R2) attributable to 
the proportion of total variability being explained by the three factors (=14.22%) is not 
large (slightly above 13%, which can be regarded as a medium effect size, based on the 
rule of thumb values prescribed by Cohen (1992)), given that IOCC and IPDC remain the 
main predictors of PI. It is important to note that PI as a phenomenon is being predicted 
by the theoretical model on radical product innovation phenomenon (see Figure 6.5 for 
R2 of PI) and company characteristics are just control variables. 
                                                 
9  The F statistic of a factor is the ratio between explained variance due to the factor, relative to the 
unexplained variance by the factors (model). 
10  The residual plots of PI (Figure 6.8) show that assumptions on GLM are met. Normal probability plot 
and the histogram show that the distribution of residuals does not depart significantly from normality. 
The versus fits plot shows that residuals show equal variance for all fitted (predicted) values of PI. 
Finally, the versus order plot does not show any trend to suggest that observations are not independent. 
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Figure 6.8: The residual plots of PI 
Figure 6.9 presents the main effects plot comparing the effect of age, size, and ownership 
on mean PI. The company characteristics are coded as follows: Age (“2001 to present” = 
1, “1951 – 2000” = 2, “1900 – 1950” = 3, and “before 1900” = 4); Size (“0 – 5” = 1, “6 – 
49” = 2, “50 – 99” = 3, and “99 +” = 4); and Ownership (“fully New Zealand owned” = 
1, “partially overseas owned” = 2, and “overseas majority owned” = 3). 
The main effects plot of PI clearly shows that younger companies return higher mean PI 
scores compared to their older counterparts. This implies that innovative new food and 
beverage products are more likely to be introduced by young companies. It supports the 
hypothesis H13 that younger New Zealand food and beverage companies are more 
receptive to innovative product ideas. 
Furthermore, the main effects plot of PI clearly shows that the mean PI increases with the 
size, implying that medium to large companies introduce more innovative products than 
micro to small companies. This suggests that medium to large companies have an 
advantage over micro to small companies when it comes to radical food product 




Figure 6.9: Main effects plot comparing age, size, and ownership effect on mean PI 
Lastly, the main effects plot of PI and ANOVA results show that there is no clear 
relationship between ownership and PI, which suggests that nationality of ownership may 
not affect product innovativeness. Nevertheless, the small sample size of partially 
overseas owned and overseas majority owned companies (6 and 10 respectively), means 
that statistical power is inadequate to reject the null hypothesis (H0: ownership has no 
effect on product innovativeness), if it is in fact false. Power analysis shows that a sample 
size of 20 is required in each category to achieve an approximate 80% chance (i.e. Power 
= 0.80) of rejecting a false null hypothesis. Thus, it is inconclusive whether nationality of 
ownership could influence product innovativeness. 
In addition, an interaction plot is provided to investigate any interactions between the two 
significant company characteristics (i.e. age and size). The interaction plot, shown in 
Figure 6.10, shows no interaction between age and size. 
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Figure 6.10: Interaction plot between age and size 
Finally, to control for the effects of IOCC and IPDC on mean PI, a hierarchical regression 
analysis was conducted. Both IOCC and IPDC were calculated as the arithmetic mean of 
their retained indicators (IOCC_1, IOCC_2, IOCC_6, IOCC_7, and IOCC_8 for IOCC, 
and IPDC_1, IPDC_3, IPDC_5, and IPDC_6 for IPDC). 
Table 6.12 shows the factorial ANOVA table based on Minitab 18 output displayed on 
the session window with IOCC and IPDC included in the analysis. The table shows IOCC, 
IPDC, age, and size highly significant at 5% confidence level and the model’s R2 value 
of 41.64%. When age and size are removed, the R2 value reduces to 35.95%. This 
significant but practically small reduction in predictive power of the model (-5.69) 
reinforces that age and size as predictors on PI are not as practically significant predictors 
as IOCC and IPDC. Nevertheless, company age and size are useful for identifying the 






Table 6.12: Factorial ANOVA Results with IOCC and IPDC 
Source DF Adj SS Adj MS F-Value P-Value 
  IOCC 1 17.391 17.3906 19.87 0.000 
  IPDC 1 4.140 4.1399 4.73 0.031 
  Age 3 8.025 2.6751 3.06 0.031 
  Size 3 7.071 2.3571 2.69 0.049 
Error 128 112.020 0.8752   
  Lack-of-Fit 121 105.260 0.8699 0.90 0.639 
  Pure Error 7 6.760 0.9658   
Total 136 191.960    
 
In summary, both the ANOVA results and main effects plot support H13 and H14 but 
the finding on H15 remains inconclusive due to small sample size of partially overseas 
owned and overseas majority owned companies. Table 6.13 shows the hypothesis results 
related to RQ3 along with a brief justification. As mentioned earlier, a more detailed 
discussion of the hypothesis results is provided in section 6.6.3. 




H13: There is a greater level of 
acceptance for product innovativeness in 
younger New Zealand food and beverage 
companies than in older companies. 
Yes Positive main effect and it is 
significant (p < 0.01) 
H14: Larger New Zealand food and 
beverage companies are more likely to 
have a higher level of product 
innovativeness than smaller counterparts. 
Yes Positive main effect and it is 
significant (p < 0.01) 
H15: New Zealand owned food and 
beverage companies are more innovative 




Inconclusive; failed to reject H0 
most probably due to small 
sample sizes for partially overseas 
owned and overseas majority 
owned companies 
 
A comprehensive answer to RQ3 has been provided in section 6.6.3, upon discussion of 




6.6.1 Discussion on the determinants of radical product innovation 
From the partial least squares path modelling analysis conducted in section 6.4, all the 
five causal variables as determinants of radical product innovation were supported by the 
results. Each of the determinants and their indicators are discussed below in the following 
sections to shed more light on how the determinants of radical product innovation relate 
to one another in predicting and explaining product innovativeness (section 6.6.1.1 to 
6.6.1.5). 
6.6.1.1 Top management innovation capability as the determinant of radical 
product innovation 
Top management innovation capability (TMIC in Figure 6.5) is defined as the ability of 
top management to manage radical product innovation in their organisation. The 
capability is proposed as the most important determinant of radical product innovation 
because top management have the responsibility of driving the whole organisation. As 
shown in the theoretical model on radical product innovation phenomenon (e.g. Figure 
6.5), TMIC acts as the exogenous construct that drives other determinants of radical 
product innovation. 
Based on the internal consistency reliability measured in section 6.4.1, top management 
innovation capability as a construct retains all of its five indicators. This includes being 
highly involved with the project, providing the project direction, willing to pursue the 
project, allocating sufficient financial resources, and building relationships with external 
partners. How top management innovation capability can determine radical product 
innovation is discussed below. 
Firstly, top management can be highly involved with the radical project. They can take 
part in radical product development themselves as observed in the micro-small companies 
interviewed (Company A, B, C, and D), or set project criteria and provide feedback to the 
radical project team during project reviews as observed in the large company interviewed 
(Company E). This finding is consistent with the literature (e.g. Booz et al., 1982; 
Holahan et al., 2014; Leifer et al., 2000). 
Secondly, top management can provide direction to the radical project. They can provide 
direction by establishing formal product innovation strategy and product development 
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process. The formal product innovation strategy ensures that the company’s product 
development effort is in alignment with the company’s overall business strategy. It can 
be a result of top management’s strategic vision, such as new product vision with mass 
market appeal (Tellis & Golder, 1996), new technology vision (Reid et al., 2015), and 
new market vision (O’Connor & Veryzer, 2001). In addition, the formal product 
development process ensures that the product development team follows a proper 
procedure to reduce risks and delays. This is particularly relevant for larger companies 
that could have many ongoing projects. It is also useful for allocating resources, 
evaluating project performance, and reducing failures as discovered in the interview with 
the Company E. This finding is consistent with the literature (e.g. Booz et al., 1982; 
Cooper, 2011; Slater et al., 2014). 
Thirdly, top management need to be willing to pursue the radical project because radical 
projects are long term in nature and can sometimes replace existing products or 
competencies. Top management need to be willing to pursue radical projects in spite of 
these drawbacks, which is a strategic decision. This is reflected in their support and 
encouragement for radical product innovation. This finding is consistent with the 
literature (e.g. Cooper, 2011; McDermott & O’Connor, 2002; Tellis & Golder, 1996). 
Fourthly, top management are responsible for allocating sufficient financial resources for 
the radical project. Often, top management are supportive of radical projects but are 
unwilling to commit financially to them (Cooper, 2011; Tellis & Golder, 1996). Without 
sufficient funding, radical product can lose out to more urgent or faster return projects. In 
all the companies interviewed, top management provided sufficient financial resources to 
their radical projects in order to open new offices, buy new machines, and educate 
markets. This finding is consistent with the literature (e.g. Holahan et al., 2014; Slater et 
al., 2014; Tellis & Golder, 1996). 
Lastly, top management can build relationships with external partners. Top management 
can leverage their network to gain access to external resources for their organisation. As 
discovered in many of the companies interviewed (Company A, B, C, and D), top 
management were directly responsible for building long term relationships (i.e. alliances) 
with key external partners such as suppliers, manufacturers, and distributors. This finding 
is consistent with the literature (e.g. McDermott, 1999; Verganti, 2008). 
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6.6.1.2 Internal innovation capability as the determinant of radical product 
innovation 
Internal innovation capability (IIC in Figure 6.5) is defined as the ability of an 
organisation to develop and utilise its in-house technological and market competency for 
radical product innovation. Strong internal innovation capability enables a company to 
solve technical and marketing problems in radical product innovation. It is a result of a 
company’s accumulated learning and resource investments and needs to be constantly 
adjusted as the business environment evolves. 
Based on the internal consistency reliability measured in section 6.4.1, internal innovation 
capability as a construct retains all of its four indicators. This includes having strong in-
house technological competency, having strong in-house market competency, utilising 
in-house technological competency, and utilising in-house market competency. How 
internal innovation capability can determine radical product innovation is discussed 
below. 
Firstly, strong in-house technological competency is needed to overcome technical 
uncertainty associated with the development of new technologies. These technological 
competencies are a result of the company’s investment in developing their engineering 
and manufacturing know-how and resources. This finding is consistent with the literature 
(e.g. Danneels, 2002; McDermott & O’Connor, 2002; Rubera et al., 2012). 
Secondly, strong in-house market competency is needed to overcome market uncertainty 
associated with the development of new value propositions. These market competencies 
are a result of the company’s investment in developing their marketing and distribution 
know-how and resources. This finding is consistent with the literature (e.g. Danneels, 
2002; McDermott & O’Connor, 2002; Rubera et al., 2012). 
Thirdly, companies need to utilise their in-house technological competency. They can 
accomplish this by exploiting or leveraging their existing technological competencies to 
develop new technologies or by choosing radical projects with high synergy to their 
existing in-house technological competency. This finding is consistent with the literature 
(e.g. Kleinschmidt & Cooper, 1991; Prahalad & Hamel, 1990; Tellis & Golder, 1996). 
Lastly, companies need to utilise their in-house market competency. They can accomplish 
this by exploiting or leveraging their existing market competencies to develop new value 
propositions or by choosing radical projects with high synergy to their existing in-house 
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market competency. This finding is consistent with the literature (e.g. Kleinschmidt & 
Cooper, 1991; Prahalad & Hamel, 1990; Tellis & Golder, 1996). 
6.6.1.3 External networking capability as the determinant of radical product 
innovation 
External networking capability (ENC in Figure 6.5) is defined as the ability of an 
organisation to collaborate with external partners for radical product innovation. External 
partners are individuals or organisations outside the control of a company. Companies 
with strong external networking capability can identify and gain access to the valuable 
resources controlled by key external partners and successfully exploit or leverage them 
for radical product innovation. 
Based on the internal consistency reliability measured in section 6.4.1, external 
networking capability as a construct retains only two of the four indicators initially 
chosen. The indicators that are retained are outsourcing and alliances, while the indicators 
that are removed are informal networks and customer collaboration. How external 
networking capability can determine radical product innovation in the light of the new 
meaning based on the two indicators retained, and the two indicators removed, is 
discussed below. 
Firstly, companies need to be capable of outsourcing. It is risky for a company to maintain 
all the competencies in-house because a product design change can quickly make them 
obsolete (Olleros, 1986). Moreover, most companies simply do not have all the necessary 
competencies to conduct radical product innovation (McDermott & O’Connor, 2002). 
This leads to the need for outsourcing, allowing companies to focus on their core 
competencies. From the interview results, all companies had chosen to outsource certain 
competencies they were not good at, while keeping their core competencies in-house 
when developing radical products. This finding is consistent with the literature (e.g. 
McDermott & O’Connor, 2002; Olleros, 1986). 
Secondly, companies can benefit from a long-term relationship or alliance with external 
partners. According to McDermott (1999), there are three reasons why companies pursue 
alliances: market-driven, manufacturing-driven, and R&D-driven. These alliances are 
supported by the interview results. This finding is consistent with the literature (e.g. 
McDermott, 1999; Verganti, 2008). 
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Informal networks being removed as an indicator suggests that a large network (or 
clusters) is not related to external networking capability. External networking capability 
allows a company to identify and access valuable resources that are controlled by a few 
external partners. In other words, these resources are not available to everyone. Knowing 
a large number of people (i.e. informal networks) may not be sufficient to access these 
resources. Thus, rejection of informal networks on statistical grounds (low reliability) 
seems to have some practical grounding. Informal networks may become relevant if the 
valuable resources are readily available within the network, such as is the case with 
incremental product innovation. 
Customer collaboration being removed as an indicator suggests that working with 
customers may not stand out, as part of external collaboration. Not every customer is 
suitable to participate in radical product innovation because they do not have the right 
attitudes, knowledge, and needs (Lettl, 2007). In addition, alliances as an indicator can 
mean working with customers for certain companies. For example, several of the 
interviewed companies consider their distributors, who they have established long-term 
working relationships with, as their customers. Thus, rejection of customer collaboration 
on statistical grounds (low reliability) seems to have some practical grounding. 
Accordingly, by virtue of being the two empirically supported constituents of external 
networking capability, it is argued that the ability to identify and access the key external 
partners (i.e. outsourcing) and establishing long-term collaboration with them (i.e. 
alliances) may be better indicators of external networking capability than informal 
networks and customer collaboration. 
6.6.1.4 Innovative organisational culture capability as the determinant of radical 
product innovation 
Innovative organisational culture capability (IOCC in Figure 6.5) is defined as the ability 
of an organisation to cope with high uncertainty created by radical product innovation. 
Radical product innovation, as considered in this study, has the highest degree of 
uncertainty. Hence, an organisation that can tolerate a high degree of uncertainty is more 
likely to pursue radical product innovation. 
Based on the internal consistency reliability measured in section 6.4.1, innovative 
organisational culture capability as a construct retains only five of the eight indicators 
initially chosen. The indicators that are retained are relentless innovation, entrepreneurial 
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orientation, learning orientation, well communicated product innovation strategy, and 
appropriate employee performance metrics; the indicators that are removed are customer 
orientation, technological orientation, and competitor orientation. How innovative 
organisational culture capability can determine radical product innovation in the light of 
the new meaning based on the five indicators retained and the three indicators removed, 
is discussed below. 
Firstly, relentless innovation is needed to overcome organisational inertia created by 
accumulated resources and experience. According to Tellis and Golder (1996), relentless 
innovation means the company is committed to continuous product innovation, even at 
the cost of cannibalising their existing products and investments. 
Secondly, entrepreneurial orientation is needed to pursue high risk projects in anticipation 
of high returns. According to Hult et al. (2004), entrepreneurial orientation means the 
company is willing to enter a new business or renewing their existing business in order 
to generate growth. 
Thirdly, learning orientation is needed to cope with failures from radical product 
innovation. According to Hult et al. (2004), learning orientation means the company is 
willing to experiment and learn from their failures. 
Fourthly, well communicated product innovation strategy is needed to create employee 
support for radical product innovation. According to Cooper (2011), well communicated 
product innovation strategy means the company’s product innovation strategy is robust, 
clearly defined, and disseminated across the whole organisation. 
Lastly, appropriate employee performance metrics are needed to incentivise employee’s 
commitment towards radical projects. Employees can see radical projects as high risk for 
their career. Therefore, they may become reluctant to participate in those projects 
(O’Connor & McDermott, 2004). Hence, appropriate employee performance metrics are 
needed to incentivise employees and overcome this resistance (Cooper, 2011; Leifer et 
al., 2000). 
Interestingly, the indicators of innovative organisational culture capability that were 
removed—customer orientation, technological orientation, and competitor orientation—
are the indicators posited by Gatignon and Xuereb (1997), but not by others. As 
mentioned earlier, these indicators are removed because they show low outer loadings 
(poor relationship with the construct), suggesting that they do not seem to reflect 
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innovative organisational culture capability. It is suggested that the five indicators 
retained adequately represent different facets of innovative organisational culture 
capability and that the three indicators being removed are redundant. Relentless 
innovation emphasises the willingness to satisfy both current and future customer 
demands, which captures customer orientation; entrepreneurial orientation seeks new 
business opportunities including facing new competitors, which captures the competitor 
orientations; and learning orientation encourages experimentation such as playing with 
new technologies, which captures the technological orientation. Hence, removing the 
three indicators does not compromise the overall meaning of the determinant. Removing 
the three indicators is consistent with the literature, in the sense, innovative organisational 
culture capability has been represented without these indicators (e.g. Cooper, 2011; Hult 
et al., 2004; Leifer et al., 2000; Tellis & Golder, 1996). 
6.6.1.5 Innovative product development capability as the determinant of radical 
product innovation 
Innovative product development capability (IPDC in Figure 6.5) is defined as the ability 
of an organisation to conduct radical product development. It embodies best radical 
product development practices based on the current literature. 
Based on the internal consistency reliability measured in section 6.4.1, innovative product 
development capability as a construct retains only four of the six indicators initially 
chosen. The indicators that are retained are a full-time project leader, a multi-disciplinary 
team, a well-structured product development process, and well executed product 
development activities (a more structured process for a higher level of uncertainty); the 
indicators that are removed are a project champion and a compelling business case. How 
innovative product development capability can determine radical product innovation in 
the light of the new meaning based on the four indicators retained, and the two indicators 
removed, is discussed below. 
Firstly, a full-time project leader is suitable for radical product development because 
without a committed full-time project leader, a radical project can become suboptimal, as 
the project leader works on other projects. This finding is consistent with the literature 
(e.g. Booz et al., 1982; Cooper, 2011; Holahan et al., 2014). 
Secondly, a multi-disciplinary team is suitable for radical product development because 
a multi-disciplinary team allows for diversity in training and knowledge sharing for the 
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development of new technology and value proposition. This finding is consist with the 
literature (e.g. Booz et al., 1982; Cooper, 2011; Holahan et al., 2014). 
Thirdly, a well-structured product development process is suitable for radical product 
development because a well-structured product development process brings in structure 
and control. This helps reduce project risks and uncertainties. This finding is consistent 
with the literature (e.g. Booz et al., 1982; Cooper, 2008; Holahan et al., 2014). 
Lastly, well executed product development activities mean bringing in more structure as 
the project level of uncertainty increases. The inclusion of this indicator reinforces this 
study’s position that more structure is needed to cope with high level of uncertainty 
created by radical product innovation, and not more flexibility. This is consistent with the 
literature (e.g. Cooper, 2011; Cooper & Kleinschmidt, 1987; Holahan et al., 2014). 
The project champion being removed as an indicator of innovative product development 
capability seems to suggest that the role of a project champion is less vital for building 
that capability. A full-time project leader and formal product development process can 
protect radical projects, eliminating the need of a project champion. A compelling 
business case being removed as an indicator of innovative product development 
capability suggests that a compelling business case may be better associated with the 
project’s commercial outcome rather than its degree of innovativeness. Radical product 
innovation, based on its definition, is expected to be compelling as a business case from 
the fuzzy front end of the development. Hence, it is argued that both indicators being not 
considered as indicators of innovative product development capability makes some 
practical sense. 
6.6.2 Theoretical relationship between the determinants of radical product 
innovation and the interpretation of the results from a practical 
perspective 
The measurement model (Figure 6.5) shows most of the theoretical relationships being 
significant. However, as shown earlier, three relationships were not found to be 
significant. These three relationships are the direct relationships that top management 
innovation capability, internal innovation capability, and external networking capability 
have with innovative product development capability. In addition, the relationship 
between internal innovation capability and external networking capability was found to 
be negative—a finding contrary to what was hypothesised. To explain and discuss the 
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direct and indirect effects of the causal variables on effect variables, the measurement 
model is partitioned into several sections (section 6.6.2.1 to 6.6.2.5), each corresponding 
to a specific effect variable. The theoretical relationships between the determinants and 
their interpretations from a practical perspective are provided within these sections. 
6.6.2.1 Causal antecedents of product innovativeness 
Looking at the two causal antecedents of product innovativeness in Figure 6.11, it is clear 
that innovative organisational culture capability (IOCC) has a direct effect of 0.422 on 
product innovativeness (PI) and an indirect effect of 0.139 (= 0.562 * 0.247) through 
innovative product development capability (IPDC), resulting in a total effect of 0.561 (= 
0.422 + 0.139), which is substantial. This finding is consistent with the literature that have 
posited that companies with innovative organisational culture are more willing to pursue 
radical product innovation than those without it (e.g. Chandy & Tellis, 1998; Herrmann 
et al., 2006; Tushman & O’Reilly, 1996). Similarly for IPDC, companies that utilise 
innovative product development practices are better prepared to successfully conduct 
radical product development (e.g. Cooper, 2011; Holahan et al., 2014; McDermott & 





























Figure 6.11: The direct and indirect effects of the two causal antecedents of PI 
From a practical perspective, companies with innovative organisational culture or strong 
IOCC mean that they are willing to take more risks in pursuing innovative products with 
high returns (i.e. being entrepreneurial). They are also more receptive to product ideas 
that could make their existing products and/or investments obsolete. This orientation is 
similar to the “willingness to cannibalise” originally proposed by Chandy and Tellis 
(1998) and “willingness to abandon investments” later developed by Herrmann et al. 
(2006). In these companies, organisational inertia or core rigidities are less likely to be an 
issue because they have a strong determination to develop their products to 
commercialisation, despite any difficulty—that is, relentless innovation (Tellis & Golder, 
1996) and learning orientation to learn from failures (Hult et al., 2004). Furthermore, the 
innovation objectives (i.e. product innovation strategy) are likely to be well 
communicated across the whole organisation and valuable employees or innovators are 
recognised and rewarded through appropriate employee performance metrics, creating 
R2 = 0.37 
R2 = 0.25 







*** p < 0.001 
** p < 0.01 





IOCC: Innovative Organisational Culture Capability 
IPDC: Innovative Product Development Capability 
PI: Product Innovativeness 
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the right climate and environment for innovation, as recommended by Cooper (2011) and 
Leifer et al. (2000). 
Similarly, companies who utilise innovative product development practices or have 
strong IPDC can conduct radical product development more efficiently and effectively. 
Examples of innovative product development practices include having a full-time project 
leader to commit to each radical project and a multi-disciplinary product development 
team. As the projects become more complex or uncertain, companies put in more effort 
in understanding the challenges in order to reduce risks. This means ending poorly 
performing projects early so that they can devote resources towards projects that are more 
likely to succeed. Most importantly, companies should have a formal product 
development process, such as a Stage-Gate process (Cooper, 2008). 
The strong relationship between IOCC and IPDC (total effect of 0.562) also supports the 
proposed research hypothesis H11 that innovative organisational culture leads to more 
adoption of innovative product development practices across the whole organisation. This 
relationship is consistent with the model posited by Slater et al. (2014). Moreover, a new 
argument here is that this relationship could be bidirectional. Slater et al. (2014) only 
consider a unidirectional relationship in their model. However, based on the interview 
finding from Company E, it is very likely that IPDC can positively affect IOCC as well. 
This is because IPDC allows the companies to reduce risks associated with radical 
product development through more structure and control. This implies that the companies 
can better cope with uncertainties leading to more positive beliefs towards radical product 
ideas. This finding supports the finding of Herrmann et al. (2006) that links innovative 
product development practices to supportive innovation culture (i.e. willingness to 
abandon investments). The conclusion is that this study sheds new insights onto existing 
literature on how PI is caused via IOCC and IPDC. 
6.6.2.2 Causal antecedents of innovative organisational culture capability 
Looking at the three causal antecedents of innovative organisational culture capability 
(IOCC), in Figure 6.12, it is clear that top management innovation capability (TMIC) 
causes the most effect on IOCC both directly and indirectly through the mediating 
variables, internal innovation capability (IIC) and external networking capability (ENC). 


















Figure 6.12: The direct and indirect effects of the three causal antecedents of 
IOCC 
The total effect of TMIC on IOCC (= 0.382) can be partitioned into direct and indirect 
effects as follows. 
Direct effect of TMIC on IOCC = 0.223 
Indirect effect of TMIC on IOCC via ENC = (0.266 + 0.394 * -0.338) * 0.257 = 0.034 
Indirect effect of TMIC on IOCC via IIC = 0.394 * 0.317 = 0.125 
Total effect of TMIC on IOCC = 0.223 + 0.034 + 0.125 = 0.382 
From Figure 6.12, it is clear that the indirect effect of TMIC on IOCC, through the 
mediating variables IIC and ENC, is weakened by the negative effect of IIC on ENC (-
0.338). This negative relationship between IIC and ENC is unexpected since it was 
originally hypothesised that IIC would have a positive effect on ENC, according to the 
theory of absorptive capacity (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990). Still, Cohen and Levinthal 
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(1990) did point out the possibility for a negative effect due to the not-invented-here 
(NIH) syndrome, where a company resists accepting innovative ideas from outside in 
favour of internally originated ideas. 
In regard to the present study, the negative effect may indicate the same (existence of 
NIH syndrome) in New Zealand food and beverage companies. It is also possible that the 
idea of open innovation is not widely adopted by the New Zealand food and beverage 
companies (an expected outcome for the food and beverage industry (Bigliardi & Galati, 
2013b; Sarkar & Costa, 2008)), making them more likely to rely on IIC at the cost of 
ENC. This negative relationship is discussed in greater detail in section 6.6.2.4. 
IIC have the total effect of 0.230 on IOCC. The total effect of IIC on IOCC is partitioned 
into direct and indirect effect as follows. 
Direct effect of IIC on IOCC = 0.317 
Indirect effect of IIC on IOCC via ENC = -0.338 * 0.257 = -0.087 
Total effect of IIC on IOCC = 0.317 - 0.087 = 0.230 
Again, the negative relationship between IIC and ENC contributes negatively to the total 
effect IIC has on IOCC. This suggests that a strong IIC can contribute both positively and 
negatively to IOCC: positively by giving the company the ability to solve technical and 
market problems effectively, and negatively by making the company more close-minded, 
leading to myopia. However, the positive effect appears to significantly outweigh the 
negative effect—an expected outcome consistent with the literature that recommends 
companies to leverage their internal competencies when pursuing radical product 
innovation (e.g. Kleinschmidt & Cooper, 1991; Prahalad & Hamel, 1990; Tellis & 
Golder, 1996). 
ENC has a total effect of 0.257 on IOCC (ENC has only a direct effect on IOCC). This 
shows that having good relationships with external partners can give companies 
confidence to pursue radical product innovation—an expected outcome consistent with 
the literature (e.g. Herrmann et al., 2006; McDermott, 1999; Verganti, 2008). 
From a practical perspective, top management can directly encourage innovative 
organisational culture by establishing clear and robust product innovation strategy and 
objectives, and communicating them across their organisation (Cooper, 2011; Earle et al., 
2001). They also need to set up appropriate employee performance metrics (Leifer et al., 
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2000). By being involved and providing support to innovative projects, top management 
can demonstrate their values, beliefs, and assumptions to their organisation, leading to an 
innovative organisational culture (Slater et al., 2014). 
Lastly, both IIC and ENC can positively contribute to the innovative organisational 
culture by providing the companies with the competencies (from internal and external 
sources) needed to overcome uncertainties. However, as observed empirically, a strong 
IIC can contribute negatively to ENC. This finding is something that was unexpected and 
possible explanations are provided in section 6.6.2.4 when covering the causal 
antecedents of ENC. 
6.6.2.3 Causal antecedents of innovative product development capability 
Looking at the four causal antecedents of innovative product development capability 
(IPDC) in Figure 6.13, it is clear that only innovative organisational culture capability 
(IOCC) has a significant direct relationship with IPDC (= 0.562). Top management 
innovation capability (TMIC), internal innovation capability (IIC), and external 
networking capability (ENC) have no significant direct effect on IPDC at 0.05 
significance level. However, these three determinants have an indirect effect on IPDC 
through the mediating variable, IOCC. 
Based on the prior calculations in section 6.6.2.2, IOCC is mostly affected by TMIC (total 
effect = 0.382), followed by ENC (total effect = 0.257), and IIC (total effect = 0.230). 
This indicates that TMIC plays the biggest role in establishing IPDC through IIC, ENC, 
and IOCC. This relationship is consistent with the literature that highlights the role top 
management play in setting up innovative product development practices in their 
organisation (e.g. Cooper, 2011; Earle et al., 2001; Leifer et al., 2000). However, the 
relationship does not seem to be as straightforward as the literature seems to suggest. For 
example, Slater et al. (2014) posit a direct relationship between senior leadership and 
radical product innovation process in their hypothetical model. However, this relationship 
is not supported on the empirical analysis conducted in this study. TMIC seems to drive 





















Figure 6.13: The direct and indirect effects of the two causal antecedents of IPDC 
A plausible explanation as to why TMIC, IIC, and ENC have no direct relationship with 
IPDC is that these determinants by themselves do not cause the adoption of innovative 
product development practices. For individual employees to adopt innovative product 
development practices, they need to feel a need to adopt these practices; a possibility is 
that a sizable proportion of organisations that responded to the survey have cultures that 
resist change and/or weak change management climates. If their values, beliefs, and 
assumptions are not in alignment with those of their top management, it is possible they 
would not want to follow the practices imposed upon them by the top management. This 
argument is similar to the argument provided by Tushman and O’Reilly (1996); they 
argue that the companies need to have the right organisational innovation culture before 
they can conduct radical product development. Without the right organisational 
innovation culture, top management are likely to face strong organisational resistance to 
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radical product innovation (Cooper, 2011; Leifer et al., 2000; Tushman & O’Reilly, 
1996). Companies with the right innovative organisational culture are likely to adopt 
innovative product development practices more successfully (Cooper, 2008). 
From a practical perspective, a company’s IPDC is greatly dependant on its IOCC, and 
IOCC is greatly dependent on TMIC. Therefore, top management should ensure their 
companies have the right organisational culture (if not, they have to act as change agents) 
before attempting to implement innovative product development practices. In practice, 
this means top management needs to establish a robust product innovation strategy and 
appropriate employee performance metrics (or human resource strategy) that are well 
communicated across the organisation. Top management should also have values, beliefs, 
and assumptions that are favourable for innovation, such as relentless innovation, 
entrepreneurship, and openness to experimentation. Once the right organisational 
culture/climate is created, top management should find it easier to implement innovative 
product development practices across the whole organisation. Lastly, IIC and ENC still 
have some impacts on IPDC via IOCC. Top management should ensure the internal 
competencies and external partners are in alignment with their company’s overall product 
innovation strategy to avoid incompatibility (Leonard-Barton, 1992; Tushman & 
O’Reilly, 1996). 
6.6.2.4 Causal antecedents of external networking capability 
Looking at the two causal antecedents of external networking capability (ENC) in Figure 
6.14, it is clear that top management innovation capability (TMIC) has a direct effect of 
0.266 on ENC, which is consistent with the literature (e.g. McDermott, 1999; Slater et 
al., 2014; Verganti, 2008). However, TMIC’s indirect effect on ENC via the mediating 
variable, internal innovation capability (IIC), has a negative value of -0.133 (being 0.394 
* -0.338). This negative indirect effect significantly lowers the total effect TMIC has on 
ENC (0.266 – 0.133 = 0.133) to the point that at 5% significance level, TMIC has no 
significant total effect on ENC (see Table 6.9). 
As mentioned earlier in section 6.6.2.2, the negative relationship between IIC and ENC 
is an unexpected result. The negative relationship indicates that New Zealand food and 
beverage companies are less likely to collaborate (or lose an ability to collaborate 
effectively) as they strengthen their IIC. This finding is different from other country 
studies of the food and beverage industry (Martinez & Briz, 2000; Siriwongwilaichat & 
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Winger, 2004). This points to the cause of the negative relationship being due to a unique 
nature of food and beverage companies in New Zealand. Some possible explanations for 
the negative relationship are provided as follows. 
Firstly, New Zealand food and beverage companies could be suffering from the not-
invented-here (NIH) syndrome. Since food consumers are generally conservative, food 
and beverage companies are more likely to focus on their core products and invest in 
specialised investments (such as specialised knowledge, training, processes, machines, 
and equipment). In the long run, this can lead to a situation of the NIH syndrome where 
a company is less likely to collaborate or seek external knowledge (Cohen & Levinthal, 
1990). This situation is similar to the situation where a company is too committed on its 
core competencies or specialised investments (Chandy & Tellis, 1998; Leonard-Barton, 
1992). 
Secondly, New Zealand food and beverage companies could be suffering from a lack of 
open innovation mindset or a closed innovation mindset where a company only generates, 
develops, and commercialises its own ideas (Chesbrough, 2003). The closed innovation 
mindset means the company is less willing to collaborate with external partners, typically 
at the cost of their product innovativeness performance (Beckeman et al., 2013; Saguy & 
Sirotinskaya, 2014; Ziggers, 2005). Based on the previous discussion in section 3.4.3, the 
reasons food and beverage companies reject open innovation mindset include a lack of 
trust and communication, incremental product innovation orientation, and a low level of 
competitive pressure. As suggested by Martinez et al. (2014), food and beverage 
companies need a dedicated architecture for collaboration; this includes having 
supportive organisational structures, supportive management actions, collaboration 
mindset, and IP protection mechanisms. New Zealand food and beverage companies may 
also need to adopt a new product development process that is based on the open 
innovation model as suggested by Khan (2014). 
Lastly, New Zealand food and beverage companies could be suffering from the unique 
New Zealand contextual factors of small population and relative geographical isolation. 
Small population means there are fewer local external partners to work with. The 
geographical isolation means higher cost to collaborate, especially with external partners 
located in other countries. These innovation challenges could force New Zealand food 
and beverage companies to rely on their IIC instead of ENC for product innovation, 
















Figure 6.14: The direct and indirect effects of the two causal antecedents of ENC 
From a practical perspective, there are several forms of relationships a company can 
pursue with external partners depending on their needs such as alliances, contracts, and 
partnerships (McDermott, 1999; Olleros, 1986; Teece, 1986). Top management can also 
contribute to building these relationships by representing the company themselves. This 
is particularly so in small companies (flat organisational structures) where top 
management is usually directly responsible for building relationships with external 
partners. 
Lastly, companies need to be aware of their tendency to overvalue IIC over ENC. It is 
recommended for future study to investigate the cause of the negative relationship 
between IIC and ENC. Still, some practical recommendations based on the possible 
reasons are provided. First, companies can remedy the NIH syndrome by having a policy 
that promotes more communication and sharing of information among the project teams 
and external sources (Katz & Allen, 1982). Second, top management can promote an open 
innovation mindset in their organisation by preparing a dedicated architecture for 
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collaboration (Martinez et al., 2014), or selecting an innovation project that promotes 
exploration (Danneels, 2002). Lastly, the food clusters in New Zealand can help 
companies connect with valuable external partners, reducing cost and saving time. 
6.6.2.5 Causal antecedent of internal innovation capability 
Looking at the one causal antecedent of internal innovation capability (IIC) in Figure 
6.15, it is clear that top management innovation capability (TMIC) has a total effect (a 
direct effect only) on IIC of 0.394, which is consistent with the literature (e.g. Cooper, 











Figure 6.15: The direct effect of the one causal antecedent of IIC 
From a practical perspective, top management can develop their organisation’s internal 
competencies through their product innovation strategy. The product innovation strategy 
guides the resource allocation and project selection of the company (Cooper, 2011). This 
indicates the critical role top management play in determining their organisation’s ability 
to stay competitive. This is because their decision will determine how IIC evolves in the 
company over time (Danneels, 2002; Leonard-Barton, 1992; McDermott & O’Connor, 
2002). Consequently, top management need to be capable of selecting the resources and 
projects that increase the value (i.e. competitiveness) of the IIC of the company. Teece 
(1986) recommends companies investing in internal resources that are critical to the 
product’s core technology and value proposition that are also difficult to duplicate by 
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competitors—at the same time, outsourcing complementary and supplementary resources 
that are easily duplicated. Predictive tools such as the S-Curve (Foster, 1986), industry 
phase (Abernathy & Utterback, 1978), disruptive innovation model (Christensen & 
Raynor, 2003), technological discontinuities (Anderson & Tushman, 1990), 
technological evolution (Sood & Tellis, 2005), and technology roadmapping (Phaal et al., 
2004) are useful in reducing uncertainties and project selection. Most importantly, top 
managements’ mass market vision, persistence, financial commitment, relentless pursuit 
of innovation, and IIC leverage can determine the long-term competitive advantage of 
their company (Tellis & Golder, 1996). 
6.6.2.6 Conclusion of the discussion on the interconnectedness of the determinants 
of radical product innovation 
The relationships hypothesised in the path model containing the determinants of radical 
product innovation was discussed in detail in section 6.6.2, partitioning the cause and 
effect relationships, taking one endogenous variable at a time as the effect/explained 
variable. In the previous section (section 6.6.1), each determinant of radical product 
innovation was discussed. Thus, it is argued that RQ2 has been answered 
comprehensively in this chapter. 
6.6.3 Company characteristics affecting product innovativeness 
From the multi-factor analysis of variance in section 6.5, factors of company age and 
company size are found to have a significant effect on product innovativeness in New 
Zealand food and beverage companies, whereas the factor of company ownership (fully 
New Zealand owned, partially overseas owned, and overseas majority owned) is found to 
have no significant effect on product innovativeness. A discussion on these findings, 
paying attention to the three hypotheses on the effects of company characteristics on 
radical product innovation (hypotheses H13, H14, and H15 in section 3.6.2 in Chapter 3) 
follows. 
6.6.3.1 Company age 
The company age is found to have a negative effect on the product innovativeness of New 
Zealand food and beverage companies, supporting the hypothesis (H13) that “there is a 
greater level of acceptance for product innovativeness in younger New Zealand food and 
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beverage companies than in older companies.” The practical perspective of the test result 
of H13 can be interpreted as follows. 
Younger New Zealand food and beverage companies need to introduce more innovative 
products for survival and growth, relative to their older counterparts. These young 
companies are likely to be industry entrants (e.g. start-ups) or spinoff companies from 
industry incumbents or universities as a result of their scientific research. To survive and 
thrive, these companies need to gain market share and generate revenue. One of the ways 
they can achieve this is by introducing innovative products, in order to differentiate 
themselves in their marketplace. This explanation is consistent with the literature 
(Abernathy & Utterback, 1978; Tushman & Anderson, 1986). 
Over time, as these companies achieve success in their marketplace (i.e. gain maturity), 
they introduce less innovative products. One reason is simply that they no longer need 
innovative products to succeed (they are already established). This was found to be the 
case in Company A, B, and C interviewed; during their early years these companies had 
introduced radical products; currently the three companies focus primarily on incremental 
product innovation to maintain their market share. Company D and E on the other hand 
continue to maintain same level of product innovativeness to satisfy their desire for 
growth. 
Another potential explanation of H13 test result (from a practical perspective) is that 
companies become less innovative over time due to accumulated resources and 
experience (Balasubramanian & Lee, 2008; Tushman & O’Reilly, 1996). With more 
accumulated resources and experience, it becomes more costly for companies to make 
major changes to them (Abernathy & Utterback, 1978; Balasubramanian & Lee, 2008). 
The high adjustment cost often leads to organisational inertia or core rigidities that 
inhibits companies from pursuing radical product innovation (Leonard-Barton, 1992; 
Tushman & O’Reilly, 1996). Consequently, older companies are less likely to accept 
innovative product ideas because they require too much adjustment to their accumulated 
resources and experience. 
On the contrary, Capitanio et al. (2010), Ziggers (2005), Martinez and Briz (2000), and 
Rama and Tunzelmann (2008) identify accumulated resources and good R&D experience 
as being necessary for radical food product innovation. These resources are a function of 
the company’s internal innovation capability instead of the company age. This is because 
radical product innovation often obsoletes existing internal competencies (e.g. 
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accumulated resources and R&D experience), forcing the companies to transform them. 
The companies that are unable to transform their internal competencies are said to suffer 
from age-related innovativeness deficiency. This makes this finding consistent with 
Capitanio et al. (2010), who found a weak negative relationship between company age 
and new product adoption in the Italian food industry. 
In summary, empirical data support H13 and there is a practical basis for the test results. 
6.6.3.2 Company size 
The company size is found to have a positive effect on the product innovativeness of New 
Zealand food and beverage companies, supporting the hypothesis (H14) that “larger New 
Zealand food and beverage companies are more likely to have a higher level of product 
innovativeness than smaller counterparts”. Medium to large companies are found to 
introduce more innovative products compared to micro to small companies. 
The reason why medium and large companies are more innovative than micro and small 
companies could be that large companies are more capital intensive (a plus point for 
research and development) and they have a larger customer base to work on in introducing 
new products. Another reason could be that larger companies can better respond to 
changes in macro environmental factors and forces. Today, food product development is 
becoming more complex due to increasing regulation and sophisticated consumer needs 
(Bigliardi & Galati, 2013a; Figiel & Kufel, 2016). More resources in the form of 
specialised personnel are likely needed in this situation. This is supported by the interview 
findings where a larger company (Company E) introduced a much higher number of 
radical product innovations compared to smaller companies. 
According to Rama and Tunzelmann (2008), smaller food and beverage companies may 
need to surpass a minimum company size to successfully launch new products. This is 
supported by data in the sense for 6-49 size category, the mean PI score was below 5 (5 
is “somewhat agree” while 6 is “agree”); whereas for the 50-99 size category, the mean 
score jumped above 5.25 as shown in Figure 6.9 (in section 6.5). Hence, the data suggests 
that the minimum company size for New Zealand food and beverage companies to 
successfully launch new products is 50+ full-time employees. 
Nevertheless, smaller food and beverage companies could innovate and compete with 
larger companies by building alliances with other companies. They can also seek funding 
and assistance from the New Zealand Government, Crown Research Institutes, 
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Universities, and New Zealand food innovation hubs. Moreover, smaller companies can 
become more agile, in being more responsive to changing customer needs; the smaller 
companies could use web resources (e.g. the internet) to compensate for any lack of 
specialised knowledge to remain innovative. These balancing acts notwithstanding, data 
analysis shows that the size has almost the same effect as the age on product 
innovativeness, as shown earlier using the F ratios of age and size in factorial analysis of 
variance (Table 6.11). 
In summary, the findings are consistent with the expected outcome on H14 and the 
majority of literature supports the proposition that larger food and beverage companies 
introduce more innovative products (e.g. Baregheh et al., 2012; Capitanio et al., 2010; 
Martinez & Briz, 2000; Tomas et al., 2014; Ziggers, 2005). 
6.6.3.3 Company foreign ownership 
The factor of company foreign ownership (3 levels were chosen) is found to be non-
significant, meaning that at 0.05 significance level, there is no empirical support for H15: 
“New Zealand owned food and beverage companies are more innovative than overseas 
owned companies”. This finding is similar to the finding by Siriwongwilaichat and 
Winger (2004) albeit in a different context; they found a non-significant relationship 
between ownership (foreign versus local) and product innovativeness, in Thai food 
manufacturing companies. However, in the case of the present research, the non-
significant result could be attributable to low statistical power due to not having sufficient 
data on partially New Zealand owned and overseas majority owned companies (see 
Figure 6.3). 
Based on the overseas studies by Sadowski and Sadowski-Rasters (2006) and Guadalupe 
et al. (2012), foreign companies often purchase domestic food and beverage companies 
based on their innovation performance and potential growth. The foreign companies then 
transfer superior technologies, knowledge, and organisational practices to the acquired 
companies, boosting their innovation performance. This suggests that having access to 
overseas investments can be beneficial for New Zealand food and beverage companies, 
whose resources are often limited due to the small local population. 
It is argued that foreign ownership is also not without its baggage. Foreign ownership can 
bring different values and expectations that could negatively affect the acquired 
companies. For example, company founders could leave the company after it was 
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acquired and take with them the company’s top management innovation capability. 
Similarly, the change in organisational practices could negatively affect the company’s 
entrepreneurial characteristics. Given New Zealand’s strong scientific research base and 
training and its innovative national culture, it could be that New Zealand owned 
companies are as innovative (if not more innovative) as overseas owned companies. 
In summary, the findings on H15 is inconclusive since there were not enough overseas 
owned companies to confidently reject the possibility of a false null hypothesis. It is 
suggested that having a foreign ownership or investment from overseas companies can 
be beneficial for New Zealand food and beverage companies so long as they do not 
negatively affect the determinants of radical product innovation. 
6.6.3.4 Overall conclusion on the effect of characteristics on product innovativeness 
The overall conclusion is that discussion of test results on the three research hypotheses 
on company characteristics (age, size, and type of ownership) enabled the researcher to 
answer the third research question (RQ3): “what company characteristics affect product 
innovativeness in the New Zealand food and beverage industry?”. 
It is important to note that more discussion was provided in the previous chapter 
(qualitative data analysis and discussion) on RQ3. 
6.6.4 Salient features of a highly innovative New Zealand food and beverage 
company 
There is nothing better than a theoretical model to predict and explain a phenomenon. 
The theoretical model (tested via PLSPM empirically) explains how PI is caused. Thus, 
it could be argued that a highly innovative New Zealand operated food and beverage 
company is a company that excels in TMIC, IIC, ENC, IOCC, and IPDC, although IIC 
was found to be affecting PI negatively, via ENC. This coupled with the fact that a 
theoretical model explains only part of the story (R2 values of endogenous variables were 
ranging between 0.11 to 0.39 as shown in Figure 6.5) means that additional investigations 
need to be done to discuss the salient features of highly innovative New Zealand operated 
food and beverage companies. 
For aforementioned reasons, the salient features of highly innovative New Zealand food 
and beverage companies are identified by triangulating the results from the theoretical 
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model (PLSPM), ANOVA results on company characteristics, and qualitative interview 
data analysis (Chapter 5). 
First, all the survey respondents (137 companies) are ranked according to their mean 
product innovativeness (PI) scores from highest to lowest. These respondents are then 
separated into three groups: highly innovative companies, moderately innovative 
companies, and low innovative companies. The cut off points are one standard deviation 
away from the mean of all mean PI scores (mean = 5.03, SD = 1.19). Thus, highly 
innovative companies have their mean PI scores higher than 6.22, moderately innovative 
companies have their mean PI scores between 3.84 and 6.22, and low innovative 
companies have their mean PI scores lower than 3.84. Figure 6.16 shows the distribution 
of respondents’ companies by their degree of innovativeness. Of all the respondents, there 
are 22 low innovative companies, 89 moderately innovative companies, and 26 highly 
innovative companies. 
 
Figure 6.16: Distribution of the companies by innovativeness 
Participants from four of the five companies interviewed (Company B, C, D, and E) also 
participated in the survey. Their company characteristics (age and size), mean 
determinant scores (calculated according to the mean of retained indicators) and mean PI 
scores are provided in Table 6.14 (thankfully, the respondents of the four companies that 
were interviewed provided their contact details in the quantitative survey, which enabled 























The mean PI scores for Company B and C suggest that they are low innovative 
companies, which is expected, given they have become less innovative due to their 
maturity (company age). Company E has the highest PI score (= 7, which is the maximum 
a company can score); this is an expected result given their strong research facilities. 
Interestingly, Company D, who referred to themselves as an incrementally orientated 
company, returned a moderately innovative score. This reflects the fact that they 
constantly introduce new products, driven by top management (Company D returns a 
high TMIC score). 
Table 6.14: Mean Determinant Scores, and Mean PI Scores of the Companies 
Interviewed, Along with Their Characteristics 
Company Age Size TMIC IIC ENC IOCC IPDC PI 
B 1951-2000 0-5 3.4 4.25 2 1.8 2.75 
2 
(Low) 
C 2001-present 6-49 5.4 2.5 7 3.2 1.75 
2.5 
(Low) 








Furthermore, their mean determinant scores show consistent patterns with the PLSPM 
results where they become more innovative as their determinant scores increase. The only 
outlier is the high ENC score for Company C but low PI (= 2.5). Company C appears to 
rely on their suppliers (the fieldwork suggested so), possibly for new ingredients and 
formulas, more than their own internal competencies. As a result, they would be investing 
more in their ENC at the cost of their IIC; this is reflected in their low IIC score. 
In the following sections (sections 6.6.4.1 through to 6.6.4.3), companies from each group 
of innovativeness are randomly selected, and additional qualitative data are collected 
from these companies through their publicly available administrative records, in order to 
explore their salient features. 
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6.6.4.1 Highly innovative New Zealand food and beverage companies 
Highly innovative companies are companies that return a mean PI score higher than 6.22 
(with 7 being the maximum). Based on PLSPM results, highly innovative New Zealand 
food and beverage companies will return high determinant scores. In addition, the 
ANOVA results indicate that highly innovative companies tend to be medium to large 
(50+ full-time employees) in size and young (founded since 2001) in age. Company E 
matches with all the predicted characteristics and determinant scores. 
From the additional qualitative data collected on highly innovative companies (of the 26 
highly innovative companies, only one were unidentifiable and remained anonymous), it 
was revealed that these companies have an established position in their marketplace and 
are often recognised as innovators with many innovation awards. These companies like 
to promote their products based on their originality (e.g. new-to-market technologies 
and/or value propositions) and superiority to competing products. 
Top management often play a big role as the chief innovator in smaller companies and 
their innovation capability comes from their prior experience in the industry. In larger 
companies, top management see product innovation as a competitive strategy for their 
companies. 
Highly innovative companies also have diverse internal competencies and external 
relationships. The internal competencies range from R&D facility, production facility, 
sales office, and distribution facility, for example. The external relationships in these 
companies are often in the form of alliances and partnerships with other companies both 
domestic and international. Some highly innovative companies partner with the Crown 
Research Institutes (e.g. Plant and Food Research) to develop many of the world’s first 
products. 
Lastly, highly innovative companies have both an innovative organisational culture and 
innovative product development practice. Their cultures (i.e. values, beliefs, and 
assumptions) often include relentless innovation, risk taking, and experimentation, while 
their product development practices focus on delivering innovative and superior new 
products. It is important to note that the salient features described here on highly 




6.6.4.2 Moderately innovative New Zealand food and beverage companies 
Moderately innovative companies are companies that return a mean PI score between 
3.84 and 6.22. Based on PLSPM results, moderately innovative New Zealand food and 
beverage companies will have moderately high determinant scores. In addition, the 
ANOVA results predict that these companies tend to be small to medium (6-99 full-time 
employees) in size and young-mature (founded before 2001) in age. The characteristics 
and determinant scores of Company D support these predictions. 
From the additional qualitative data collected (wherever possible), these companies have 
an established position in their market. Moderately innovative companies promote their 
new products based on their superior quality and reliability and less on originality and 
innovativeness. 
Top management in moderately innovative companies also drive innovations in both 
small and large companies. However, their role as the innovator is not as prominent and 
recognisable as in highly innovative companies. 
Most moderately innovative companies also seem to have diverse internal competencies 
and external relationships. However, they are not as sophisticated as highly innovative 
companies. Some companies also seem to rely on the Crown Research Institutes to help 
conduct R&D. 
Lastly, the moderately innovative companies appear to have some innovative 
organisational culture and innovative product development practices. Their cultures often 
include continuous innovation and process improvement, while their product 
development practices focus on delivering superior new products. Again, the reader is 
cautioned that the salient features described here on moderately innovative companies 
apply to the aggregate and that there will always be outlier organisations. 
6.6.4.3 Low innovative New Zealand food and beverage companies 
Low innovative companies are companies that return a mean PI score less than 3.84 (1 
being the minimum possible). Based on PLSPM results, low innovative New Zealand 
food and beverage companies will return low determinant scores. In addition, the 
ANOVA results predict that these companies tend to be micro (0-5 full-time employees) 
in size and young-mature (founded before 2001) in age. This is mostly consistent with 
the characteristics and determinant scores of Company B and Company C. 
266 
From the additional qualitative data collected (wherever possible), these companies have 
an established position in their marketplace. In this situation, the companies rely on 
product packaging and branding to differentiate since their products are pretty similar to 
others in the market. 
Top management in low innovative New Zealand food and beverage companies still tend 
to have a role in product development. However, their attention is on incremental product 
innovation rather than radical product innovation. 
Low innovative New Zealand food and beverage companies appear to have a limited 
range of internal competencies and external relationships. Their internal competencies 
and external relationships tend to be limited to those needed for their core products. 
Lastly, low innovative New Zealand food and beverage companies tend to have a certain 
degree of innovative organisational culture and innovative product development 
practices. Some companies do tend to promote continuous product innovation and 
process improvement, and their product development practices focus on refining and 
improving their current products. 
6.6.4.4 Conclusions on salient features of highly innovative New Zealand food and 
beverage companies 
Findings based on mean PI scores of the respondents, empirical test results on the 
hypothesised theoretical model on PI, ANOVA results on PI, and publicly available 
administrative records of companies (ones that are identifiable via the survey) were all 
triangulated to provide a more reliable discussion on RQ4: “what are the salient features 
of a highly innovative New Zealand food and beverage company?”. 
Instead of observing the results of highly innovative companies only, the results of 
moderately innovative and low innovative companies were discussed to show how highly 
innovative New Zealand food and beverage companies can be reliably distinguished from 
other companies. Thus, it is argued that RQ4 has been answered adequately in this 
chapter. 
6.7 Chapter Summary 
This chapter analysed and discussed the survey data in order to answer the four research 
questions. In total, 137 responses were used in the analysis. Table 6.15 presents a 
summary of the survey findings for each of the four research questions. The next chapter 
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concludes the research by summarising what was achieved in each research objective by 
way of answering the research questions, along with implications for future research. The 
limitations, delimitations, and assumptions are also being discussed. 
Table 6.15: Summary of Survey Findings 
Research Question Findings 
RQ1 What are the 
determinants of radical 
product innovation in the 
New Zealand food and 
beverage industry? 
The following determinants were shown to be valid and reliable 
determinants of radical product innovation (RPI). The 
determinants were validated using convergent and discriminant 
validity assessment as part of PLSPM. 
• Top management innovation capability – Top 
management play a critical role in enabling and driving 
other RPI determinants. 
• Internal innovation capability – Strong internal 
innovation capability enables a company to solve 
technical and marketing problems in RPI. 
• External networking capability – Collaboration with 
external partners allows a company to exploit or 
leverage external resources for RPI. 
• Innovative organisational culture capability – 
Innovative organisational culture allows a company to 
cope with high uncertainty created by RPI. 
• Innovative product development capability – 
Innovative product development practices increase a 
chance of successful radical product development. 
In the case of some determinants, the operational definitions had 
to be re-defined as not all measures (survey items) that were 
considered to be reflective of the constructs were found to be 
reliable and/or valid. The implications of the meaning of the 
constructs (determinants) in the light of items removed was 
exemplified and discussed. 
RQ2 How do the 
identified determinants of 
radical product innovation 
relate to one another in 
predicting and explaining 
product innovativeness? 
The theoretical model explains how the identified determinants 
relate to one another in predicting and explaining product 
innovativeness. The majority of these relationships (research 
hypotheses) in the theoretical model were supported by data 
except H3, H6, H7, and H9. Failing to show support for H3, 
H6, and H9 implies that top management innovation capability, 
internal innovation capability, and external networking 
capability do not have a direct relationship with innovative 
product development capability. Failing to show support for H7 
implies that New Zealand food and beverage companies with 
strong internal innovation capability are less likely to collaborate 
with external partners. 
The implications of hypothesis test results were discussed in 
detail (in some instances findings of the qualitative data analysis 
covered in the previous chapter were used to bolster the 
discussion) from a theoretical and practical perspective to 
comprehensively answer RQ2. 
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Research Question Findings 
RQ3 What company 
characteristics affect 
product innovativeness in 
the New Zealand food 
and beverage industry? 
Hypothesis test results (multifactor ANOVA) confirmed that the 
factors “company age” and “company size” influence product 
innovativeness in the New Zealand food and beverage industry. 
This implies that young (started in 2001 or later) and medium to 
large size (50+) companies are likely to introduce more 
innovative products than older and smaller companies because 
they have more resources and less organisational inertia. The 
factor “type of ownership” was not supported by data, and 
hypothesis test results were discussed in detail to 
comprehensively answer RQ3. 
RQ4 What are the salient 
features of a highly 
innovative New Zealand 
food and beverage 
company? 
The theoretical model on RPI phenomenon, mean scores of 
product innovativeness, ANOVA test results on company 
characteristics, qualitative data analysis findings, and 
administrative records of companies were triangulated to 
comprehensively answer RQ4. 
In brief, a highly innovative New Zealand food and beverage 
company tend to have a high degree of the five determinants of 
RPI and is young (founded since 2001) and medium to large in 
size (50+). There will always be some innovative maverick 
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CHAPTER 7 CONCLUSIONS 
7.1 Chapter Overview 
This chapter concludes the study. Section 7.2 recapitulates the basis of this study, for the 
benefit of the reader. Section 7.3 covers achievements against each research objective. 
Section 7.4 covers knowledge contributions of this study to the discipline of product 
development. Section 7.5 covers the contribution of this study to the practice of product 
development. Section 7.6 covers the limitations, delimitations, and assumptions of the 
study. Section 7.7 provides further research recommendations (directions for further 
research). Finally, section 7.8 concludes this thesis with some final thoughts. 
7.2 Recapitulating the Basis of this Research 
The food and beverage industry is an important industry in New Zealand and the 
government plans to triple food and beverage export earnings in the next 15 years. 
Although radical product innovation is an obvious solution to increase productivity 
through high value added products, many industries around the world struggle with the 
idea of radical product innovation—let alone radical food and beverage product 
innovation. Very little is known, at least in a New Zealand food and beverage industry 
setting, what causes radical product innovation. This important study was undertaken to 
fill this gap. 
This research aims to explain the radical product innovation phenomenon in the New 
Zealand food and beverage industry. Its overarching research question chosen for the 
study is: what are the determinants of radical product innovation in the New Zealand 
food and beverage industry, and how do they explain product innovativeness? This 
overarching research question was partitioned into four research questions, well informed 
by the extant literature (Chapter 2). The basis of the research objectives, as shown in the 
introduction chapter, are these four research questions, in the sense, each research 
question has a matching, specific research objective (RQ1 with objective 1, RQ2 with 
objective 2 etc.). In addition, two general objectives were also specified. 
The main focus of this chapter is to show how each objective was achieved by 
comprehensively answering each research question, and how the study makes knowledge 
contributions and practical contributions to the industry (managerial recommendations). 
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For ease of reading, the four specific research objectives (first outlined in section 1.4) are 
repeated as follows. 
 
1. To investigate the determinants of radical product innovation in the New Zealand 
food and beverage industry (how this objective was achieved by answering RQ1 
is given in section 7.3.1). 
 
2. To analyse the relationship between the determinants of radical product 
innovation and product innovativeness (how this objective was achieved by 
answering RQ2 is given in section 7.3.2). 
 
3. To identify the company characteristics that affect product innovativeness in the 
New Zealand food and beverage industry (how this objective was achieved by 
answering RQ3 is given in section 7.3.3). 
 
4. To identify the salient features of a highly innovative New Zealand food and 
beverage company (how this objective was achieved by answering RQ4 is given 
in section 7.3.4). 
 
The two general research objectives (first outlined in section 1.4) are as follows. 
 
1. To contribute new knowledge to product development discipline on the 
determinants of radical product innovation in the New Zealand food and beverage 
industry (how this objective was achieved is explained in section 7.4). 
 
2. To provide managerial recommendations to the New Zealand food and beverage 
companies on how to encourage more radical product innovation in their 




7.3 Achievements against Research Objectives 
7.3.1 Answers to research question 1 to achieve objective 1 
RQ1 What are the determinants of radical product innovation in the New 
Zealand food and beverage industry? 
In total, five determinants of radical product innovation in the New Zealand food and 
beverage industry are identified via literature. These determinants are factors that affect 
the propensity of a company to pursue radical product innovation. They were 
conceptualised based on organisational capabilities (resource-based view theory) with the 
New Zealand food and beverage industry as the context. The identified determinants were 
content-validated through qualitative interviews with five innovative New Zealand food 
and beverage companies. The validity of these determinants as theoretical constructs, 
based on the operationalisation used in this research (a quantitative survey questionnaire 
derived from the literature as shown in section 4.5.2), was tested based on survey data 
collected from 137 New Zealand food and beverage companies, using the partial least 
squares path modelling (PLSPM) modelling technique (section 6.4). 
From the five determinants, innovative organisational culture capability has the strongest 
total effect on product innovativeness at 0.561, followed by innovative product 
development capability (= 0.247), top management innovation capability (= 0.225), 
external networking capability (= 0.160), and internal innovation capability (= 0.153). 
The five determinants of radical product innovation in the New Zealand food and 
beverage industry are summarised as follows. 
 
Determinant 1 – Top management innovation capability 
Top management innovation capability (TMIC) can be nominally defined as the top 
management’s ability to manage radical product innovation in their organisation. Top 
management do not have a direct relationship with radical product innovation. Instead, 
they drive the four other determinants leading to radical product innovation. This makes 
top management innovation capability the primary antecedence of radical product 
innovation. The characteristics of this capability include: 
• Top management are highly involved with radical projects. 
• Top management provide direction to radical projects. 
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• Top management are willing to pursue radical projects. 
• Top management provide sufficient financial resources to radical projects. 
• Top management build external relationships for radical projects. 
Further details are found in section 6.6.1.1. 
 
Determinant 2 – Internal innovation capability 
Internal innovation capability (IIC) can be nominally defined as an organisation’s ability 
to develop and utilise its in-house technological and market competency for radical 
product innovation. Strong internal innovation capability enables a company to develop 
new technologies and value propositions. Examples of in-house technological 
competency are manufacturing plant and equipment, manufacturing know-how, 
engineering know-how, and quality assurance tools; and examples of in-house market 
competency are knowledge of customer needs and processes, distribution and sales 
channels, communication channels, and company/brand reputation. The characteristics of 
this capability include: 
• Having strong in-house technological competency. 
• Having strong in-house market competency. 
• Utilising in-house technological competency for radical projects. 
• Utilising in-house market competency for radical projects. 
Further details are found in section 6.6.1.2. 
 
Determinant 3 – External networking capability 
External networking capability (ENC) can be nominally defined as an organisation’s 
ability to collaborate with external partners for radical product innovation. Strong 
external networking capability enables a company to identify and access valuable 
resources controlled by key external partners for radical product innovation. The 
characteristics of this capability include: 
• Outsourcing certain competencies for radical projects. 
• Building alliances (long-term relationships) with key external partners. 
Further details are found in section 6.6.1.3. 
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Determinant 4 – Innovative organisational culture capability 
Innovative organisational culture capability (IOCC) can be nominally defined as an 
organisation’s ability to cope with high uncertainty created by radical product innovation. 
A company with an innovative organisational culture can tolerate high uncertainty and is 
more willing to accept and pursue radical product innovation. The characteristics of this 
capability include: 
• Relentless innovation. 
• Entrepreneurial orientation. 
• Learning orientation. 
• Having a clearly defined, robust, and well communicated product innovation 
strategy. 
• Having appropriate employee performance metrics. 
Further details are found in section 6.6.1.4. 
 
Determinant 5 – Innovative product development capability 
Innovative product development capability (IPDC) can be nominally defined as an 
organisation’s ability to conduct radical product development. A company with 
innovative product development practices has a better chance to successfully identify, 
develop, and commercialise radical products. The characteristics of this capability 
include: 
• A full-time project leader. 
• A multi-disciplinary team. 
• A well-structured or formal product development process. 
• An adaptable product development process that increases structure (or control) as 
the project becomes more uncertain (or risky). 




In answering RQ1, the study made inroads into the present body of literature because it 
was shown that some facets of some determinants do not properly apply to at least the 
New Zealand food and beverage context, the boundary of the study (a detailed discussion 
is provided in section 6.6.1). A good example is the construct (determinant) ENC, where 
only two of the four facets (measures, in a psychometric sense) seemed to shape the 
meaning of ENC, leading the researcher to argue that the ability to identify the key 
external partners (i.e. outsourcing) and establishing long term collaboration with them 
(i.e. alliances) may be better indicators of ENC than informal networks and customer 
collaboration. 
Since each construct was shown to be predicting and explaining in a theoretically (section 
6.4.3) and a practically meaningful way (section 6.6.2), it is concluded that the study 
answers the first research question comprehensively. 
7.3.2 Answers to research question 2 to achieve objective 2 
RQ2 How do the identified determinants of radical product innovation relate to 
one another in predicting and explaining product innovativeness? 
Stated simply, the causal predictive theoretical model involving the five determinants as 
explanatory variables and product innovativeness as the explained variable, showing 
which hypothesised relationships are significant and which are not, answers RQ2. This 
theoretical model is referred to as the final theoretical model. 
The final theoretical model of radical product innovation is presented in Figure 7.1 (the 
reader may refer to Figure 6.5 in the previous chapter for the estimated strengths of the 
relationships and their statistical significance). The model shows the interrelationships 
among the five determinants and product innovativeness (depicted as “Radical Product 
Innovation” in Figure 7.1). As mentioned earlier, the model was tested through the 
PLSPM using the quantitative survey data from 137 New Zealand food and beverage 
companies. The bold arrows represent supported relationships and dash arrows represent 
unsupported relationships. Unsupported relationships do not invalidate the researcher’s 
theory because each determinant is linked to another determinant directly or indirectly 
(i.e. via another determinant) through one or more supported relationships. The 















0.05 significance level (i.e. p < 0.05) was used to seek support for the hypotheses 
Figure 7.1: Final theoretical model 
 
H1: Top management innovation capability has a positive effect on internal 
innovation capability (supported). 
What this supported hypothesis means is that top management establish the product 
innovation strategy which guides the project selection and resource allocation leading to 
the development and utilisation of internal competencies (IIC). 
 
H2: Top management innovation capability has a positive effect on innovative 
organisational culture capability (supported). 
What this supported hypothesis means is that top management create an innovative 
organisational culture (IOCC) by demonstrating their commitment to radical projects, 
establishing a clearly defined, robust, and well communicated product innovation 
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H3: Top management innovation capability has a positive effect on innovative 
product development capability (not supported). 
The above unsupported hypothesis means that the data fail to support the hypothesis that 
TMIC has a direct relationship with IPDC. However, TMIC does affect IPDC indirectly 
through IOCC. From a practical perspective, this means that top management affect IPDC 
by establishing a formal product development process that is communicated across their 
organisation and being involved in radical projects (e.g. setting up project criteria, 
participating in gate reviews, and giving feedback). 
 
H4: Top management innovation capability has a positive effect on external 
networking capability (supported). 
What this supported hypothesis means is that top management can build relationships 
with external partners. In smaller companies, top management often are directly 
responsible for building relationships with key external partners. In larger companies, 
they accomplish this by investing in internal competencies and policies that promote 
external collaboration. 
The supported hypotheses H1, H2, and H4 clearly show the role top management play 
towards radical product innovation by building IIC, IOCC, and ENC. This justifies the 
label TMIC for the role they play. 
 
H5: Internal innovation capability has a positive effect on innovative 
organisational culture capability (supported). 
What this supported hypothesis means is that IIC enables the company to cope with high 
uncertainty by solving technical and marketing problems, thus enhancing the IOCC. 
 
H6: Internal innovation capability has a positive effect on innovative product 
development capability (not supported). 
The above unsupported hypothesis means that the data fail to support the hypothesis that 
IIC does have a direct relationship with IPDC. However, the indirect relationship through 
IOCC means that IIC plays its part in building IPDC. From a practical perspective, this 
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means that IIC assists the radical product development team by reducing uncertainty 
during radical product development, which manifests as an increase in IOCC. 
 
H7: Internal innovation capability has a positive effect on external networking 
capability (not supported because a statistically significant negative relationship 
was observed instead of a positive relationship). 
IIC was found to be negatively related to ENC in this study, contradicting the literature 
(Martinez & Briz, 2000; Siriwongwilaichat & Winger, 2004). It is proposed that the food 
and beverage companies in New Zealand could be suffering from three possible 
conditions: the not-invented-here (NIH) syndrome (prejudice against external ideas and 
innovations), a closed innovation mindset, and a high cost of collaboration (due to small 
local population and geographical isolation). However, future study is required to identify 
the cause. 
The general conclusion on the IIC → ENC relationship is that IIC can have both a positive 
effect as well as a negative effect on ENC, depending on the nature of the company being 
considered. 
 
H8: External networking capability has a positive effect on innovative 
organisational culture capability (supported). 
What this supported hypothesis means is that ENC enables the company to cope with 
high uncertainty by providing access to valuable external resources, which manifests as 
an increase in IOCC. 
 
H9: External networking capability has a positive effect on innovative product 
development capability (not supported). 
The above unsupported hypothesis means that the data fail to support the hypothesis that 
ENC does have a direct relationship with IPDC. However, ENC brings an indirect 
positive effect on IPDC via IOCC. Again, from a practical perspective, this mediating 
relationship can be interpreted as ENC assisting the radical product development team by 
reducing uncertainty during radical product development. 
279 
 
H10: Innovative organisational culture capability has a positive effect on radical 
product innovation (supported). 
What this supported hypothesis means is that IOCC makes the company more willing to 
accept and pursue radical product ideas, leading to more radical product innovation. 
 
H11: Innovative organisational culture capability has a positive effect on 
innovative product development capability (supported). 
What this supported hypothesis means is that IOCC assists the radical product 
development team in coping with high uncertainty during radical product development. 
This relationship could be bidirectional where IPDC also makes the company more 
tolerant of high uncertainty. 
 
H12: Innovative product development capability has a positive effect on radical 
product innovation (supported). 
What this supported hypothesis means is that IPDC makes the company more competent 
at radical product development, leading to more radical product innovation. 
 
Having tested and interpreted the hypothesis test results both theoretically and practically, 
it is concluded that the study answers the second research question comprehensively. 
7.3.3 Answers to research question 3 to achieve objective 3 
RQ3 What company characteristics affect product innovativeness in the New 
Zealand food and beverage industry? 
Company characteristics that could affect product innovativeness in the New Zealand 
food and beverage industry are company age, company size, and company foreign 
ownership (details in section 3.5). These company characteristics were tested through 
multi-factor ANOVA analysis using the quantitative survey data from 137 New Zealand 




H13: There is a greater level of acceptance for product innovativeness in younger 
New Zealand food and beverage companies than in older companies (supported). 
What the above supported hypothesis means is that in general, younger New Zealand 
food and beverage companies introduce more innovative products than older companies. 
It was argued that this is because younger companies are driven to introduce innovative 
products and succeed, but as they mature, they are less likely to stay innovative due to 
success and accumulated resources and experience. It is acknowledged that this argument 
cannot be tested empirically, within a cross section study such as the present study. Such 
claims need to be more robustly tested through a time series (panel) study. 
 
H14: Larger New Zealand food and beverage companies are more likely to have 
a higher level of product innovativeness than smaller counterparts (supported). 
What the above supported hypothesis means is that in general, larger New Zealand food 
and beverage companies introduce more innovative products than smaller companies. 
This is because they have more resources to conduct radical product development. The 
minimum company size to successfully launch new products as suggested by the data is 
50+ full-time employees for New Zealand food and beverage companies, as shown in 
Figure 6.9 in the previous chapter. 
 
Although H13 and H14 are supported by the data, the effects of both age and size on PI 
(radical product innovation) are not large (based on low R2 in ANOVA as well as the 
main effects plot), but the combined effect of these factors is not trivial either (R2 = 0.14 
in Table 6.11 translates to a “medium effect size” in social and behavioural sciences, as 
explained in the previous chapter). Moreover, practically speaking, both factors had the 
same effect (approximately the same sum of squares or explained variation in ANOVA 
table shown in Table 6.11 in the previous chapter) meaning that one is unlikely to be more 




H15: New Zealand owned food and beverage companies are more innovative than 
overseas owned companies (not supported). 
It was argued that failing to support the above hypothesis is probably attributable to low 
statistical power resulting from not having a sufficient number of cases in non-New 
Zealand owned companies. Thus, it is inconclusive whether or not New Zealand owned 
food and beverage companies are more innovative than overseas owned companies. 
Nevertheless, it is suggested that foreign investments can benefit New Zealand companies 
whose resources are limited so long as the foreign investments do not negatively affect 
the determinants of radical product innovation in the acquired companies. A large 
proportion of top New Zealand food and beverage companies are foreign owned. 
Although, one can speculate that these companies are innovative product-development-
wise, it could be that a sizable proportion of the top overseas food and beverage 
companies play safe by being incrementally innovative. Further research is needed in this 
area. 
 
Having tested and interpreted the test results of H13 through to H15, both theoretically 
and practically, it is concluded that the study answers the third research question 
comprehensively. 
7.3.4 Answers to research question 4 to achieve objective 4 
RQ4 What are the salient features of a highly innovative New Zealand food and 
beverage company? 
The salient features of a highly innovative New Zealand food and beverage companies 
were identified by triangulating results based on quantitative approaches and the field 
studies (qualitative data collected from 5 companies). More specifically, the final 
theoretical model explains how radical product innovation is caused (hypotheses test 
results on RQ1 and RQ2 enhanced this explanation). Analysis of mean PI scores to 
answer RQ3 enabled the study to identify highly innovative companies from the rest. 
Qualitative data analysis added richness to the study by being able to study the 
characteristics of companies that were at various levels of innovativeness (product-
development-wise). Additional qualitative data (more technically, administrative 
records) collected from highly, moderately, and low innovative companies (determined 
based on their PI scores) provided further depth to the investigation on RQ4. 
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The study found that a highly innovative New Zealand food and beverage company tends 
to score highly in the five determinants of radical product innovation. As discussed 
earlier, being young (founded since 2001) typically makes these companies very driven 
to introduce new products. Furthermore, as discussed earlier, in general, a company that 
is medium to large in size (50+ full-time employees) enables that company to successfully 
launch new products more often (based on the analysis of mean PI scores). 
Analysis of additional qualitative data seems to indicate that in general, a company is 
likely to promote their products based on their originality (innovativeness) and superiority 
over competing products. In highly innovative companies, top management were found 
to be highly involved with product development and these companies had a product 
innovation strategy that promoted innovative projects. Moreover, these companies 
seemed to have diverse and well-developed internal competencies and external 
relationships. Finally, these companies are imbued with innovative organisational 
cultures and innovative product development practices. 
It is concluded that RQ4 has been answered comprehensively. 
7.4 Knowledge Contributions to the Discipline of Product 
Development 
Three knowledge contributions are made to the discipline of product development. 
7.4.1 Meaning or operationalisation of the determinants of radical product 
innovation 
The study identified and validated five determinants of radical product innovation in 
relation to the New Zealand food and beverage industry. In doing so, the study answers 
the calls by Khan (2014) and Marsh (2004) for a greater understanding and support for 
radical product innovation in the New Zealand food and beverage industry. The study 
also uncovered some definitional changes for some determinants. ENC is a case in point. 
In the product development field, companies that are high in ENC are expected to be high 
in outsourcing, alliances, informal network activity, and customer collaboration. The 
study showed that only the first two facets (indicators) shape the meaning of ENC in the 
New Zealand food and beverage industry, based on PLSPM results. 
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7.4.2 Relationships between the determinants of radical product innovation 
The study proposed and tested a new theoretical model to explain the radical product 
innovation phenomenon, building upon the existing knowledge, based on the work of 
Chang et al. (2012) and Slater et al. (2014). Empirical data analysis (i.e. PLSPM) showed 
that the model predicts and explains how product innovativeness is caused. Whilst the 
model alone is a contribution to new knowledge, the study suggested that bidirectional 
relationships could exist between innovative organisational culture capability and 
innovative product development capability; it is acknowledged that no such bidirectional 
relationship was tested (this was not possible within a cross-sectional design and also 
PLSPM does not allow bidirectional relationships to be specified). More importantly, the 
study showed up a negative relationship between IIC and ENC, which requires further 
investigation (NIH syndrome, a closed innovation mindset, and a high cost of 
collaboration were proposed as interim reasons for this unusual finding). The empirical 
data analysis also highlighted the important mediating role IOCC plays in justifying the 
effects (to be more technically precise, total effects) of TMIC and ENC on other 
determinants (some of the paths leading out from TMIC and ENC were found to be non-
significant). 
7.4.3 Profiles or characteristics of radically innovative companies 
The study identified three company characteristics that could affect product 
innovativeness in the New Zealand food and beverage industry. Company age was found 
to have a negative relationship with PI due to accumulated resources and experience (this 
was the basis of the corresponding hypothesis), which is consistent with most findings 
conducted overseas. Company size was found to have a positive relationship with PI, 
which again is consistent with most overseas findings. Company ownership type did not 
show any relationship with PI but this finding, as mentioned earlier, is inconclusive due 
to the limited samples of overseas owned companies (fully owned and partially owned). 
Findings on the effects of company characteristics on PI being consistent with overseas 
studies does not provide anything exciting, but it is a knowledge claim because this study 
was conducted within the boundary of food and beverage companies in New Zealand. 
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7.5 Contributions to the Practice of Product Development 
Based on the overall findings of the study, five sets of managerial recommendations are 
made for food and beverage companies in New Zealand. It is possible companies in other 
industries in New Zealand could benefit from these recommendations, given the 
generalisation considerations in section 4.6. This is because companies in other industries 
in New Zealand share the same New Zealand unique contextual factors and that the food 
and beverage industry has a similar set of determinants of radical product innovation to 
other industries. Nevertheless, caution is advised when applying these recommendations 
for other companies beyond the food and beverage industry in New Zealand because 
certain determinants may be more or less important in different industrial contexts. 
Firstly, companies can use the characteristics of the five determinants of radical product 
innovation described in section 7.3.1 as a guideline to improve their product 
innovativeness performance. 
Secondly, the final theoretical model (Figure 7.1) helps a company prioritising which 
determinant to improve. Although the purpose of a theoretical model is to predict and/or 
explain a phenomenon of interest, because the explained variable (final outcome variable) 
in this study is PI, the model can be used to reliably distinguish successful radical product 
development efforts from unsuccessful radical product development efforts. Assuming 
the company already has a strong top management innovation capability, in the short 
term, the company should focus on improving their innovative organisational culture 
capability followed by innovative product development capability. This is to avoid 
organisational resistance. In the long term, the company should focus on improving their 
internal innovation capability followed by external networking capability. This is because 
these two capabilities are much more difficult to duplicate and substitute by competitors, 
leading to sustainable competitive advantage. 
Thirdly, top management need to consider how their product innovation strategy (i.e. 
project selection and resource allocation) can affect the development of their company’s 
internal competencies (i.e. in-house technological and market competency). Past studies 
show that the decisions of top management can either enhance, destroy, or stretch internal 
competencies. Consequently, top management should develop internal competencies 
according to their company’s overall business strategy and market situation to ensure they 
stay valuable for the company. In addition, top management should attempt to reduce 
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their tendency to overvalue internal innovation capability over external networking 
capability by adopting practices and processes that promote external collaboration or 
open innovation mindset. 
Fourthly, companies need to ensure that their new radical products actually contribute to 
superior product advantage in the eyes of the customers. They may also need to invest in 
educating the market, not only for their immediate customers, but also for internal 
stakeholders, external partners, and potential end consumers as well. 
Lastly, coming back to company characteristics, smaller companies can compete with 
larger companies by using their external networking capability to exploit or leverage 
external resources. Older companies can escape vagaries of a mature company—success 
traps and accumulated resources and experience—by having a product innovation 
strategy that favours radical projects and internal competency development. Bringing in 
foreign investments can also be beneficial. However, companies should be cognisant of 
the fact that foreign ownership could negatively affect the five determinants of radical 
product innovation because foreign ownership could affect the existing culture of a 
company. Attracting capital is one thing and changing the dynamics of a social entity is 
a completely different thing, which can go horribly wrong! 
7.6 Research Limitations, Delimitations, and Assumptions 
7.6.1 Limitations and delimitations 
Four research limitations are identified. 
Firstly, the theoretical model is tested only within the New Zealand food and beverage 
industry context, which is the boundary or a delimitation of this study. However, the study 
does not make a comparative assessment to gauge to what extent the New Zealand context 
differs from seemingly similar and different contexts within the food and beverage 
industry. Such a multi country study was not considered due to time, human, and financial 
resource limitations (a doctoral study is an independent study although a research 
consortium can employ doctoral researchers and other researchers to handle large scale 
projects). Consequently, the generalisability of this study to other populations remains 
unanswered. 
Secondly, how the determinants of radical product innovation lead to commercial success 
is not considered in this research. This is due to the difficulty of measuring the 
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commercial outcome of radical product innovation as it is greatly dependent on market 
timing. As a result, the identified determinants are related to radical product innovation 
as an outcome (i.e. the product is launched into the marketplace). Whether it becomes a 
commercial success or not depends on additional factors not considered in this study. For 
example, well known success factors of product innovation such as a compelling business 
case and collaboration with customers are not included as study variables. 
Thirdly, the qualitative interview design could have been improved by involving a second 
researcher to review the data during the data collection process (Brink, 1993) and having 
the participants validate the interview transcript and the final themes and concepts (Noble 
& Smith, 2015). These practices were not implemented because the qualitative interview 
phase was considered less crucial than the quantitative survey phase. 
Lastly, in regard to presenting “outsourcing” as an indicator of ENC, the behavioural 
statement “we prefer to outsource when developing new products” could have been 
rephrased as “we are willing to outsource certain competencies when developing new 
products” in the questionnaire before launching the full-blown survey. This slip was due 
to the researcher’s evolving understanding of “outsourcing” in a new product 
development context and also to a certain extent, naivety on the part of the researcher, 
who thought at the time of conducting the survey that a pilot test could pick up ill-defined 
statements. 
7.6.2 Assumptions 
It was assumed that the invitees would respond to the survey personally and that they 
would not outsource the job to a colleague! It was also assumed that the survey invitees 
(more correctly the survey respondents) understood the statements in the questionnaire 
without too much ambiguity. It was also assumed that the respondents paid enough 
attention (i.e. did not do a rushed job) to the statements in the questionnaire and that they 
would respond to the survey without prejudice. Further, it was also assumed that the 
probability of responding to the survey remains approximately the same across all 
categories of companies invited (e.g. large versus small, old versus new, foreign versus 
New Zealand owned). Clearance of data via post hoc statistical tests (e.g. Harman’s single 
factor test on common method bias) provides some confidence to the researcher that these 
assumptions are probably true. 
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7.7 Future Research Recommendations 
Five future research recommendations are proposed. 
Firstly, future research may investigate the determinants of radical product innovation in 
other contexts, within and outside the food and beverage industry to understand the true 
impact of the context of this study. The New Zealand food and beverage industry is an 
example of a successful and mature New Zealand industry. The determinants of radical 
product innovation identified in this study could be tested in other industries within New 
Zealand since they share a similar national and cultural context. This will help validate 
the findings of this research in a broader context. 
Secondly, future research may investigate how companies change their product 
development orientations as they age. As mentioned earlier, a cross-sectional study such 
as this study cannot make strong claims on causal relationships, particularly when time 
dependant variables such as age are involved. It is well known that correlational research 
has low internal validity. Researchers may consider longitudinal/panel studies to study 
how age affects radical product innovation. 
Thirdly, future research may investigate the cause of the negative relationship between 
IIC and ENC. The negative effect of IIC on ENC came as a surprise and the 
generalisability of this relationship across New Zealand remains an attractive proposition 
(NIH syndrome, a closed innovation mindset, and a high cost of collaboration were just 
tentative explanations for the negative relationship). 
Fourthly, future research may investigate how mature New Zealand food and beverage 
companies stay innovative. The interview results from Company A, B, and C suggested 
that these companies became less innovative over time due to success and accumulated 
resources and experience. Does this mean these companies can no longer conduct radical 
product innovation? How can these companies ensure they are not at risk of disruptive 
innovation? What more could we learn from companies such as Company D and E who 
have managed to stay innovative? Answers to these questions cannot only make 
contribution to academia but also to the practice of product development. For example, 
the answers could give companies a better mechanism to maintain their product 
innovativeness, theoretical model (Figure 7.1) notwithstanding! 
Lastly, future research may investigate the impact of foreign ownership on the product 
innovativeness of New Zealand food and beverage companies; this could be 
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accomplished by analysing a different probability sampling technique that provides 
adequate sample sizes across all categories of ownership. 
7.8 Final Thoughts 
A doctoral study in soft sciences can go horribly wrong for number of reasons: specifying 
unattainable goals, specifying a wrong theoretical model(s), collecting wrong data (e.g. 
bad operationalisations of constructs, biased responses), insufficient responses, wrong 
data analytic techniques, plus a myriad of controllable and uncontrollable factors. A great 
deal of care has been given to ensure that this study does not suffer from the above 
mistakes. 
In one sentence, this study can be summarised as follows. “This study provides a 
parsimonious explanation of the radical product innovation phenomenon, using the New 
Zealand food and beverage industry as a context to enable academia and the practitioner 
to better understand the phenomenon within the given context.” 
PI has been used as a marker in this study to distinguish a very high level of product 
innovativeness to very low level of product innovativeness to accommodate the fact that 
incremental to radical product innovation can be represented in a continuum. As the 
famous statistician George Box (1976) once said “all models are wrong, but some models 
are useful.” The researcher has done his best to ensure that his models belong to the 
“useful” category.  
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APPENDIX F: Multi-factor Analysis of Variance to Answer 
RQ3 Based on a Transformed Scale for Product Innovativeness 
Because the scores of product innovativeness (PI) show a certain degree of non-
normality, the multifactor analysis of variance (ANOVA) was also performed through a 
transformed scale. This appendix shows the multi-factor ANOVA results based on this 
transformed scale. 
Table H1 provides a comparison of the Anderson-Darling normality test for three data 
transformation. The data formed using the Johnson transformation is found to be normally 
distributed and as a result is used for ANOVA analysis. 
Table H1: Transformation Result Comparison 
Transformation Anderson-
Darling Value 
p Value Normal Distribution? 
(p > 0.05) 
No transformation 1.265 < 0.005 No 
Log base 10 4.174 < 0.005 No 
Box-Cox transformation (λ = 2) 0.808 0.036 No 
Johnson transformation (p = 0.05) 0.664 0.081 Yes 
 
The ANOVA result using the Johnson transformed data is provided in Table H2. 
Table H2: ANOVA Result 
Source DF Adj SS Adj MS F-Value P-Value 
  Age 3 13.300 4.4332 5.03 0.002 
  Size 3 11.577 3.8589 4.38 0.006 
  Ownership 2 1.228 0.6139 0.70 0.500 
Error 128 112.721 0.8806   
  Lack-of-Fit 16 9.708 0.6067 0.66 0.827 
  Pure Error 112 103.013 0.9198   
Total 136 132.165    
 
The ANOVA result indicates that age and size have a significant impact on the mean PI 
(p = 0.002 and p = 0.006 respectively) while ownership does not (p = 0.500). The model 
Lack-of-Fit is not significant (p = 0.827) and has R2 value of 14.71% which indicates the 
326 
three company characteristics are not good predictors of PI. This is a good indication as 
it suggests the theoretical model is a better predictor of PI. 
Next, Figure H1 presents the main effects plot comparing the effect of age, size, and 
ownership on mean PI. The company characteristics are coded as follows: Age (“2001 to 
present” = 1, “1951 – 2000” = 2, “1900 – 1950” = 3, and “before 1900” = 4); Size (“0 – 
5” = 1, “6 – 49” = 2, “50 – 99” = 3, and “99 +” = 4); and Ownership (“fully New Zealand 
owned” = 1, “partially overseas owned” = 2, and “overseas majority owned” = 3). 
 
Figure H1: Main effects plot comparing age, ownership, and size effect on mean 
product innovativeness (transformed) 
The main effects plot clearly shows younger companies having higher mean PI compared 
to older companies. This means that innovative new food and beverage products are more 
likely to be introduced by young companies. It supports the hypothesis H13 that young 
food and beverage companies are more accepting of innovative product ideas. 
Furthermore, medium to large companies are found to introduce more innovative 
products than micro to small companies. This suggests that medium to large companies 
have advantage over micro to small companies when it comes to innovative food product 
development given their number of employees. 
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Lastly, there is no clear difference regarding ownership, which suggests that nationality 
of ownership may not affect product innovativeness. Nevertheless, due to a small sample 
size of partially overseas owned and overseas majority owned companies (6 and 10 
respective), the current predictive power for one-way ANOVA is approximately 0.27. In 
other words, given the current sample size of 6 for partially overseas owned companies, 
the ANOVA test only has a 27% chance of detecting a statistically significant difference 
between the 3 group means when that difference truly exists. A minimum sample size of 
20 is required for approximate 0.80 power. Thus, it is inconclusive whether nationality of 
ownership could influence product innovativeness. 
In summary, both the ANOVA result and main effects plot support H13 and H14. 
However, H15 is inconclusive due to the small sample size of partially overseas owned 
and majority overseas owned companies. This result is consistent with the non-




Ancillary components: The supporting technologies and mechanisms used in the 
product (Golder et al., 2009). 
Auxiliary benefits: The way core value proposition is delivered to the customer 
including additional customer services and benefits (Kotler & Armstrong, 2014). 
Core technology: The central technology used in the product (Golder et al., 2009). 
Core value proposition: The fundamental reason the customer buys the product (Kotler 
& Armstrong, 2014). 
Incremental product innovation: The introduction of a new product that involves a 
new-to-company core technology and/or core value proposition. 
New technology innovation: The introduction of a new product that involves a new-to-
market core technology. 
New value proposition innovation: The introduction of a new product that involves a 
new-to-market core value proposition. 
Product innovation: “The introduction of a good or service that is new or significantly 
improved with respect to its characteristics or intended uses” (OECD & Statistical Office 
of the European Communities, 2005, p. 48). 
Product innovation process: “A disciplined and defined set of tasks, steps, and phases 
that describe the normal means by which a company repetitively converts embryonic 
ideas into saleable products or services” (Kahn et al., 2013, p. 463). 
Product innovativeness: “A measure of the potential discontinuity a product (process or 
service) can generate in the marketing and/or technological process” (Garcia & 
Calantone, 2002, p. 113). 
Radical product innovation: The introduction of a new product that involves a new-to-
market core technology and core value proposition. 
Radical product innovation determinant: The factor that affects the propensity of a 
company to pursue radical product innovation (Herrmann et al., 2007). 
Technology: “The processes by which an organisation transforms labour, capital, 
materials, and information into products and services of greater value” (Christensen, 
1997, p. xiii). 
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Value proposition: “A short, clear, simple statement of how and on what dimensions a 
product concept will deliver value to prospective customers” (Kahn et al., 2013, p. 475). 
